State of Utah in the interest of K.G.C.
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
----ooOoo----
State of Utah, in the interest
of K.G.C., a person under eighteen years of age.
______________________________
T.G. and S.G.,
Appellant,
v.
State of Utah,
Appellee.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 981632-CA
F I L E D
September 23, 1999
1999 UT App 268
-----
Fifth District Juvenile,
St. George Department
The Honorable Hans Q. Chamberlain
Attorneys:
T.G., St. George, Appellant
Pro Se
Jan Graham and Annina M.
Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
-----
Before Judges Wilkins, Billings, and Jackson.
BILLINGS, Judge:
¶ 1
T.G. appeals from an order
of the juvenile court denying his motion to dismiss him from juvenile court
proceedings regarding his daughter, K.G.C. We affirm, but in doing so,
we clarify the scope of the juvenile court's order.(1)
BACKGROUND
¶ 2
The juvenile court first
adjudicated K.G.C. as within the jurisdiction of the court at a hearing
on a marijuana possession charge on December 10, 1996. K.G.C. was sixteen
years old and unmarried at the time. Prior to the hearing, K.G.C.'s parents,
T.G. and S.G., received a "Petition and Notice" alerting them of the charges
and the time and date of the hearing. The notice instructed them to "appear
with [K.G.C.]" at the hearing. Further, if they failed to appear, a summons
would issue. K.G.C. and her parents appeared at the hearing. The juvenile
court found K.G.C. within its jurisdiction, but held the charges in abeyance.
¶ 3
K.G.C. married R.C. on May
2, 1997, when she was sixteen years old. Her parents consented to the marriage.
She changed her name from K.G. to K.G.C., reflecting her marriage.
¶ 4
The parents were next notified
of juvenile court proceedings on July 15, 1997. They received another "Petition
and Notice," charging K.G.C. with shoplifting, giving false information,
and breaking curfew, and setting a hearing date of July 28, 1997. The charged
events allegedly took place on April 11, 1997, before K.G.C. married. However,
the parents received the Petition and Notice after K.G.C.'s marriage. The
notice again instructed them to appear at the hearing with K.G.C. and noted
that failure to do so would result in the issuance of a summons.
¶ 5
Neither K.G.C. nor her parents
appeared at the July 28 hearing. The court entered a not guilty plea on
K.G.C.'s behalf. The court also ordered the parents to "notify the Court
as to why they didn't appear at today's hearing or they will be found in
contempt." The record does not show that the court ever actually found
the parents in contempt.
¶ 6
On or about September 18,
1997, the parents received a "Notification of Hearing" alerting them to
K.G.C.'s trial date of October 14, 1997. The notice again instructed that
"you are to appear with [K.G.C.] for this hearing," although it did not
specify a summons would issue for failure to appear. This notice was sent
to a West St. George Boulevard address, rather than to the Beech Street
address of the previous notices.
¶ 7
Neither K.G.C. nor her parents
appeared at trial. The court found K.G.C. guilty, assessed fines against
K.G.C., and issued a pick-up order for her.
¶ 8
K.G.C.'s parents were notified
of further proceedings by a "Summons" dated June 22, 1998, attached to
a petition asserting new charges against K.G.C. This summons was delivered
to the Beech Street address. The summons stated, "you are notified of this
matter and summoned to personally appear with the child for an arraignment
hearing . . . . If you fail to appear, the county sheriff will personally
summons you to court, which may be punishable as contempt of court." The
petition alleged charges of theft, occurring on or about March 7, 1998,
almost a year after K.G.C. had married. The summons set the date for hearing
on July 8, 1998.
¶ 9
On June 30, 1998, K.G.C.'s
parents filed a motion asking that the court dismiss them from the juvenile
court proceedings. The motion included information that K.G.C. had married
and thus was no longer a minor under Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1 (1996).
At the hearing on July 8, which the parents attended, though K.G.C. did
not, the parents provided further information about K.G.C.'s marriage,
but had no current address for her. Additionally, they notified the court
that K.G.C. had received no notice of the proceedings because she did not
live at the parents' home and had not lived there for over a year. Notice
was sent only to the parents' address, rather than the address K.G.C. listed
on the citation.
¶ 10
The court rescheduled the
arraignment to provide time to send notice to K.G.C. The court instructed
that notice be sent to the address on the citation and that K.G.C.'s name
be changed to reflect her marriage. The court noted that the parents wanted
no further involvement with the proceedings regarding K.G.C., but did not
rule on their motion to be dismissed from the proceedings.
¶ 11
Finally, on August 3, 1998,
the parents received another "Notification of Hearing" setting a new date
for K.G.C.'s arraignment on August 12. This notice identified separate
addresses for K.G.C. and her parents, but still contained the same language
as before: "[Y]ou are to appear with K.G. for this hearing." Notice of
the arraignment was sent both to the parents' address and to the address
K.G.C. gave on the citation.
¶ 12
Neither K.G.C. nor her parents
appeared at the arraignment on August 12. The juvenile court ruled from
the bench, finding K.G.C. guilty and denying T.G.'s motion to be dismissed.
In its comments from the bench, the court stated: "The court has reviewed
the law and has found that [the parents] are liable and responsible under
Utah state law in certain respects with regard to a child under eighteen."
¶ 13
In its order filed August
26, the juvenile court found K.G.C. guilty in absentia and imposed a fine
on K.G.C. The court also denied the parents' motion to be dismissed from
the proceedings, stating in its findings and conclusions, "the court has
reviewed the law and finds that the Juvenile's parents are still responsible
in matters regarding their child, K.G.C." The parents now appeal this order,
specifically complaining about the language that they remain "responsible"
for their emancipated child. However, they do not claim that the court
has no jurisdiction to summon them to appear and to assist the court in
dealing with K.G.C.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶ 14
The sole issue is whether
the juvenile court exceeded its authority by including language in its
order which could be read to subject T.G. to liability for his daughter,
who has been emancipated by marriage. This matter turns on statutory interpretation,
and thus is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See A.E.
v. Christean, 938 P.2d 811, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
ANALYSIS
I. Jurisdiction Over K.G.C.
¶ 15
As an initial matter, it
is clear that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over K.G.C. after her
marriage. The court's jurisdiction is provided in Utah Code Ann. §
78-3a-104 (Supp. 1999). Among other grants of jurisdiction, the juvenile
court has exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings regarding "a minor who
has violated any . . . law or municipal ordinance or a person younger than
21 years of age who has violated any law or ordinance before becoming 18
years of age." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104(1)(a) (Supp. 1999). For
the purposes of the Juvenile Court Act, minor is defined as "a person under
the age of 18 years." Id. § 78-3a-103(1)(p).
¶ 16
The court's jurisdiction
is strictly age linked, and does not end merely because a person attains
majority status when that person was previously within the court's reach.
See,
e.g., id. § 78-3a-121(1) ("Jurisdiction of a minor obtained
by the court through adjudication . . . continues . . . until he becomes
21 years of age."). Furthermore, though marriage affects other legal relationships,
it does not impact the continuing jurisdiction of the juvenile court. See
id. § 78-3a-121(2)(b). Thus, K.G.C. remained within the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court even after her marriage.
II. Jurisdiction Over K.G.C.'s Parents
¶ 17
The juvenile court attains
jurisdiction over a minor's parents only by first attaining jurisdiction
over the minor. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-110, -112
(Supp. 1999) (providing notice, summons, and contempt provisions specifying
method of obtaining jurisdiction over parents). "The jurisdiction of the
juvenile court over a child is a prerequisite for the obtaining of jurisdiction
of a parent of that child." In re Graham, 110 Utah 159, 170 P.2d 172, 178 (1946). Once a child is within the court's jurisdiction, the court
can exercise jurisdiction over the parents, require the child's parents
to appear with him or her in court,(2) and
determine the rights of both child and parent. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-3a-104, -110, -112 (Supp. 1999); cf. Graham,
170 P.2d at 178 (holding juvenile court could not determine parents' custody
rights when court had not acquired jurisdiction over parents).
¶ 18
Here, the court has jurisdiction
over K.G.C., and thus has jurisdiction over her parents for purposes of
summoning them to court. The court's jurisdiction over K.G.C.'s parents
does not depend on K.G.C.'s marital status, but only her adjudicated status
as within the court's reach. Indeed, once the juvenile court has jurisdiction
over a minor, the court has broad authority to summon to court a minor's
parents, custodian, guardian, or "any other person whose presence the court
finds necessary" to serve the interests of the minor. Utah Code Ann. §
78-3a-110(5) (Supp. 1999). This extensive reach reflects the nature of
the equitable mission of the juvenile court, permitting the court to use
many resources to provide guidance for a juvenile.
III. Financial Responsibility of Parents After Emancipation
¶ 19
Although the court could
properly summon K.G.C.'s parents to appear before it, the court arguably
exceeded its authority in the order by imposing a potential legal liability
on her parents. In the court's findings and conclusions of the August 25
order, the court noted: "The Court has reviewed the law and finds that
the Juvenile's parents are still responsible in matters regarding their
child, [K.G.C.]."(3) Though the court perhaps
meant only that the parents retained a moral responsibility for their daughter,
the language of the order was ambiguous enough to raise serious concern
on the part of K.G.C.'s parents that they could be held financially responsible
to the court.
¶ 20
Prior to the final charges
against K.G.C., the legal relationship between K.G.C. and her parents changed
through her attainment of majority and her emancipation. "The period of
minority extends in males and females to the age of eighteen years; but
all
minors obtain their majority by marriage." Utah Code Ann. § 15-2-1
(1996) (emphasis added). Minority in this context is a legal status that
limits the legal capacity of those within the status, minors. The limitations
are intended to protect minors from themselves, based on the premise that
minors are youthful, improvident, and subject to the influence of others.
See 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants §§ 1-3 (1969). The "distinguishing
legal characteristic [of minors] is the inability to make decisions on
their own behalves." Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen,
Minor Changes:
Emancipating Children in Modern Times, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 239,
244 (1992). Attaining majority means that the legal disabilities attached
to minority status are removed. See 42 Am. Jur. 2d
Infants
§ 1 (1969).
¶ 21
Emancipation is a concept
closely related to, though slightly narrower than, majority. Emancipation
is the release of a child from parental control, and the corresponding
release of the parent from support obligations. See In re R.R.,
797 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Emancipation is the "termination
of certain rights and obligations of the parent-child relationship." Id.
When a child is emancipated, "these reciprocal rights and responsibilities
are extinguished and are no longer legally enforceable." Id. (citation
omitted).
¶ 22
Typically, the marriage
of a minor emancipates the minor by operation of law, without a court order.
See
59 Am. Jur. 2d Parent and Child § 83 (1987). Marriage creates
"a new relation inconsistent with subjection to the control and care of
the parent," and thus emancipates the child. Id.; see alsoNiesen
v. Niesen, 157 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1968) ("[T]he fact that a child
has entered into a [marriage] relation which is inconsistent with the idea
of being in legal subjection to his [parent] or in a sense in bondage is
sufficient to effect an emancipation."). "The salient feature of [marriage]
is the child creates a new relationship between itself and its parent,
relieving the parent from the responsibilities of support. . . . Once married,
a dependent spouse no longer looks to its parent for support but relies
instead upon the other spouse . . . ." Green v. Green, 447 N.E.2d 605, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). Thus, though the biological, and perhaps
emotional, tie between parent and child persists, the marriage of a minor
severs the legal responsibilities and duties between parent and child.
¶ 23
Here, K.G.C. was not only
emancipated under traditional common law concepts by marriage, but attained
full majority status under Utah statutory law. Therefore, not only were
the parent-child reciprocal duties severed, but all legal disabilities
of minority were extinguished, and all responsibilities of adulthood were
conferred. K.G.C., as an adult, has no guardian to either protect or control
her. She is fully accountable for herself. Her parents have no legal responsibilities
for her actions and are subject to no financial obligations which may be
imposed on her by the court.
¶ 24
Because this legal relationship
was changed through K.G.C.'s marriage, the juvenile court erred in its
order if the court intended to impose potential future liability on K.G.C.'s
parents for obligations properly attributable to K.G.C. The court cannot
recreate a parent-child responsibility or duty when a person has attained
majority and is emancipated because the legal status conferred upon majority
is inconsistent with such control. See B.A. v. State Dep't of
Human Resources, 640 So. 2d 961, 962 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (holding
parents owed no duty to pay college expenses to child emancipated under
statutory provisions, stating that "a minor child who has had all [legal]
disabilities removed . . . so that he can manage his own affairs as an
adult is no longer due support from his parents"); Towery v. Towery,
685 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Ark. 1985) (holding courts cannot reimpose duty of
child support on parent when an emancipated, adult child became disabled).
CONCLUSION
¶ 25
In sum, the juvenile court
did not err in failing to dismiss K.G.C.'s parents from their obligation
to appear in juvenile court. Juvenile courts have broad jurisdiction and
can summon to court parents, guardians, custodians, and others whom the
court deems necessary to the proceedings to achieve the goals of the juvenile
justice system. However, the court cannot recreate a legal responsibility
between a parent and a child who has attained majority. Thus, the court's
order should not be read as imposing on K.G.C.'s parents any potential
legal or financial responsibility for her actions.
______________________________
Judith M. Billings, Judge
-----
¶ 26
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
______________________________
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. T.G. is the only true appellant as he is representing himself and cannot represent his wife. The orders and issues, however, are the same for both parents.
2. The statute places the burden of appearance on the parents or guardian of the minor. "The summons shall require the person or persons who have physical custody of the minor to appear personally and bring the minor before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-110(4) (Supp. 1999).
3. Further, in its oral instructions during the court proceedings, the court stated: "The order should specifically indicate . . . that the Court is denying the parents' petition to dismiss them from the proceedings. The Court has reviewed the law and has found that they still are liable and responsible under Utah state law in certain respects with regard to a child under eighteen."
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.