State of Utah v. Pooler
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Lance Allan Pooler,
Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 20010623-CA
F I L E D
September 19, 2002
2002 UT App 299
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Third District, Tooele Department
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:
J. Franklin Allred and L.
Clark Donaldson, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kris
C. Leonard, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
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Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne.
BENCH, Judge:
¶1 Defendant appeals his
conviction for one felony count of driving under the influence of alcohol.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In August 2000, Defendant
was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which was
enhanced to a third degree felony because of two prior DUI convictions
in justice court, one in 1996 and one in 1997. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44 (1998). The State produced evidence of the prior convictions,
which Defendant moved to strike, claiming that (1) they were not supported
by proof of compliance with the notification of enhancement requirements
under section 41-6-44; and (2) they did not prove compliance with plea
requirements of rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
¶3 The trial court ruled
that it lacked jurisdiction to determine whether Defendant's 1996 and 1997
convictions were constitutionally infirm or whether the courts in those
cases had complied with rule 11. After the denial of his motion, Defendant
entered a conditional guilty plea and now appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶4 Defendant argues that
the trial court improperly admitted evidence of his two prior DUI convictions
for enhancement purposes without first holding an evidentiary hearing on
whether he was afforded his constitutional right to counsel in the prior
proceedings. We review a trial court's factual findings for clear error
and its conclusions of law for correctness. See State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
ANALYSIS
¶5 The supreme court's
decision in State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146
(Utah 1989), addresses
the requirements for the use of prior convictions for enhancement purposes.
Although Triptow deals with the use of prior offenses to designate
the defendant as a habitual criminal, the reasoning is applicable to the
present case. See id. at 146.
¶6 In Triptow, the
court analyzed approaches used by different jurisdictions in resolving
the question of "who bears the burden of proof on the issue of representation
or waiver of counsel in prior proceedings leading to a conviction that
is used to increase the penalty in a subsequent prosecution?" Id.
at 148. The court then concluded that, in Utah, the State bears the initial
burden of "proving the prior conviction, sentencing, and commitment." Id.
at 149. The previous judgment of conviction is thereafter "entitled to
a presumption of regularity, including a presumption that the defendant
was represented by counsel." Id. After the State has introduced
evidence of the prior conviction, the burden shifts to the defendant "to
raise the issue and produce some evidence that he or she was not represented
by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel." Id. When the presumption
of regularity is rebutted by the defendant, the State must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the "defendant was in fact represented or knowingly
waived representation." Id.
¶7 In this case, the State
met its initial burden by introducing record evidence of Defendant's two
prior DUI convictions, which are entitled to a presumption of regularity.
Defendant did not present or proffer any evidence specifying the irregularities
that he now claims. Instead, Defendant merely argues that it is the State's
burden to prove that the prior proceedings complied with all constitutional
requirements. Because Defendant failed to provide "some evidence" to rebut
the initial presumption, the trial court could presume the regularity of
the proceedings. Id. Thus, we conclude that the prior convictions
were properly used for enhancement purposes.
CONCLUSION
¶8 The State properly introduced
evidence of Defendant's two prior DUI convictions. Thereafter, Defendant
failed to introduce any evidence that the prior convictions were entered
without the benefit of counsel or without a voluntary waiver of counsel.
Therefore, the trial court could presume the regularity of the proceedings
and correctly denied Defendant's motion to strike the prior convictions.
¶9Accordingly, we affirm.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
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¶10 WE CONCUR:
Gregory
K. Orme, Judge
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
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