Williamson v. Williamson
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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Joan Williamson,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Stuart Kim Williamson,
Defendant and Appellee.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 981245-CA
F I L E D
July 1, 1999
1999 UT App 219
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First District, Logan Department
The Honorable Clint S. Judkins
Attorneys:
Larry E. Jones and Lyle W. Hillyard,
Logan, for Appellant
Pete N. Vlahos, Ogden, for Appellee
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Before Judges Wilkins, Jackson, and Orme.
JACKSON, Judge:
¶1
Joan Williamson appeals the trial
court's termination of alimony and its denial of her request for attorney
fees. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
¶2
Joan and Stuart Kim Williamson divorced
on May 24, 1996, following a twenty-three-year marriage. When they divorced,
they had one minor child, whose custody was awarded to Ms. Williamson.
The parties stipulated that Mr. Williamson would pay $368 per month as
child support and $425 per month as alimony. The stipulated decree provided
that alimony would end when Ms. Williamson married, cohabited, or died.
¶3
When they divorced, Mr. Williamson
was earning roughly $3,550 per month as a supervisor at Morton Automotive
Safety Products. In late August 1996, Mr. Williamson was fired for unsatisfactory
performance and violating company policy. About one month later, Mr. Williamson
filed a Petition to Modify the child support provisions of the divorce
decree. Shortly thereafter, he filed an Amended Petition to Modify, asking
that alimony also be modified. He asserted that the decrease in his income
was a substantial change of circumstances justifying a reduction of both
obligations.
¶4
Mr. Williamson later started working
for his brother's drywall business as a drywall taper, making $11 per hour.
After a hearing on Mr. Williamson's petition to modify, the trial court
found that his income was $2,090 per month. Mr. Williamson's brother testified
that he was paid less than other workers because his age and physical problems
caused him to work slowly. Ms. Williamson presented testimony that a drywaller
of similar age and physical health could make $13 to $15 per hour.
¶5
Ms. Williamson's income at the time
of the divorce was $1,442 per month. By the time of the modification hearing,
her pay had increased, and she also earned some overtime pay and had taken
a part-time job. The trial court found her income to be $1,692 per month.
¶6
At the close of the hearing, the
trial court found that there had been a substantial change of circumstances
since the parties divorced. The court then reduced child support to $271.64
per month and ended alimony. The court ordered Mr. and Ms. Williamson to
bear their own attorney fees.
¶7
On appeal, Ms. Williamson challenges
the sufficiency of the trial court's findings regarding alimony. She also
contends the trial court abused its discretion in ending her alimony entirely.
Finally, she argues she should be awarded attorney fees both below and
on appeal.(1)
ANALYSIS
I. Terminating Alimony
¶8
Ms. Williamson first argues the
trial court's findings of fact are insufficient to support ending alimony.(2)
We agree. Before the trial court can modify a divorce decree, it must find
that there has been a "substantial material change of circumstances not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce."(3)
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998). Once that finding has been
made, the court must then consider "at least the following factors in determining
alimony: (i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; (iii)
the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and (iv) the length
of the marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (1998).(4)
These factors apply not only to an initial award of alimony, but also to
a redetermination of alimony during a modification proceeding. SeeChristiansen
v. Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592, 595 (Utah 1983). The trial court must
then make findings of fact based on these factors. See Breinholt
v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
¶9
The standard for findings in modification
proceedings is well established. "'[T]he trial court must make findings
on all material issues, and its failure to delineate what circumstances
have changed and why these changes support the modification made in the
prior divorce decree constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the
record are clear, uncontroverted and only support the judgment.'" Muir
v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting
Whitehouse
v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). The findings
should be more than cursory statements; they must "'be sufficiently detailed
and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Id. (quoting
Acton v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)).
¶10
In this case, the trial court stated
that it was "painting with a broad brush," and made findings only on the
parties' incomes at the time of the divorce and at the time of the modification
hearing. The trial court, however, should have substituted a sharpened
pencil for its broad brush and set forth detailed findings on the factors
specified in section 30-3-5(7)(a). "Accordingly, we remand for the trial
court to enter adequate findings, supported by sufficient evidence," on
the factors set forth in section 30-3-5(7)(a). Muir, 841 P.2d at
741. That is, the trial court should consider evidence of, and enter findings
regarding, all four statutory factors: i.e., Ms. Williamson's "financial
conditions and needs" and her "earning capacity or ability to produce income,"
Mr. Williamson's ability to provide support, and the length of the parties'
marriage.(5) Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(a)
(1998).
¶11
When considering Ms. Williamson's
financial condition and earning capacity, and Mr. Williamson's ability
to give support, the trial court should move beyond merely considering
their incomes and inquire more fully into their financial situations, including
Mr. Williamson's new spouse's "financial ability to share living expenses"
with him. Id. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(iii)(A). This in-depth consideration
of the parties' circumstances is necessary to fulfill the goal of alimony,
which is to equalize the parties' standards of living, not just their incomes,
in those cases in which insufficient resources exist to satisfy both parties'
legitimate needs. See Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566-67
(Utah 1985); Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942, 951 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). Moreover, the trial court should consider current evidence of the
parties' financial situations, as their "circumstances . . . may have changed
during this appeal." Moon v. Moon, 973 P.2d 431, 438 (Utah Ct. App.
1999).
¶12
Although our decision is based on
the insufficiency of the findings below, we remind the trial court that
"the power to terminate [alimony] should be exercised with caution and
only after
full consideration of the circumstances of the parties
. . . ." 24A Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 813 (1998)
(emphasis added). We note, for the trial court's guidance on remand, that
for the trial court to terminate
[an] alimony award, there must be an articulated basis for doing so; i.e.,
the court must be persuaded that [the recipient spouse] will be able to
support [him- or] herself at a standard of living to which [he or] she
was accustomed during the parties' marriage, or that [the payor spouse]
is no longer able to pay.
Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 951. In
determining this, the trial court should consider Mr. Williamson's reduced
income, but that factor alone is not enough to justify ending alimony.
See Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
("The loss of a job . . . may go to [a payor spouse's] ability to pay the
judgment, but it is not a proper basis upon which to change the amount
of the original award."). We note further that the child support paid by
Mr. Williamson to Ms. Williamson is earmarked for the parties' minor child
and should not be considered as income to Ms. Williamson for purposes of
calculating alimony. See Reick v. Reick, 652 P.2d 916, 917
(Utah 1982) (stating "the basic and unalienable right to child support
. . . is vested in the minor").
II. Attorney Fees
¶13
Ms. Williamson argues the trial
court should have awarded her attorney fees below. Section 30-3-3(1) states
that a trial court may award attorney fees in a modification proceeding.
See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(1) (1998). Here, each party proffered
$1,500 in attorney fees, and neither party objected to the other's proffer
or the reasonableness of the fees. The trial court ordered both parties
to pay their own attorney fees, but made no findings about either party's
need for or ability to pay attorney fees. "In short, the court gave no
explanation for requiring each party to bear his or her own fees and costs.
The absence of these findings prevents a meaningful review of the trial
court's ruling." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 444 (Utah Ct. App.
1998). Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to reconsider Ms. Williamson's
request for attorney fees and to enter findings regarding the same.(6)
¶14
Ms. Williamson also requests attorney
fees on appeal. She is the successful party on appeal and, accordingly,
should she be awarded attorney fees on remand, we instruct the trial court
also to hear evidence regarding her reasonable attorney fees on appeal
and to order Mr. Williamson to pay those fees. See id. If the trial
court does not award her attorney fees below, she will bear her own attorney
fees and costs incurred on appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶15
We remand to the trial court to
consider, and enter findings regarding, the alimony factors set out in
section 30-3-5(7)(a). Should the result differ on remand, we direct the
trial court to enter appropriate conclusions and an order regarding alimony.
We also remand for entry of findings, conclusions, and an order regarding
attorney fees below. If Ms. Williamson is awarded fees below, we order
that she also be awarded her fees on appeal.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
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¶16
WE CONCUR:
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. We decline to address Ms. Williamson's other arguments because they are without merit or not necessary to our disposition of this case. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (stating we "need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and properly before us on appeal").
2. We agree with Ms. Williamson that she "need not engage in a futile marshalling exercise [because she] can demonstrate the findings, as framed by the court, are legally insufficient." Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
3. Ms. Williamson does not challenge the determination that there was a substantial material change of circumstances. As the trial court's "determination that there [has or has not] been a substantial change of circumstances . . . is presumed valid," and she has not challenged that determination, we will not disturb the trial court's ruling on this issue. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036, 1038 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (alterations in original).
4. Section 30-3-5(7)(a) codifies the three factors set out in English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977), and Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), often referred to as the "Jones factors." The statute adds a fourth factor--the length of the parties' marriage.
5. That the parties were married for twenty-three years was an undisputed fact before the trial court. However, because the findings are cursory, we do not know whether the trial court considered the long length of the marriage in deciding to end alimony.
6. Insofar as the court's decision to have Ms. Williamson pay her own fees is attributable to Mr. Williamson's having prevailed on his petition--something the trial court did not articulate but might have had in mind--the rationale may need to be reassessed, depending on the outcome of the proceedings on remand.
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