Heaney v. Galetka

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Anthony Dion Heaney,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Hank Galetka,
Defendant and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20000959-CA

F I L E D
May 2, 2002 2002 UT App 137 -----

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable William B. Bohling

Attorneys:
Anthony Dion Heaney, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
Mark L. Shurtleff and Sharel S. Reber, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Bench.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:

Appellant Anthony Dion Heaney appeals the district court's denial of his petition for extraordinary relief and grant of summary judgment. We affirm.

Appellant first argues the district court erred in concluding that the Interstate Corrections Compact (ICC) affords him only the restricted canteen, phone, property, library, and visitation privileges that other Utah maximum security inmates receive.(1) The ICC provides that all inmates "confined . . . pursuant to [the ICC] . . . shall be treated equally with such similar inmates of the receiving state as may be confined in the same institution." Utah Code Ann. § 77-28a-1, Art. IV(e) (1999). This provision "allow[s] authorities having daily, physical custody of a transferred inmate to determine the . . . classification" and attendant canteen, phone, property, library, and visitation "aspects of that inmate's incarceration." Glick v. Holden, 889 P.2d 1389, 1393 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). Thus, the
district court properly concluded that the ICC does not require that Utah prison officials treat Appellant differently.

Appellant argues a stipulation between Montana and the United States grants him a legal right to privileges afforded inmates in the general prison population and Utah is bound by the stipulation. We agree with the district court's conclusion that Utah is not bound by the stipulation. An inmate's classification and attendant privileges are "dependent upon actual in-state incarceration" and thus do not "fall within the ambit of protected rights" under the ICC. Jennings v. Lombardi, 70 F.3d 994, 997 (8th Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted).

Appellant next argues he has been housed improperly in a punitive environment although he did not commit a serious institutional violation. Recreation, visitation, phone, library, canteen, and programming restrictions placed upon an inmate in "protective segregation . . . who has not violated prison rules" do not violate "the Eighth Amendment['s] prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." Taylor v. Rogers, 781 F.2d 1047, 1048, 1050 (4th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (quotations and citations omitted). In the present case, extensive safety concerns necessitate housing Appellant in the most secure area of the prison, and consequently, not affording him the same privileges that inmates in the general population receive. Thus, the district court properly concluded that the Eighth Amendment was not violated.

Finally, Appellant argues his transfer to the Utah State Prison violated his right to due process. We find no basis for this claim in the facts alleged. Appellant has no right to incarceration in a particular facility. See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245, 103 S. Ct. 1741, 1745 (1983).

We accordingly affirm.
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings,
Associate Presiding Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge

1. On appeal Appellant also claims that he is being denied "court ordered" rehabilitative programming and thus has no chance of parole before his discharge date. Because this claim was not raised before the district court, we decline to address it. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996).