Owens v. Young

----ooOoo----

Robert J. Owens,
Petitioner, Appellee, and Cross-appellant,

v.

Cindy Lou Young,
Respondent, Appellant, and Cross-appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 981291-CA

F I L E D
February 10, 2000
  2000 UT App 034 -----

Third District, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable William B. Bohling

Attorneys:
Delano S. Findlay, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Bench, Jackson, and Wilkins.(1)

WILKINS, Judge:

Cindy Lou Young (appellant) contends the trial court erred by refusing to impose sanctions under Rule 11 and by awarding Robert J. Owens (appellee) $2,000 for the loss of his work trailer and its contents. Owens cross-appeals arguing the trial court abused its discretion by: (1) awarding Owens inadequate damages for the loss of his work trailer and its contents; and (2) awarding Young $4,500 in attorney fees. Owens also contends the trial court erred in refusing to award interest on the MasterCard judgment. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.(2)

1. RULE 11

Young argues the trial court erred by refusing to award her attorney fees as a sanction under Rule 11. When reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 determination, we review its factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and its conclusion that Rule 11 was or was not violated for correctness. SeeBarnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992).

In this case, Owens stated he honestly believed that funds were garnished from his bank account and used to satisfy the Nordstrom judgment. Owens also claimed that because his bank records were transferred to another state, he was unable to provide proof that he paid the Nordstrom account. Apparently, the trial court found Owens's attorney made a reasonable inquiry into these facts before pursuing the claim against Young because it rejected her contention that Owens had obtained a wrongful judgment and concluded that Rule 11 sanctions were unwarranted. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 n.6 (Utah 1991) (stating we "uphold[] the trial court even if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings"). This determination was clearly within the legitimate exercise of the trial court's discretion. See Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988). Accordingly we affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue. Furthermore, because the trial court did not find Owens asserted a bad faith claim, we refuse to award Young attorney fees under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996). See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 317 (Utah 1998).

2. DAMAGES

Young also challenges the trial court's award of $2,000 in damages to Owens for the loss of his work trailer and its contents. More specifically, Young contends she cannot be held liable for the disappearance and loss of these items. However, Young's brief on appeal contains little analysis on this point. There is almost no reference to legal authority in support of her contention, and no citation to the record. It is well established that an appellate court will decline to consider an argument that a party has failed to adequately brief. SeeCarrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 944 P.2d 346, 354 (Utah 1997). Consequently, we decline to address Young's argument on this issue.

3. ADEQUACY OF DAMAGES

Owens cross-appeals arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding Owens inadequate damages for the loss of his work trailer and its contents. We disagree.

The adequacy of damages is a factual question reviewed for clear error, see In Re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 981 (Utah 1996), and we must affirm the award if there is evidence in the record to support it. See Cowen & Co. v. Atlas Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109, 115 (Utah 1984). In this case, the parties disputed the value of the work trailer and its contents. Owens argued the minimum value of the equipment was $3,500; Young claimed the value was much less. In fact, the trial court acknowledged the difficulty in assigning a value to the equipment. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that Owens was entitled to $2,000 in damages for the loss of his equipment. Because the trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining the amount of damages and Owens has failed to show the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the equipment at $2,000, see O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), we affirm the trial court's award.

4. ATTORNEY FEES

Owens also argues that the trial court's factual findings do not adequately support its award of $4,500 in attorney fees to Young. We agree.

A trial court has the power to award attorney fees in divorce proceedings pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1998). However, the decision to make such an award must be based on sufficient findings addressing "the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested fees." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The failure to consider any of the enumerated factors is grounds for reversal on the fee issue. See Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

In its amended judgment, the trial court simply ordered Owens to pay Young "$4,500 for her attorney'[s] fees and costs" without further justification. Although the record reveals the trial court briefly considered the reasonableness of the fee, it made no findings regarding either Young's ability to pay her own attorney fees or Owens's ability to pay her fees. The absence of these findings prevents a meaningful review of the trial court's ruling. See Bell, 810 P.2d at 494. Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to reconsider Young's request for attorney fees and to make the required findings in support of its determination.

5. INTEREST

Finally, Owens cross-appeals the trial court's refusal to award pre-judgment and post-judgment interest. In this case, there was evidence that Owens was in arrears in his child support obligation thus entitling Young to interest on those past due amounts. See McReynolds v. McReynolds, 787 P.2d 530, 533-34 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Apparently, the trial court took this into consideration in denying Owens's request for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest because it stated that it was "attempting to give consideration toward equalizing the claims of the respective parties." This determination appears to be well within the equitable discretion of the trial court and should not be disturbed. See Hamilton v. Regan, 938 P.2d 282, 284 (Utah 1997) ("The common practice in Utah's trial courts has long been to exercise equitable powers in . . . family law cases."); Despain v. Despain, 610 P.2d 1303, 1305-06 (Utah 1980) (stating trial judge in domestic matters has considerable latitude in exercising equitable powers to fashion remedy which best serves parties). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision on this ground.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Norman H. Jackson, Judge

1. Utah Supreme Court Justice Michael J. Wilkins sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-9.5 (1996); Utah Code Jud. Admin. R3-108(3).

2. We have carefully considered and deny Young's motion to strike portions of Owen's reply brief. However, this court has exercised its discretion in reviewing that material.