State of Utah, in the interest of J.E.L.

----ooOoo----

State of Utah, in the interest of J.E.L.,
a person under eighteen years of age.
______________________________

J.E.L.,
Appellant,

v.

State of Utah,
Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990533-CA

F I L E D
April 27, 2000
  2000 UT App 119 -----

Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Robert S. Yeates

Attorneys:
Sam N. Pappas, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and J. Frederic Voros, Jr., Salt Lake City, for Appellee

-----

Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Orme.

DAVIS, Judge:

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(ix) (Supp. 1999) specifies that a person who violates that section is, "upon conviction," subject to an enhancement in penalty if the act is committed within 1,000 feet of a school. On the other hand, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-117(2) (Supp. 1999) makes it clear that an adjudication by a juvenile court is not considered a conviction of a crime. "The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purposes the statute was meant to achieve, and the best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain meaning of the statute." Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 139 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

The plain meaning of these statutes, in effect at the time of sentencing, is that an adjudication by a juvenile court simply does not equate to a criminal conviction. Thus, in denying J.E.L.'s motion to strike the enhancement language from the State's petition, the court erroneously ruled: "[A]n adjudication in the Juvenile Court is tantamount to a conviction in the [c]riminal [c]ourt [and,] for the purposes of applying enhanced penalties under the [C]ontrolled [S]ubstances [A]ct." This notwithstanding, and even though the trial court may not have been under any statutory obligation in imposing sentence to view the delinquent act in issue as more akin to a second than a third degree felony, it was appropriate for the court to consult the drug penalty statute to ascertain the appropriate juvenile disposition. Because there is no reason why the sentence imposed by the court would not be the same in either case, the error is harmless.(1)
 
 
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge -----

I CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge -----

ORME, Judge (dissenting):

I agree that, before the recent amendment, a juvenile court adjudication could not be equated with a conviction for purposes of enhancing a sentence. I agree the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. I agree that the trial court, in the exercise of its broad sentencing discretion, would be entirely free to consider the relative severity of the juvenile's misdeed and could do so by considering what offense this would have been if perpetrated by an adult. I agree that if the court had done so here--as a matter of discretion rather than misinterpretation of the law--and thereupon imposed a stiffer sentence than it otherwise would have done, affirmance would be in order.

From all that appears, however, the trial court in this case did not consider the relative severity of offense for an adult because that seemed like a good idea in the course of the exercise of its broad discretion. Rather, it did so because it considered itself legally required to do so. It is pure speculation to assume the trial court would have considered the severity of J.E.L.'s offense had he been an adult, and to what extent, if it had realized the statute, properly interpreted, did not constrain it to do so.

Thus, having identified the legal mistake under which the trial court operated, I would simply remand to permit the trial court the opportunity to resentence appellant with the knowledge it was not bound to equate its adjudication with a criminal conviction. The main opinion goes beyond recognizing that the trial court would have been free to consider the relative severity of the equivalent adult offense at its discretion--a concept with which I readily agree--and basically holds that the trial court would have abused its discretion had it not considered that matter and, moreover, would have abused its discretion had it not imposed a stiffer sentence than it otherwise was inclined to do. Only in that way can the trial court's legal error be characterized as harmless.

I dissent because I believe broad discretion in sentencing--albeit discretion untainted by legal error--is the prerogative of the juvenile court rather than of this court.
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

1. Section 78-3a-117 has recently been amended to hereafter equate adjudications and convictions "for the purposes of determining the level of offense for which a juvenile may be charged and enhancing the level of an offense in the juvenile court." Utah Legislature, 2000 General Session, S.B. 149 (signed March 10, 2000).