State of Utah v. Maul

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State v. Maul. Filed February 7, 2000 IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Jeremiah Maul,
Defendant and Appellant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990195-CA

F I L E D
February 17, 2000
  2000 UT App 40 -----

Sixth District, Manti Department
The Honorable K.L. McIff

Attorneys:
Margaret P. Lindsay, Provo, and Randy S. Kester, Springville, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee

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Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Wilkins.(1)

DAVIS, Judge:

Defendant Jeremiah Maul appeals the trial court's denial of his Motion for a New Trial, made pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court "has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for a new trial." State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, ¶5, 984 P.2d 975. We will not disturb the trial court's ruling absent an abuse of that discretion.

Defendant first argues "that he was denied his right to a fair and impartial jury by Juror Christine Christensen's failure to advise the trial court of her relationship with several key witnesses during jury selection and voir dire." During voir dire, the trial court explained to the potential jurors the types of relationships with the witnesses, attorneys, victim, or defendant, it wanted the jurors to disclose: I'm going to ask now about more general relationships. Before I do, I need to draw a distinction between acquaintanceships and close relationships.
We live in a small area. It's not uncommon that you would know everyone in the town where you live and maybe everyone in the end of the county where you live and maybe many people throughout the county. I'm not concerned about general acquaintanceships, because those are just so common that we all live with those every day and adjust to them. I am concerned about close relationships that could compromise your ability to be fair. Defendant argues that the relationship between Christensen and Angela and Mary Goode "goes beyond the casual nature found by the trial court after trial." However, as the State correctly notes, defendant has failed to properly challenge this finding. "When challenging a trial court's findings, '[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the evidence," thus making them "clearly erroneous."'" Young v. Young, 1999 UT 38, ¶15, 979 P.2d 338 (citations omitted). Because defendant failed to meet his marshaling burden, we assume the trial court's finding was supported by adequate evidence. See Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 233 (Utah 1998).

Defendant also maintains that a new trial should have been granted because juror Christensen failed "to disclose even the casual nature of her relationship with the Nielson's [sic] and more particularly with Mary and Angela Goode." Defendant argues that this nondisclosure "stripped Maul and his counsel of the ability to engage in an informed exercise of the peremptory challenge." For this argument to succeed, however, defendant must have objected to the trial court's characterization of the relationships the jurors were required to reveal. Defense counsel did not object to the type of disclosure, or nondisclosure, the trial court sought; therefore, he cannot now complain on appeal that Christine Christensen failed to disclose the "casual" relationship between herself and the witnesses. See State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988) (holding "failure to . . . object to the trial court's failure to cover . . . issue constitutes waiver and bars inquiry into th[at] . . . question").

Accordingly, because defendant neither objected to the way the trial court conducted voir dire nor properly challenged the trial court's finding of fact that only a casual relationship existed between Christensen and Angela and Mary Goode, we affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's Motion for a New Trial.
 
 
 

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James Z. Davis, Judge ----- WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge

1. Justice Wilkins heard the arguments in this case and participated in its resolution prior to his swearing-in as a member of the Utah Supreme Court.

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