Eagar v. Eagar

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Eagar v. Eagar IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Eagar, Inc.; and L. Stanley Bell,
Plaintiffs, Counterclaim Defendants, and Appellants,

v.

James Leroy Eagar,
Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff, and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20010584-CA

F I L E D
June 6, 2002 2002 UT App 192 -----

Second District, Farmington Department
The Honorable Rodney S. Page

Attorneys:
David O. Black and Wesley C. Argyle, Salt Lake City, for Appellants
Paul M. Durham and Steve K. Gordon, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Davis, Orme, and Thorne.

ORME, Judge:

Both parties waived oral argument, and we thereafter ordered that the matter be submitted on the briefs. See Utah R. App. P. 29(b). The sole issue raised is readily resolved under settled law.

"One who seeks an award of attorney fees . . . has the burden of producing evidence to buttress the requested award." Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998). In this regard, the Utah Supreme Court has "mandated that a party seeking fees must allocate its fee request according to its underlying claims. Indeed, the party must categorize the time and fees expended for '. . . successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, . . . and . . . claims for which there is no entitlement to attorney fees.'" Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiffs did not meet their burden in this regard. On the contrary, the trial court found "that counsel seeks fees for services performed as far back as sixteen months before the complaint in this matter was filed, and further seeks reimbursement for time spent on issues that were later withdrawn by Plaintiff." Moreover a portion of the requested fees seems to be beyond the coverage of the attorney fees provision, which was limited to fees and costs incurred in "enforc[ing] this agreement."

Thus, the trial court would have been within its rights to deny the fee request outright. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 318 (Utah 1998) (noting "a trial court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether for failure to allocate"). Against that background, it is impossible to conclude the court abused its discretion in limiting the fee awarded, especially given the trial court's well-based sentiment that this case is a "monument to the gods of paper chasing and billable hours."

Affirmed. The parties shall bear their own attorney fees incurred on this appeal.
 
 

______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge
 
 

______________________________
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge

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