Imperial Mobile Home Park v. Kelsch et al

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Imperial Mobile Home Park, L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

Michael Kelsch, personal representative to the estate of LaRue Griffin, deceased; Ruth Williamson; and John Does 1-10,
Defendants and Appellant.
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Michael Kelsch, personal representative to the estate of LaRue Griffin, deceased; Ruth Williamson; and John Does 1-10,
Counter-claimants and Appellant,

v.

Imperial Mobile Home Park, L.L.C.; Patton Kawan and Janet Kawan dba Imperial Mobile Home Park; Scott A. Madsen; Ron Clark; and Does 1-10,
Counter-defendants,
Appellees, and Third- party Defendants.

Case No. 971591-CA

F I L E D
(November 27, 1998)
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Fourth District, Orem Department
The Honorable John C. Backlund

Attorneys:
Chris D. Greenwood and James K. Haslam, Provo, for Appellant
James R. Boud, Murray, for Appellees
 

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Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Orme.

ORME, Judge:

"[A] challenge to a summary judgment presents for review only conclusions of law because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment do not resolve factual disputes." Schurtz v. BMW of North America, Inc., 814 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Utah 1991). "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we accord no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law and review them for correctness." Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997).

Although it renders restrictions "purporting to prevent or unreasonably limit the sale of a mobile home . . . void and unenforceable," the Utah Mobile Home Park Residency Act (MHPRA), Utah Code Ann. 57-16-1 to -15.1 (1994 & Supp. 1998), expressly permits mobile home parks to "require that a mobile home be removed from the park upon sale if . . . the mobile home does not meet minimum size specifications." Utah Code Ann. 57-16-4(4) & (7)(a) (Supp. 1998). Accordingly, we reject appellant's claim that appellee lacked statutory authority to enforce its minimum size requirements.(1)

Similarly, we reject appellant's claim that appellee established the park's minimum size requirements in an unconscionable manner, as proscribed by the MHPRA. See Utah Code Ann. 57-16-7 (1)(a) (Supp. 1998). There is simply no evidence demonstrating that appellee unconscionably changed the minimum size specifications, a conclusion that would be difficult in light of the statutory grant of authority to make such changes and the fact that this requirement applies only upon sale and merely reduces, rather than eliminates, the home's sale value. Moreover, even in the doubtful event that the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. 13-11-1 to -23 (1996 & Supp. 1998) (UCSPA) applies to this dispute, there is no evidence indicating appellee engaged in an "unconscionable act or practice by a supplier" under section 13-11-5(1) of UCSPA. Appellant fails to show the gross bargaining power inequality or oppressive contractual terms necessary to establish unconscionability. See generally Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 1017 (Utah 1991) (plurality opinion).

Consequently, the trial court also correctly granted summary judgement in appellee's favor on appellant's claim of intentional interference with economic relations. Parties are not liable for intentional interference with economic relations unless they act with an improper purpose or by improper means. See Pratt v. Prodata, Inc., 885 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1994); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). The only improper purpose or means claimed by appellant is appellee's alleged violations of the MHPRA and UCSPA. As shown above, appellee did not violate either of these statutes and, therefore, appellee did not act with the improper purpose or means necessary to establish intentional interference with economic relations.

In addition to not being unconscionable under the MHRPA and the UCSPA, appellee's actions were not violative of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. "[T]here is no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a party is simply exercising its contractual rights." Howe v. Professional Manivest, Inc., 829 P.2d 160, 163 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992).

Even assuming appellant and appellee are involved in a contractual relationship to which the covenant of good faith and fair dealing attaches, we hold that appellee did not violate the covenant. The lease entered by Mrs. Griffin provided both that appellee could reject subtenants and assignees, and that appellee could change the rules governing the park. Hence, permission to rent a nonconforming home to subtenants was not an entitlement under the contract that appellant could justifiably expect.

Based on our disposition of his other claims, we need not reach appellant's claims regarding the existence of a lease between appellee and the estate or the parties' contentions regarding mitigation of damages. Assuming a leasehold relationship existed between appellee and the estate, there was no lease violation by appellee. Similarly, because we find no liability on appellee's part, whether appellant mitigated his damages is irrelevant.

Finally, we reject appellant's claim that the trial court erroneously required him to produce evidence. To the contrary, the trial court correctly required appellant to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial once appellee had met its initial burden. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); TS 1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Appellant failed to meet this burden and, based on the analysis above, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Affirmed.
 

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Gregory K. Orme, Judge

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WE CONCUR:
 

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Judith M. Billings, Judge
 

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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

1. In arriving at this conclusion, we need not, as appellant urges us to do, explore the legislative history and policy concerns underlying the MHPRA. "Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations." World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994).