Haley v. Board of Pardons

Haley v. Board of Pardons Case No. 20010529-CA

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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Peter E. Haley,
Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

Utah Board of Pardons,
Respondent and Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 20010529-CA

F I L E D
(December 20, 2001)

2001 UT App 411

 

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Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick

Attorneys: 
Peter E. Haley, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
Mark L. Shurtleff and Sharel S. Reber, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Davis.

PER CURIAM:

This matter is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary affirmance because "it plainly appears that no substantial question is presented" for review. Utah R. App. P. 10(e). Appellant Peter E. Haley requests us to reverse the trial court's dismissal of his petition for extraordinary relief filed under Rule 65(B)(d)(2)(D) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Haley is not entitled to parole nor does he have a constitutional right to be released on parole before the end of his sentence. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979). Haley is currently serving three life sentences, and he faces no additional penalty for refusing to participate in sex offender treatment. The Board of Pardons has discretion whether to release Haley prior to the end of his sentence. See Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 1994).

Absent a gross and flagrant abuse of discretion, decisions of the Board are not subject to judicial review. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1999); Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 683 (Utah 1995). Haley's compliance with sex offender treatment is the kind of information the legislature intended the Board to consider when determining the risk a sex offender poses to society if released. See Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-6(1)(e) (Supp. 2001) ("[T]he department [of corrections] shall provide the results of ongoing assessment of sex offenders and objective diagnostic testing to sentencing and release authorities.").

The Board's right to rely on any factors known . . . or later adduced . . . , and the weight to be afforded such factors in deciding whether [defendant] pose[s] a societal risk, . . . are all matters within the discretion of the Board. They are precisely the kinds of issues that are not subject to judicial review under section 77-27-5(3).

Northern v. Barnes, 825 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

Haley fails to demonstrate that the Board of Pardons exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by constitutional or statutory law when it rescinded his parole date. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65(B)(d)(2)(D). Consequently, the petition fails to state a claim for relief, and the trial court properly dismissed the petition. See Lancaster v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 869 P.2d 945, 947 (Utah 1994). Accordingly, we grant the sua sponte motion and affirm the trial court's decision.

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge

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Judith M. Billings, Judge

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James Z. Davis, Judge