State of Utah, in the interest of N.D.

----ooOoo----

State of Utah, in the interest of N.D.,
a person under eighteen years of age.
______________________________

J.D.,
Appellant,

v.

State of Utah,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20000960-CA

F I L E D
June 27, 2002 2002 UT App 224 -----

Seventh District Juvenile, Price Department
The Honorable Scott N. Johansen

Attorneys:
Sharon L. Preston, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Carol L. Verdoia, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem -----

Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

Appellant J.D. appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to N.D. We affirm.

J.D. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to N.D. When challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the appellant "'must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack.'" State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106,¶11, 999 P.2d 1252 (citation omitted). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 2000), the juvenile "court may terminate all parental rights with respect to one or both parents if it finds any one" of eight different grounds, including a finding that the child was neglected or abused. Id. § 78-3a-407(2).

Here, the juvenile court determined, among other things, that N.D. was "neglected or abused." Id. The juvenile court also found that J.D. (1) previously "has had her parental rights terminated on five of her seven other children, and there is concern that [N.D.] is also in danger of severe physical neglect";(1) (2) "ha[s] a pattern of substance abuse, codependency, and severe physical neglect of [her] children"; (3) had previously fled from the State of Washington "to avoid involvement with that State's child protective services"; (4) "ha[s] a history of lack of compliance with treatment plans," including substance abuse plans and treatment plans specific to the safety and health of J.D.'s other children; and (5) "ha[s] a pattern of behavior which leads to repeated abuse and/or neglect of [her] children and [her] behavior is unlikely to change despite any services the Division [of Child and Family Services] provides."

J.D. has failed to marshal the evidence, and therefore has failed to show how the juvenile court's findings were not supported by the evidence. Further, our review of the record shows that there is ample evidence to support the juvenile court's ruling. We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to terminate J.D.'s parental rights to N.D., and that the juvenile court did not exceed its discretion.

J.D. next argues that the juvenile court improperly took judicial notice of prior adjudicative facts. Were we to assume that the juvenile court erred by taking judicial notice of these facts, such error was harmless. See State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 538 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (holding "error was harmless in light of the other evidence offered against defendants"). As stated above, our review of the record shows that the evidence supports the juvenile court's ruling. Moreover, the record shows that the juvenile court relied upon facts other than those at issue to reach its conclusion to terminate J.D.'s parental rights.

The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
 
 

______________________________
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge
 
 

______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. We note that the two children for whom J.D.'s parental rights have not been terminated have been in long-term foster care with relatives.