Gates Sr. v. Labor Comm'n

Gates Sr. v. Labor Comm'n p { margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 1px } body { font-family: "Courier", monospace; font-size: 12pt; font-weight: normal; font-style: normal }  

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Kelly Gates Sr.,

Petitioner,

v.

Labor Commission and George M. Anderson,

Respondents.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

(Not For Official Publication)

 

Case No. 20010934-CA

 

 

F I L E D

(December 19, 2002)

 

2002 UT App 428

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Original Proceeding in this Court

 

Attorneys:J. MacArthur Wright, St. George, for Petitioner

Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, and Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Respondents

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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Thorne.

THORNE, Judge:

Because the Legislature has vested the Labor Commission (the Commission) with a great deal of discretion concerning matters involving workers' compensation, we will reverse the Commission's decisions only if they are unreasonable or irrational. See McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2002 UT App 10,¶11, 41 P.3d 468. The Commission's factual findings will be affirmed so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, "in light of the whole record." Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quotations and citation omitted). So long as the findings are supported by substantial evidence, we will not overturn them "even if another conclusion from the evidence is permissible." Id. (quotations and citation omitted).

Moreover, when a party challenges the Commission's factual findings on appeal, the party must first marshal all of the evidence that might support the challenged findings and then demonstrate why, in light of this marshaled evidence, the findings are not supported. See id. The marshaling process requires the party to "'present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced . . . which supports the very findings the appellant resists.'" Neely v. Bennett, 2002 UT App 189,¶11, 51 P.3d 724 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). When faced with a challenge to factual findings that fails to comply with our marshaling requirements, "[w]e have shown no reluctance to affirm" the decisions of the Commission. Whitear, 973 P.2d at 985; see also Neely, 2002 UT App 189 at ¶11 ("In the face of an appellant's failure to properly marshal the evidence, our most likely action is summary affirmance of the challenged . . . decision.").

Here, Gates asserts several arguments on appeal, most of which focus on the Commission's factual findings. However, Gates's brief fails to "'present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced . . . [that] supports the very findings'" he now resists. Neely, 2002 UT App 189 at ¶11 (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted). Among other evidence that could have been relied upon to support the Commission's findings, Gates failed to include that (1) Anderson's pay stubs were all drawn on Gates Sr.'s corporate bank account and signed by Gates Sr.; (2) Gates Jr. never directly paid Anderson for any work done on the house; (3) the pay stubs of all of the other employees working on the construction project were also drawn on Gates Sr.'s corporate bank account and signed by Gates Sr.; (4) Gates Sr. knew Anderson's exact wage rate, while Gates Jr. could not accurately testify to that number; (5) Gates Sr. had ordered Anderson off the job due to either alcohol or drug-induced impairment; and (6) the employees all looked to Gates Sr. concerning their work schedules. In the absence of properly marshaled evidence, even though the evidence relied upon by Gates Sr. might support a different finding, we must assume that the Commission's findings are correct.

We also conclude that Gates Sr.'s sole remaining claim, that he was substantially prejudiced by the Commission's decision to substitute its own findings and conclusions for those of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), to be without merit. As succinctly stated by our supreme court, "the Commission . . . need not hold further hearings, and in its review of the record made before the Administrative Law Judge, may make its own findings on the credibility of the evidence presented." United States Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 607 P.2d 807, 811 (Utah 1980); see also Vali Convalescent & Care Inst. v. Division of Health Care Fin., 797 P.2d 438, 448 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that an administrative agency is not bound by the recommendations and findings of its hearing officer, so long as those recommendations and findings are considered as part of the record evidence). Here, the Commission examined all of the evidence presented to the ALJ, as well as the ALJ's findings and conclusion before adopting new findings of its own. This process is not at all out of the ordinary, and therefore, absent evidence that the new findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the Commission's findings and conclusion will not be reversed by this court. See United States Steel Corp., 607 P.2d at 811. Therefore, because we have concluded that the record supports the Commission's findings, we conclude that the Commission acted within its authority.

Finally, Anderson, the Respondent, argues that this appeal is frivolous and asks this court to sanction Gates Sr., in the form of attorney fees and costs, pursuant to rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. While we have the authority to sanction a party for filing a frivolous appeal, "sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions." Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In the instant case, while we have concluded that Gates Sr.'s petition for review is meritless, we cannot say that it is so frivolous as to be worthy of sanctions. We therefore deny Anderson's request.

______________________________

William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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WE CONCUR:

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Russell W. Bench, Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge