State of Utah v. Martinez

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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Dyan Lynn Martinez,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20001063-CA

F I L E D
June 13, 2002 2002 UT App 207 -----

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Roger A. Livingston

Attorneys:
Joan C. Watt, Patrick W. Corum, and Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Thorne.

JACKSON, Presiding Judge:

Martinez appeals the trial court's order requiring her to pay restitution to the Workers' Compensation Fund (WCF) in the amount of $14,647. She challenges the sentencing court's "interpretation of the restitution statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (1999), when it ordered restitution . . . related to criminal conduct for which [she] was not convicted, did not plead guilty, and did not admit responsibility." We remand.(1)

We apply an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing an order of restitution. See State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273,¶7, 12 P.3d 110, cert. granted, 21 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001); State v. Dominguez, 1999 UT App 343,¶6, 992 P.2d 995. However, "[w]e review the trial court's interpretation of a [restitution] statute for correctness and accord no deference to its conclusions of law." State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 937 (Utah 1998).

Martinez pleaded guilty to Workers' Compensation Fraud, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109(2) (1996), which provides in part: Any person who has intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, devised any scheme or artifice to obtain workers' compensation insurance coverage, disability compensation, [or] medical benefits . . . by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises, or material omissions, and who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly communicates or causes a communication with another in furtherance of the scheme or artifice, is guilty of workers' compensation insurance fraud . . . . Id. Martinez supplemented her guilty plea with a statement of her conduct, stating: "I . . . obtained workers' compensation benefits by working under an assumed name while receiving benefits for being unemployable." (Emphasis added.)

If Martinez's admitted criminal conduct resulted in pecuniary damages to WCF, then the sentencing court correctly applied section 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) and correctly concluded that restitution is appropriate. See State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 273,¶¶3-5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam). Conversely, if Martinez's admitted criminal conduct bears no relationship to the damages suffered by WCF, then the court erroneously imposed restitution. See id. (requiring that defendant's admitted criminal conduct bear "sufficient nexus" to damages suffered by victim before court may enter restitution order). To determine whether a "sufficient nexus" exists between the defendant's admitted conduct and the claimed pecuniary damages, the sentencing court must determine that "liability is clear as a matter of law and [that] commission of the crime clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages." State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Martinez's statement ambiguously identifies the conduct that violated the Workers' Compensation Fraud statute because she does not state how her work under an assumed name obtained benefits, or exactly which benefits she "devised . . . to obtain." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-109(2). She pleaded guilty to a separate charge of attempting to distribute methamphetamine. She did not plead guilty to fraudulently obtaining medical benefits. The record is unclear whether she was not entitled to prescription coverage due to her admitted conduct in working under an assumed name and attempting to distribute methamphetamine. It thus remains unclear whether the court could hold her liable for restitution. See Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983 (requiring that commission of crime must "clearly" establish causality of pecuniary damages suffered by victim); see also Watson, 1999 UT App at ¶5 ("[The restitution statute] does not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of mind, but rather asks it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing court." (Emphasis added.)).

Further, the court's statements do not show us why Martinez's admitted conduct clearly establishes a nexus with the pecuniary damages suffered by WCF. It stated twice that the legal basis of its restitution order was the "fraudulent activities" Martinez engaged in. It also stated there was a nexus because Martinez "would not have received Oxycontin at all had she been forthright and had she not been engaging in fraudulent activities." The court reiterated that it was disingenuous for Martinez to expect payment after she had been deceitful and dishonest and that Dr. Dall "would not have prescribed the medication had he known all the circumstances." However, the court failed to explain what "fraudulent activities" it relied upon in imposing restitution, or how Martinez's statement admitted those "fraudulent activities."

The restitution order seems to rest on the assumption that although Martinez was entitled to some pain medication, she was not entitled to Oxycontin because of her "fraudulent activities." Apparently, the court based its restitution order on allegations that Martinez somehow fooled Dr. Dall into prescribing Oxycontin or excess Oxycontin. However, the State dropped the charges relating to such misrepresentation and fraud in exchange for her guilty plea. It appears that in order to create a "sufficient nexus," the court may have considered conduct beyond that which Martinez admitted.

Accordingly, "we remand this case to the trial court to conduct a restitution hearing in conformance with this opinion," State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402,¶25, 40 P.3d 1143, to identify and explain (1) the nature and extent of Martinez's admitted conduct,(2) and (2) how that conduct "clearly establishes causality of the injury or damages" suffered by WCF. State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d at 983.
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge
 
 

______________________________
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

1. In light of this ruling, we decline to address Martinez's remaining issues.

2. The sentencing court must settle this question to satisfy the first prong of the Robinson test, which requires that "liability [must be] clear as a matter of law . . . ." State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).