State of Utah v. Watson
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
----ooOoo----
State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Ellie Watson,
Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 981538-CA
F I L E D
September 30, 1999
1999 UT App 273
-----
Third District, Salt Lake
Department
The Honorable Tyrone E.
Medley
Attorneys:
David C. Cundick, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
Jan Graham, James Beadles,
and Vincent Meister, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
-----
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Billings.
PER CURIAM
¶1.
Ellie Watson appeals the
trial court's order requiring her to pay restitution to the Victim's Reparation
Fund for money it gave to a murder victim's family for counseling. The
State concedes error. We reverse.
¶2.
On July 23, 1996, Lonnie
Durazo was killed and Melissa Fraga was injured. Watson was charged with
criminal homicide and attempted criminal homicide because she allegedly
drove codefendants, Quetzalcohual Chapman and Mike Pierson, to and from
the crime scene. Watson was also charged with obstruction of justice for
having sold the car used in the crime. Under a plea bargain, Watson pleaded
guilty to attempted obstruction of justice. She was sentenced and ordered,
over her objection, "to pay restitution in such amount (sic) as have been
made of the Victim's Reparation's (sic) Fund relating to the death of Lonnie
Durazo.
¶3.
A court may order restitution
only if the defendant has been convicted of a crime that resulted in pecuniary
damages and agrees to pay restitution or admits to the criminal
conduct. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(4)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999)
(stating "[w]hen a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose,
the court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of
crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement"). "Criminal
activities" is defined as "any offense of which the defendant is convicted
or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility
to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(1)(b) (Supp. 1999).
¶4.
The trial court focused
on the phrase "criminal conduct for which the defendant admits" in the
"criminal activities" definition, in determining that restitution was appropriate:
This court is of
the opinion that for 76-3-201(b) and again focusing on that language "any
other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to."
In this court's opinion the defendant did admit to the responsibility of
driving this vehicle. And in this court's opinion also, [defense counsel],
in spite of the fact that you maintain that some of the facts are disputed,
I am just of the opinion that there are sufficient facts, substantial as
they may be, which are reflective of the defendant's state of mind in this
particular case; i.e., hearing the shots, individuals running towards the
vehicle, her admission that she drove the vehicle away. In this court's
opinion is sufficient nexus to hold her accountable for restitution in
this particular case and meets the statutory definition. And even when
you apply the "but for" analysis to that conduct, in this court's view,
she still qualifies to have restitution imposed. For those reasons, I am
going to require that the defendant, Ms. Watson, make restitution in this
particular case.
¶5.
To conclude that Watson
admitted responsibility for the murder and that there was a sufficient
nexus to hold her accountable to the victim's family for restitution, the
trial court examined and made inferences about Watson's state of mind based
upon the evidence before it. However, the statute is more narrow. It does
not ask the trial court to analyze a defendant's state of mind, but rather
asks it to focus on admissions made to the sentencing court. In other words,
the statute requires that responsibility for the criminal conduct be firmly
established, much like a guilty plea, before the court can order restitution.
See, e.g., State v. Voetberg, 99 Or. App. 112, 781 P.2d 387
(1989) (interpreting a restitution statute similar to Utah's). In Voetberg,
the Oregon Court of Appeals determined that the trial court should not
have ordered the defendant, who admitted the company's liability in his
capacity as president, to pay restitution because he did not admit personal
liability and he was not determined to be the alter ego of the company.
See 781 P.2d at 388-89. The court concluded that a trial court must
insure that formalities of an admission are met before restitution can
be ordered:
For the purposes
of determining the basis for restitution, the admission of a defendant
is essentially the same as a plea of guilty that would support a conviction,
but a judgment of conviction is not entered because of a plea bargain.
Because such an admission can result in liability for substantial sums
of money, defendant's responsibility for the criminal activities ought
to be firmly established.
Id. at 389 (citation
omitted). The same rationale applies here. Without making inferences as
the trial court did, it cannot be said that Watson admitted responsibility
for the murder nor did she agree to pay restitution. Watson only admitted
and pleaded guilty to the obstruction of justice charge for which there
were no pecuniary damages. Thus, there was no firmly established admission
of responsibility upon which to order Watson to pay restitution.
¶6.
Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court's order of restitution and remand the case for such further
proceedings as may now be proper.
______________________________
Pamela T. Greenwood,
Associate Presiding Judge
______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge
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