Brookside v. Sporl

----ooOoo----

Brookside Mobile Home Park,
a Utah limited partnership
dba Brookside Mobile Home Park,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-appellee,

v.

Douglas M. Sporl,
Geraldine M. Sporl,
and Ronald L. Sporl,
Defendants, Appellees,
and Cross-appellants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Case No. 990205-CA

F I L E D
June 29, 2000
  2000 UT App 195 -----

Third District, Murray Department
The Honorable Michael K. Burton

Attorneys:
Andrea Nuffer Godfrey and Dennis K. Poole, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Douglas M. Sporl and Geraldine M. Sporl, Kearns, and Ronald L. Sporl, Laughlin, Nevada, Appellees Pro Se -----

Before Judges Greenwood, Billings, and Orme.

ORME, Judge:

We have determined that "[t]he facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).

The trial court was obviously exasperated by the lengths Brookside went to and the expense it incurred in vindicating its legal rights against the Sporls. Perhaps the trial court, perceiving that Brookside had gone overboard, believed it was justified in requiring each party to bear its own costs and attorney fees. While the court's frustration may be understandable, its conclusion was erroneous.

The trial court was not at liberty to ignore the contractual agreement between the parties. It was not within the trial court's discretion to flatly deny an award of attorney fees when fees were provided for in the contract. See Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 809-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 837 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("Since the right is contractual, the court does not possess the same equitable discretion to deny attorney's fees that it has when fashioning equitable remedies[.]").

Trial courts can disregard such contractual attorney fee provisions only in very unique circumstances, none of which are present in this case. See, e.g., Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah 1992) (disallowing attorney fees despite contractual agreement when need for litigation due to prevailing party's error); Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, 610 (Utah 1976) (finding it inequitable to award attorney fees when defendant had already forfeited over twelve thousand dollars in payments to plaintiff).

Therefore, we must reverse the trial court's decision not to award fees and remand for a determination of the attorney fees Brookside reasonably incurred in obtaining "'the successful vindication of contractual rights within the terms of [the] agreement.'" Stacey Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1084 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citation omitted; alteration in original), cert. denied, 779 P.2d 688 (Utah 1989). That being said, we note that while the trial court lacked the discretion to award Brookside no attorney fees, it enjoys considerable discretion in fixing the amount of a reasonable fee, see Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988), and may award considerably less than requested so long as the reduction is supported by adequate findings. See Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 266 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517-18 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

In Utah, attorney fees authorized by contract are awardable only to the extent permitted by the contract. See Dixie, 764 P.2d at 988; Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Here, the contract limits fees to those incurred in enforcing the agreement between the parties or the rules of the trailer park. Brookside was only partially successful, and its fees should be limited accordingly. See Wixen, 766 P.2d at 1085. And to the extent the time and effort expended by Brookside's attorneys was excessive, the trial court may make an appropriate reduction. See Dixie, 764 P.2d at 989.

Accordingly, we remand the case to the trial court to award Brookside the reasonable attorney fees to which it is contractually entitled.
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge
 
 
 
 
 

______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge