Thornock v. Christensen

----ooOoo----

Reed Thornock, individually
and as guardian for
his minor daughter, Hanna Thornock,
and as personal representative for
the estate of Debra Thornock,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Daniel D. Christensen, M.D.;
Wyeth-Ayerst Research,
a division of Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc.;
University of Utah Medical Center;
and State of Utah,
Defendants and Appellees.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 981474-CA

F I L E D
February 3, 2000
  2000 UT App 014 -----

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson

Attorneys:
James R. Hasenyager, Ogden, and Peter W. Summerill, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Elliott J. Williams, Kurt M. Frankenburg, J. Anthony Eyre, Terence L. Rooney, and David G. Williams, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

-----

Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Wilkins.(1)

BILLINGS, Judge:

Reed Thornock appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint against Dr. Daniel D. Christensen, a psychiatrist, Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., and the University of Utah Medical Center (Appellees). Thornock's wife was killed and his daughter seriously injured when the car of Richard Dunn struck Thornock's car in Logan Canyon. At the time of the accident, Dunn was Dr. Christensen's psychiatric patient and was also enrolled in a study supervised by Dr. Christensen to investigate a drug manufactured by Wyeth. Thornock's complaint alleges that Dr. Christensen negligently failed to hospitalize Dunn when Dunn was enrolled in the investigational drug study, and that Christensen's breach of duty caused the accident.(2)

To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must show, as a threshold matter, that the defendant owed him a duty. SeeFerree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989). In Utah, one has no duty to protect others from harm by a third party unless one has a special relationship to the third party or to a reasonably identifiable victim. See Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 419-20 (Utah 1998); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 236-37 (Utah 1993); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1159-60 (Utah 1991). Wilson, Higgins, and Rollins recognize that therapists and mental health institutions have a special relationship with--and thus a duty to protect--potential victims only when they know or should know(3) that a third person presents a "likely danger to an individual or distinct group of individuals." Wilson, 969 P.2d at 420 (citing Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240).

In Rollins, the court found that the State Mental Hospital owed no duty to a motor vehicle accident victim who died after being struck in a head-on collision by an escaped inmate. See Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162. The victim "was simply a member of the public, no more distinguishable to the hospital than to any other person. . . . [The escaped patient] had not set himself apart in terms of dangerousness to [the victim] personally or to any distinct group of which [the victim] was a member. Therefore, the hospital owed no duty to [the victim]." Id.

In the instant case, as in Rollins, Appellant's wife and daughter were not victims who reasonably could have been identified by Appellees. Dunn did not set himself apart in terms of dangerousness to them any more than he did to other users of public roads. We conclude that this case is indistinguishable from Rollins and hold that Appellees had no duty to protect Appellant's wife and daughter from Dunn.

We decline Appellant's invitation to distinguish this case from Wilson, Higgins, or Rollins based upon the distinction that Appellees were also engaged in an investigational drug study rather than solely in the standard diagnosis, treatment, and cure of an illness. We conclude this factual distinction is legally irrelevant. Accordingly, we hold that Appellees had no duty to the Thornocks, and affirm the trial court's dismissal of Thornock's complaint.
 
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge -----

I CONCUR:
 
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge -----

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
 
 
 

______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge

1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments in this case and participated in its resolution prior to his swearing-in as a member of the Utah Supreme Court.

2. The theory of recovery against the University of Utah Medical Center and Wyeth Laboratories is largely derivative of the claim against Dr. Christensen. We need not reach these claims as our holding precludes liability against all defendants.

3. In Wilson, the court acknowledged that Utah case law imposes a broader duty upon therapists than Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) (1996). See Wilson, 969 P.2d at 420. Under the statute, therapists have a duty only when they have actual knowledge of a threat: A therapist has no duty to warn or take precautions to provide protection from any violent behavior of his client or patient, except when that client or patient communicated to the therapist an actual threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14a-102(1) (1996). Under our case law, a therapist also has a duty when he "should have known" of a threat. Wilson, 969 P.2d at 420. In the present case, there is clearly no duty under the statute because no threat was communicated against an identifiable victim.