UTA v. DWS

UTA v. DWS

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Utah Transit Authority,

Petitioner,

v.

Department of Workforce Services, Workforce Appeals Board, and David S. Holly,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020860-CA
 

F I L E D
(October 9, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 334

 

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Original Proceeding in this Court

Attorneys: Desiree D. Peri and Kathryn H.S. Pett, Salt Lake City, for Petitioner

Michael R. Medley, Salt Lake City, and David J. Holdsworth, Sandy, for Respondents

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Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.

DAVIS, Judge:

Utah Transit Authority (UTA) appeals from a decision of the Workforce Appeals Board (the Board) granting David S. Holly unemployment benefits. We affirm.

First, UTA challenges the Board's finding that a November 2001 conversation between Holly and a coworker (the November 2001 conversation) was a private conversation. We will uphold the Board's finding if it is "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before [this] court. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Johnson v. Department of Employment Sec., 782 P.2d 965, 968 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (quotations and citations omitted). "We give deference to the [Board] on questions of fact because it stands in a superior position from which to evaluate and weigh the evidence and assess the credibility and accuracy of witnesses' recollections." Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).

Our review of the record reveals that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's finding. At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), the coworker involved in the November 2001 conversation--who was called to testify by UTA--testified that he considered the November 2001 conversation to be a "private conversation." Further, when he was specifically asked if the November 2001 conversation was a "private conversation," he responded affirmatively and stated that "it was just between the two of us." The Board's finding that the November 2001 conversation was a private conversation is "supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before [this] court." Johnson, 782 P.2d at 968 (quotations and citations omitted). Therefore, we uphold this finding.

Second, UTA argues that the Board erred in determining that the November 2001 conversation did not satisfy the culpability element of Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202(1).(1) Because this element was not satisfied, UTA could not establish that it discharged Holly for "just cause" under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(2)(a) (2001).(2) UTA does not challenge the Board's other findings of fact as part of this argument. Instead, UTA challenges the Board's application of the culpability standard, see Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(1), to its findings of fact.

"Whether an employee is terminated for 'just cause' is a mixed question of law and fact." Johnson, 782 P.2d at 968. "When we review an agency's application of the law to a particular set of facts, we give a degree of deference to the agency." Autoliv ASP, Inc. v. Department of Workforce Servs., 2001 UT App 198,¶16, 29 P.3d 7 (quotations and citations
omitted). "Accordingly, we will not disturb the Board's application of law to its factual findings unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Johnson, 782 P.2d at 968.

In its decision, the Board adopted "in full" both "the factual findings of the [ALJ] to the extent they are consistent with the Board's additional findings," and "the [ALJ]'s reasoning and conclusions of law." The ALJ made subsidiary determinations supporting its ultimate conclusion under Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202(1). The ALJ determined that the November 2001 conversation, during which Holly made the comment in question, was a "private conversation." The ALJ also determined that the coworker involved in the November 2001 conversation "did not report this matter for approximately three months[,] which tends to demonstrate that the employee was not severely offended or negatively [a]ffected by [Holly]'s conduct." In further support of this determination, the record reveals that when this coworker testified at the hearing before the ALJ, he indicated that he did not initiate the report of the November 2001 conversation and that he only reported it after being questioned about it by his supervisors.

Although the ALJ determined that the comment made by Holly in the November 2001 conversation was "clearly inappropriate" and that Holly knew the comment was inappropriate, the ALJ concluded, for the reasons set forth above, that the comment did not make Holly sufficiently culpable under Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202(1). The ALJ also concluded that UTA "could have chosen lesser forms of discipline that would have prevented future harm to the employer's rightful interests." The Board noted in its decision that UTA "may have made a wise business decision when it discharged [Holly]. However, given the limited competent evidence available to the [ALJ] and the inability of [UTA] to establish the burden required for culpability, the [Board] must adopt in full the [ALJ]'s reasoning and conclusions of law." Consequently, the Board adopted the ALJ's conclusion that "[t]he element of culpability has not been established by a preponderance of the evidence."

After reviewing the determinations made by the ALJ and the Board, as well as the record before us, we conclude that the Board's application of the culpability element to its factual findings is both "reasonable[] and rational[]." Johnson, 782 P.2d at 968. Therefore, we uphold the Board's determination that because UTA did not satisfy the culpability element of Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202(1), it did not establish "just
cause" for Holly's discharge under Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(2)(a).

Affirmed.

______________________________

James Z. Davis, Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

______________________________

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1. The culpability element of Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202(1) requires an employer to demonstrate that the discharged employee's "conduct causing the discharge [is] so serious that continuing the employment relationship would jeopardize the employer's rightful interest."

2. If an employee is discharged for "just cause," that employee "is ineligible for [unemployment] benefits." Utah Code Ann. § 35A-4-405(2)(a) (2001). "To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements must be satisfied:" "(1) Culpability"; "(2) Knowledge"; and "(3) Control." Utah Admin. Code R994-405-202(1)-(3).