State of Utah v. Jarman
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
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State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
John Jarman,
Defendant and Appellant.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 981648-CA
F I L E D
September 30, 1999
1999 UT App 269
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Second District, Ogden Department
The Honorable Michael Lyon
Attorneys:
Martin V. Gravis, Ogden,
for Appellant
Jan Graham, Norman E. Plate,
and Scott Keith Wilson, Salt Lake City, for Appellee
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Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Jackson.
DAVIS, Judge:
¶1.
Defendant John Jarman appeals
the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress, revoking his probation,
and requiring Jarman to serve a portion of his previously suspended sentence
for violating terms of his probation. Jarman argues that evidence of the
probation violation was obtained in contravention of his constitutional
rights. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2.
The facts here are essentially
undisputed. In 1997, pursuant to a plea agreement, Jarman pleaded guilty
to three class A misdemeanor counts of unemployment compensation fraud.
The trial court imposed a sentence that included one year imprisonment,
but suspended the same pending successful completion of probation. In announcing
its ruling, the trial court did not describe the specific probation requirements
with which Jarman must comply, intending instead that Jarman execute a
standard probation agreement. The agreement Jarman executed included the
requirement that he "[a]bstain from the illegal use, possession, control,
delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled substances
. . . and submit to tests of breath or body fluids to ensure compliance
with the probation agreement." The trial court later found this provision
to have been included in its original order.
¶3.
During one of his monthly
visits to his probation officer, Jarman was required to submit to a urinalysis
to verify that he had not used controlled substances. It is undisputed
that the officer lacked any reasonable suspicion that Jarman had violated
the probation terms. Jarman's urine tested positive for cocaine, and the
probation officer subsequently filed an affidavit with the court alleging
the probation violation. The trial court issued an order to show cause
and held a hearing during which Jarman denied the allegations. Jarman also
moved to suppress the results of the urinalysis, arguing that the test
violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The trial court
denied the motion to suppress, concluding that the probation officer needed
no reasonable suspicion to obtain the urinalysis, revoked and reinstated
Jarman's probation, and ordered him to serve part of his suspended sentence.
Jarman appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶4.
Jarman argues the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress, first, because the urinalysis
was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution(1) and, second,
because the probation agreement authorizing such a test was an impermissible
modification of the probation order. "We review the factual findings underlying
the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress under
a clearly erroneous standard, and review the legal conclusions for correctness."
State
v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); seeState v. Brandley,
972 P.2d 78, 81 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE URINALYSIS
¶5.
Jarman argues that the urinalysis
was obtained through an unreasonable search in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. The State, however, correctly points out that even assuming
an unreasonable search, the trial court correctly denied Jarman's motion
to suppress if the exclusionary rule does not apply. See In re
A.R., 368 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 35 (Utah 1999) (declining to address constitutionality
of search where it held the exclusionary rule did not apply).(2)
¶6.
The State argues that the
federal exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings,
relying chiefly on Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott,
524 U.S. 357, 118 S. Ct. 2014 (1998). In Scott, the Supreme Court
held that the exclusionary rule to the Fourth Amendment does not apply
to parole violation proceedings. See 118 S. Ct. at 2022. The Court
reiterated that the exclusionary rule is not a constitutional right per
se, but rather a judicially created mechanism to deter unreasonable searches
and seizures. See id. at 2019-20. The Court then compared the deterrence
benefits against the social costs of the exclusionary rule and concluded
that because the costs outweigh the benefits in the context of parole revocations,
the exclusionary rule does not apply in those proceedings. See id.
at 2020-22. In particular, the Court noted that parole officers "are undoubtedly
aware that any unconstitutionally seized evidence that could lead to an
indictment could be suppressed in a criminal trial." Id. at 2022.
Hence, the Court concluded that the marginal deterrence gained from applying
the exclusionary rule in the narrow area of parole revocations did not
justify the particularly high costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence
and "allow[ing] many who would otherwise be incarcerated to escape the
consequences of their actions." Id. at 2020-22.
¶7.
The State argues that Scott
applies equally in the context of probation revocation proceedings. We
agree. Consistent with Scott, the Utah Supreme Court recently held
that the exclusionary rule does not apply where the social costs outweigh
the benefit of deterrence. See In re A.R., 368 Utah Adv.
Rep. at 35 (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to child
protection proceedings). Like the Pennsylvania proceeding at issue in Scott,
Utah probation revocation proceedings are civil in nature. See State
v. Hudecek, 965 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Further, because
the acts constituting a probation violation could also give rise to a criminal
prosecution, the exclusionary rule's application to criminal prosecutions
already deters unreasonable searches and seizures of probationers. SeeScott,
118 S. Ct. at 2022. Finally, courts generally recognize the similarity
between probation and parole proceedings and have treated them uniformly,
see,
e.g.,
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 & n.3, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759-60 & n.3 (1973) ("Petitioner does not contend that there
is any difference relevant to the guarantee of due process between the
revocation of parole and the revocation of probation, nor do we perceive
one."); State v. Byington, 936 P.2d 1112, 1116 n.2, 1117 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (noting that parole and probation proceedings are distinct but
"discuss[ing] precedent relevant to both, interchangeably" and applying
due process analysis from parole proceedings to probation revocation proceedings);
State
v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (applying requirement
from the parole context--that a dwelling search must be predicated on a
reasonable suspicion--to the search of a probationer), and Jarman has demonstrated
no distinction in this case justifying disparate treatment. Consequently,
we conclude that we are bound by Scott in this case, that the exclusionary
rule to the Fourth Amendment does not apply in the context of probation
revocation proceedings, and hence the trial court correctly denied Jarman's
motion to suppress.
MODIFICATION OF PROBATION TERMS
¶8.
Jarman further argues that
the court should have suppressed the urinalysis because it was obtained
pursuant to the probation agreement, which agreement was an unauthorized
modification of the court-ordered probation terms.(3)
However, although the trial court noted that it "did not expressly delineate
each of the terms of probation," it found that implicit in its original
order was that Jarman would enter into a standard probation agreement with
standard terms, that Jarman did in fact enter such a standard agreement,
and that drug testing through urinalysis was a part thereof.(4
¶9.
Jarman's argument on this
point consists only of an assertion that there was no hearing or waiver
as required for a probation modification. He thus ignores the court's conclusion
that in fact no modification occurred and hence there was no need for a
hearing or waiver. Consequently, as the State points out, Jarman has failed
to show that the court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. SeeState
v. Benvenuto, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1999) ("Because [defendant]
has made no attempt to marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's
decision and demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient to support
the court's findings of fact, we accept the trial court's findings as stated
in its ruling."); Martinez, 811 P.2d at 208-09 (stating that to
overcome the clearly erroneous standard, the appellant must show the findings
were "'against the clear weight of the evidence'" when "'view[ing the evidence]
in a light most favorable to the trial court's findings'") (citations omitted).
Because Jarman has utterly failed to meet his burden on appeal, we reject
this claim as well.
CONCLUSION
¶10.
In sum, the trial court
did not err in denying Jarman's motion to suppress. First, even assuming
the urinalysis violated Jarman's rights under the Fourth Amendment, the
federal exclusionary rule does not apply to probation revocation proceedings.
Second, Jarman fails to demonstrate clear error in the trial court's finding
that probation was administered as ordered and thus there was no impermissible
modification. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order.
______________________________
James Z. Davis, Judge
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WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
______________________________
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Although Jarman also claims that the urinalysis violated his rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, he has provided no independent authority, analysis, or argument. Consequently, we do not consider this claim. See State v. Brandley, 972 P.2d 78, 81 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 989 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
2. Although the trial court made no ruling on the applicability of the federal exclusionary rule, we may rest our decision on that basis because "an appellate court may affirm a 'judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record,' even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted).
3. The Utah Code provides, "Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(12)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999).
4. Although the requisite written findings of fact by the court on this point are absent from the record, the oral findings in the record are sufficiently clear and describe their factual support such that this court may determine the basis of the trial court's decision. See State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 n.1 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
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