City of Orem v. Price

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

City of Orem,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Sarah Jude Price,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 971234-CA

F I L E D
(November 19, 1998)
-----

Fourth District, Orem Department
The Honorable John C. Backlund

Attorneys: Randy M. Lish, Orem, for Appellant
Robert J. Church, Orem, for Appellee

----- Before Judges Davis, Bench, and Greenwood.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Sarah Jude Price appeals from her conviction of retail theft, a class B misdemeanor.

"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence or [this court] otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1998)(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). "Upon review, we accord deference to the trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor." Id. at 787; see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 1994) (stating an appellate court will defer to the trial court's advantaged position in assessing the credibility of witnesses).

It was undisputed that Price left a tent sale at the Orem Wal-Mart without paying for items in her backpack. The Wal-Mart security officer testified he approached Price at a point fifty feet from the tent and she was not returning to the main store. Price testified she was, in fact, returning to the main store and denied she intended to leave the Wal-Mart premises without paying for the items. Thus, it was necessary for the trial court to resolve conflicting testimony. Price contends the trial court erred because it would have found her guilty only if the court "completely discounted" her testimony regarding her intent to pay for the items, and "relied completely" on the testimony of the security officer.

Giving due regard to the trial court's advantaged position in evaluating the credibility of witnesses, we conclude the trial court did not err in discounting Price's testimony, particularly given the undisputed evidence that she left the tent without paying for items that were concealed in her backpack and was approached by the officer fifty feet from the tent when she was apparently not returning to the main store. The inference to be drawn from this objective evidence is that Price's statement of her intent to return to the main store to pay for the items was not credible.

Under the circumstances of this case, the verdict was not contrary to the clear weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
 

______________________________
James Z. Davis, Presiding Judge
 

______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
 

______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge