Taylorsville City v. FaberAnnotate this Case
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Defendant and Appellant.
(Not For Official Publication)
Case No. 20000295-CA
F I L E D
March 15, 2001 2001 UT App 91 -----
Third District, West Valley
The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg
Mahonri Faber, Murray, Appellant Pro Se
Lorenzo K. Miller and Lohra L. Miller, Taylorsville, for Appellee
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Davis.
Appellant Mahonri Faber appeals the decision of the district court after a trial de novo on appeal from the Justice Court of Taylorsville. This appeal is before the court on a sua sponte motion for summary affirmance.
"The judgment after trial de novo may not be appealed unless the court rules on the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-120 (Supp. 2000). "By enacting . . . section 78-5-120 . . . the Utah Legislature . . . specifically and intentionally limited the issues that may be appealed from a district court's judgment." State v. Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 276 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Accordingly, "absent an issue regarding the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, the decision of the district court is final and this court has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal thereof." Id. at 277.
The transcript of the trial de novo demonstrates that the district court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of (1) Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-46 (1998), pertaining to speed regulations and (2) Utah Code Ann. § 53-2-202 (1998), requiring Utah residents to obtain a Utah driver's license. Accordingly, this court determined the appeal was within its jurisdiction only insofar as it sought review of these constitutional rulings.(1) See id. (stating "appellate jurisdiction [under section 78-5-120] is limited to only those issues attacking the validity or constitutionality of an ordinance or statute"). In response to the sua sponte motion, Taylorsville City argues in support of the court's ruling that the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague. Faber has failed to make any argument challenging the district court's ruling on the constitutionality of the statutes. His challenge to the district court's ruling rejecting a claim that the prosecution was improperly initiated by citation followed by a formal information is not directed to the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance. Similarly, the claim that Faber was denied due process in the district court proceedings is not within the limited scope of an appeal from the decision following a trial de novo.
Because Faber raises no issue regarding the district court's ruling on the constitutionality of the statutes, he makes no argument that is within the scope of this court's appellate review, and the decision of the district court is final under section 78-5-120.
We affirm the judgment and
Norman H. Jackson,
Associate Presiding Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge
James Z. Davis, Judge
1. This decision is not intended to either preclude or authorize filing of a petition seeking post-conviction relief under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110 (1996) as a means to review claims not within our appellate jurisdiction under section 78-5-120.