State of Utah v. Beckstead

State v. Beckstead

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Melvin Scott Beckstead,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

(Not For Official Publication)
 

Case No. 20020422-CA
 

F I L E D

(April 17, 2003)
 

2003 UT App 115

 

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Sixth District, Richfield Department

The Honorable David Mower

Attorneys: Marcus Taylor, Richfield, for Appellant

Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Orme.

BENCH, Judge:

Defendant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that he possessed methamphetamine. In addition to the chemical test showing the presence of methamphetamine in his system, Defendant exhibited multiple signs of impairment due to drug use at the time he arrived at the jail. By pleading guilty to the marijuana charge, Defendant acknowledged knowing and voluntary possession of the marijuana found in his system at the same time as the methamphetamine. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989) ("The general rule . . . is that by pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all of the essential elements of the crime charged[.]"). Given this undisputed evidence, Defendant's hypothesis that his use of marijuana was knowing and voluntary but the methamphetamine entered his system only by accident, deceit, or the overbearing of others is not reasonable. See State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 786 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("'[W]here the only evidence presented against the defendant is circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.'" (citation omitted)). We thus conclude that the evidence proves his knowing and voluntary possession of methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt as a matter of law. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997) (outlining the analysis for review of findings beyond a reasonable doubt based on circumstantial evidence); Richfield City v. Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Where the facts are not in material dispute, the interpretation placed thereon . . . becomes a question of law[.]").

Defendant next contends that "no evidence was presented to prove jurisdiction." The mere presence of a controlled substance in one's system does not prove jurisdiction. See State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466, 468-70 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). However, given the conclusion above and the uncontradicted evidence,(1) a conclusion that he did not possess the methamphetamine in Utah is not reasonable. We thus conclude that the evidence proved jurisdiction in the trial court "by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 470.

Given the foregoing, we need not reach Defendant's Fifth Amendment claim relating to his post-arrest silence, and we affirm his conviction.

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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I CONCUR:

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Norman H. Jackson,

Presiding Judge

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I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. As specified above, Defendant voluntarily possessed both marijuana and methamphetamine, possessed the marijuana in Utah, had both drugs in his system at the same time in Utah, and was drug impaired when the sample showing both drugs in his system was taken.