Garza v. Barela

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Olivia C. Garza, et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,

v.

Eddie Mack Barela and Delphina Barela,
Defendants and Appellants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990006-CA

F I L E D
April 27, 2000
  2000 UT App 111 -----

First District, Brigham City Department
The Honorable Ben H. Hadfield

Attorneys:
Joseph W. O'Keefe, Ogden, for Appellants
Jack H. Molgard, Brigham City, for Appellees

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Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Orme.

GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge:

The Barelas appeal from the trial court's final judgment awarding appellees specific performance of an oral contract for sale of a home. We affirm.

Generally, "[w]hether a contract exists between parties is a question of law; therefore, we review the trial court's conclusion of law under a correction of error standard." Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. v. Quintek, 834 P.2d 582, 583 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). However, when the existence of a contract involves material disputes of fact, the determination of whether a contract exists involves both questions of law and fact. See Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The trial court's "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

Ordinarily, a contract for the sale of land is within the statute of frauds and is unenforceable unless in writing. See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1998). However, "[u]nder the statute of frauds, an otherwise invalid agreement may be enforced through a court's equitable prerogatives if a party, relying on the oral agreement, partially performs its contractual obligations." Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 801 (Utah 1998); see also Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-8 (1998) ("Nothing in this chapter contained shall be construed to abridge the powers of courts to compel the specific performance of agreements in case of part performance thereof."). Partial performance of an oral contract can only result in enforcement of the contract if "(1) the oral contract and its terms are clear and definite, (2) the acts done in performing the contract are equally clear and definite, and (3) the acts are in substantial reliance on the oral contract." Jenkins, 962 P.2d at 801; see Martin v. Scholl, 678 P.2d 274, 275 (Utah 1983).

In this case, the trial court awarded appellees specific performance of the oral contract, finding that the contract terms were clear and definite, and that appellees made monthly payments and repairs on the house in reliance on the oral contract. The trial court's findings are supported by the evidence.

Several witnesses testified regarding the terms of the oral contract, explaining that the Barelas agreed to sell the house to appellees for $1,000 down and monthly payments of $265 for ten years. The only piece of evidence that the Barelas argue demonstrates different terms is Exhibit 10, a document indicating that "the deal we made is 31,000 plus a thousand dollars down." This evidence also supports the trial court's findings in that monthly payments of $265 for ten years total $31,800, almost the exact amount listed in Exhibit 10.

Evidence was presented at trial indicating that appellees paid the Barelas $1,000 before moving into the house and made monthly payments of $265 thereafter. Each of the monthly payments presented to the Barelas included the notation "house payment." The Barelas endorsed and deposited each of the checks, never commenting on the "house payment" notation. In addition, appellees reimbursed the Barelas for property taxes each year after 1987. Further, the Barelas did not claim the income received from appellees as rental income on their 1994 and 1995 tax returns. As such, the trial court's determination that the terms of the oral sales contract were clear and definite was supported by the evidence presented at trial.

The trial court's determination that appellees' acts of partial performance were in reliance on a contract for sale of the house is also supported by the evidence. Appellees consistently paid amounts due for the house. Further, appellees made extensive repairs to the home that were inconsistent with a rental relationship. Appellees did not ask for the Barelas' permission before doing this work, nor did they bill the Barelas for the cost of materials or labor.

Finally, we note that the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Mr. Barela was a party to the contract and was therefore bound by its terms. Mr. Barela signed both the receipt for the $1,000 down payment and the document indicating the parties had a "deal" regarding the house. In addition, Mr. Barela endorsed and cashed several of the checks containing the "house payment" notation. Finally, the trial court was presented with the testimony of several witnesses indicating that, although Mrs. Barela did most of the talking for the couple, Mr. Barela was present during relevant conversations and was party to the contract for sale of the house.

In conclusion, the trial court's factual findings are supported by the evidence. The terms of the oral sales contract between the parties were clear and definite. Further, appellees' actions in making all required payments and in making substantial improvements on the house and property were made in reliance on the sales contract. Accordingly, we affirm.
 
 
 

______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge -----

WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge
 
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge