State of Utah v. Champneys

State v. Champneys

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Rebecca Champneys,

Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020123-CA
 

F I L E D

(March 27, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 92

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department

The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Attorneys: David V. Finlayson and Kent R. Hart, Salt Lake City, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

Defendant Rebecca Champneys appeals from her conviction of attempted tampering with evidence. We affirm.

Champneys argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence discovered during a warrantless search of her motel room. When reviewing a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we review the factual findings for clear error, and its application of the facts to the law for correctness. See State v. Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332,¶8, 37 P.3d 260. However, given the fact intensive nature of the probable cause determination, we grant the trial court a measure of discretion. See State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). After a hearing on the motion, the trial court concluded, based on an anonymous tip that the officers had largely corroborated, that probable cause existed to believe Champneys had committed a crime. The court further concluded that the activities of Champneys and her companion, which were observed by the officers, created an exigency that necessitated entry into the motel room to preclude the possible destruction of evidence. Champneys challenges both conclusions.

"A warrantless search . . . is constitutionally permissible where probable cause and exigent circumstances are proven." Id. at 540. "Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers' knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed." Id. (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted). When probable cause is based in part on information received from an informant, we examine (1) the nature of the informant and the type of information provided; (2) whether the amount of detail provided by the informant is sufficient to support a seizure, with a focus on whether the informant personally witnessed the reported criminal behavior, or merely was reporting information provided to him by another; and (3) the police officer's efforts to corroborate the information provided. We require police officers to make a greater effort to corroborate the information when it is supplied by an anonymous informant. See Valenzuela, 2001 UT App 332 at ¶15. Exigent circumstances that would permit a warrantless entry into, and search of, a motel room will be found if the circumstances of the situation "are those that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent . . . the destruction of relevant evidence, . . . or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." Yoder, 935 P.2d at 540 n.2 (quotations and citations omitted).

Here, we have reviewed the trial court's uncontested findings and conclude that the tip, when combined with the officers corroborative efforts and independent observations, created sufficient reason to believe that a criminal offense had been or was being committed in the motel room. See id. at 540. We further conclude that the observable behavior of Champneys and her companion,(1) when viewed in light of the informant's report that the pair were possibly using or distributing drugs, was sufficient to "cause a reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent . . . the destruction of relevant evidence, . . . or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts." Id. at 540 n.2 (quotations and citations omitted). After witnessing the behavior of Champneys and her companion, the officers reasonably concluded that the pair were attempting to destroy evidence. Thus, the officers' entry into the room was justified as an effort to preclude the destruction of evidence, and the trial court properly denied Champneys's motion to suppress.

Accordingly, we affirm Champneys's conviction of attempted tampering with evidence.

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William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. The trial court found that after the officers identified themselves and asked to enter the room, a request that she could have legitimately denied, Champneys and her companion began to run around the room and hide objects behind and under the bed. The officers also observed one of the women put an object into her purse, which, based on the officer's experience and the appearance of the object, appeared to be a crack pipe. Finally, the officers also witnessed the pair make several trips into and out of the bathroom, suggesting a possible attempt to destroy evidence of drugs in the room.