Cummings v. Cummings
Annotate this Casepublication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
----ooOoo----
Oletta Cummings,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Clyde Kay Cummings,
Defendant and Appellant.)
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 981307-CA
F I L E D
December 9, 1999
1999 UT App 356
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Third District, Salt Lake
Department
The Honorable Glenn Iwasaki
Attorneys:
M. Byron Fisher, Salt Lake
City, for Appellant
David A. McPhie, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
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Before Judges Wilkins, Bench, and Orme.
BENCH, Judge:
¶1.
Appellant appeals from the
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Upon Remand that were entered
by the trial court subsequent to appellant's first appeal to this court
in 1995. Appellant argues that the trial court divided the marital estate
unequally without explanation. Appellee urges, among other things, that
an equal distribution was achieved and that we should dismiss this appeal
in any event because appellant comes to this court with unclean hands.
Appellee also seeks an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in defending
against this appeal. We affirm and award appellee her costs and fees.
BACKGROUND
¶2.
Appellant and appellee were
married in 1954. Together they formed C. Kay Cummings Candy, Inc. in 1965.
Appellee filed for divorce in 1992, and a decree of divorce was entered
in 1995. The division of marital assets, particularly the business and
its associated land and building, are at the heart of these prolonged and
contentious divorce proceedings.
¶3.
After the decree of divorce
was entered in 1995, appellant appealed to this court, seeking review of
"the trial court's orders striking his answer, entering default judgment,
and dividing the marital estate in response to his long-term failure to
comply with court orders pertaining to discovery and other matters." Cummings
v. Cummings, No. 950504, slip op. at 1 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1996).
In our short unpublished memorandum decision, we affirmed the trial court
almost entirely. See id. We remanded the case, however, for the
limited purpose of allowing the trial court to make additional findings
of fact on the following two narrow issues: "the treatment of the retained
earnings in valuing the business, and the valuation of the business itself."
Id. As allowed by our decision, the trial court thereafter received
additional testimony and evidence on the narrow issues remanded, and modified
its prior finding concerning the value of the business. The trial court
also determined that retained earnings had no separate value apart from
the value of the business itself. To even up the property distribution
in view of its new findings, the court awarded appellant a one-quarter
interest in the business building previously awarded in its entirety to
appellee. This second appeal followed.
¶4.
While the first appeal in
this matter was pending, an $800,000 mortgage obligation on the business
building became due. Under the original decree of divorce, the building
was awarded to appellee, while appellant was ordered to make payments thereon.
Appellant did not make the required payments, and foreclosure became imminent.
The trial court ordered appellant to obtain financing to avoid foreclosure.
Appellant obtained an eighteen month interest only loan, but at the end
of the eighteen month period, he refused to pay the balloon payment then
due, forcing the loan into default. Appellee then sought and received approval
from the trial court to refinance the building herself. In order to close
the loan which appellee had arranged, appellant needed to sign the loan
papers. The trial court ordered him to sign the loan papers, but he refused
to do so.
¶5.
Appellant was held in contempt
of court, sentenced to twenty days incarceration, and monetarily sanctioned.
Due to appellant's refusal to obey court orders concerning the property,
financing was not secured and the building was sold to avoid foreclosure.
Appellee thereafter obtained two judgments against appellant, totaling
more than $262,000, which remain unsatisfied.
¶6.
In an effort to collect
on these judgments, appellee conducted a deposition on March 9, 1999 to
determine what assets appellant had that are subject to execution. At the
deposition, appellant refused to answer numerous questions and appellee
was forced to file a motion to compel. The motion was granted because appellant's
proffered reasons for not answering the questions were disingenuous. Appellant
was ordered to again submit himself for deposition. After sending notice
of the deposition, appellee was informed by counsel for appellant that
appellant had left the state, that his whereabouts were unknown, and that
counsel was not in communication with appellant and thus would not accept
service of the notice of deposition for his client. At oral argument before
this court, counsel for appellant confirmed that appellant has indeed left
the state, but indicated that he has become settled, can now be contacted,
and is available to return to Utah as necessary.
ANALYSIS
I. Appellee's Request For Dismissal
¶7.
This court has previously
determined that it is permissible to dismiss the appeals of contumacious
appellants. In D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
the appellee filed a motion to dismiss the appeal "on the grounds that
[appellant] was currently in contempt of the trial court's order and had
secreted herself, refusing to submit to the process of the district court."
Id. at 591. We held that "if appellant persists in secreting herself
in violation of the trial court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed
[in thirty days]." Id. at 595.(1)
¶8.
In Von Hake v. Thomas,
858 P.2d 193 (Utah Ct. App.) (Von Hake I), cert. granted,
868 P.2d 95 (Utah), remanded, No. 930457 (Utah Dec. 1, 1993), we
dismissed the appeal outright, giving no grace period such as the thirty
days allowed in D'Aston. The appellee in Von Hake I had initiated
supplemental proceedings in the trial court to discover the whereabouts
and extent of appellant's assets in order to collect upon an underlying
fraud judgment. See Von Hake I, 858 P.2d at 193-94. During
the course of the supplemental proceedings, the appellant was held in contempt
of court because he "had not complied with [the court's] order for production
and had used improper and dilatory tactics to frustrate its orders and
to avoid appearing in court." Id. at 194. We rejected appellant's
contention that dismissal was inappropriate because the renewal action
was different from the action in which the contempt occurred. See id.
at 195. We refused to consider a renewal proceeding to be a separate action
because "the connection between the original action and the renewal action
in the instant case is simply too close to ignore." Id. at 196.
We held that "the D'Aston rule is applicable," id., and dismissed
the appeal outright (without allowing a grace period) due to appellant's
"long-standing status as a contemnor of the trial court." Id. at
193.(2)
¶9.
In Von Hake v. Thomas,
881 P.2d 895 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (Von Hake II), we reaffirmed our
dismissal in Von Hake I. Specifically, we confirmed that the thirty-day
grace period established in
D'Aston was not mandatory:
Under D'Aston,
a court has the discretion to determine what is a reasonable approach in
dealing with a contumacious litigant who, even while disregarding the judiciary's
contempt process, nonetheless wishes to avail himself or herself of judicial
procedures thought to be beneficial. Although the D'Aston court
chose to allow a thirty-day grace period, the court did not intend this
grace period as mandatory in every circumstance.
Id. at 898. After holding
that "each case must be examined on its own specific facts to determine
what is reasonable," we considered the facts of the case, and dismissed
the appeal "outright, with no predismissal grace period." Id. We
made the dismissal "without prejudice, subject to reinstatement on reasonable
terms and conditions" because that is "consistent with D'Aston's
basic objective of providing one last chance to achieve compliance with
outstanding contempt orders before dismissing an appeal with finality."
Id.(3)
¶10.
Turning to the instant case,
it is clear that appellant's contemptuous behavior resulted in the loss
of the building. Appellee obtained substantial money judgments against
appellant as a result, and those judgments remain unsatisfied. Moreover,
appellant has now left the state in the face of a court order requiring
him to be deposed in connection with appellee's efforts to collect upon
these judgments. The connection between the enforcement efforts and the
divorce action itself is "simply too close to ignore." Von Hake I,
858 P.2d at 196.
¶11.
Because the building is
now lost, the only way appellant can remedy his contemptuous behavior is
by satisfying appellee's judgments against him. Hence, we could elect to
dismiss this appeal under D'Aston and its progeny and condition
reinstatement of this appeal upon appellant's submission to this court
of proof that he has satisfied the judgments held by appellee. However,
dismissal is not necessary in this matter because the appeal can be easily
affirmed on the merits.
II. Distribution of the Marital Estate
¶12.
On remand after the first
appeal, the trial court properly addressed the two issues that we remanded,
and determined: (1) that the retained earnings did not have value separate
from the business, and (2) that the value of the business was $481,816.
Because this was a reduction from the original valuation of $600,000, an
adjustment in the overall distribution was necessary to ensure an equal
division of the marital estate. This adjustment was made by giving appellant
a twenty-five percent interest in the building in which he previously had
no interest.
¶13.
In this appeal, appellant
has not challenged the trial court's findings on either of the two issues
we remanded or the award to him of an interest in the building, which are
the only matters that appellant could properly address in this second appeal.
Instead, appellant addresses the overall distribution of the marital estate.
¶14.
Appellant's chief contention
is that the trial court did not meet its objective of dividing the marital
estate equally, i.e., 50/50. Appellant asserts that the distribution after
remand is closer to 66/34 in favor of appellee, and that the trial court
did not adequately explain why it did not meet its stated objective of
dividing 50/50. We disagree. The distribution made in the Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law Upon Remand is almost exactly 50/50.(4)
¶15.
Appellant's attempt to demonstrate
unequal distribution is based upon a chart that was admitted at the trial
on remand. This chart contains information concerning other assets, which
were not to be considered in the remand proceedings. See, e.g.,
Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (stating that trial court, on remand, can only address issues "left
open" by appellate decision). Thus, although admitted into evidence, the
chart was immaterial to the trial court's decision. Simply stated, the
trial court properly considered only the two issues we remanded, and the
appellant has not made any argument concerning the trial court's decision
on these issues. And, in any event, the record reflects that the trial
court divided the marital estate equally. Accordingly, we affirm the decision
of the trial court.
III. Costs and Attorney Fees
¶16.
Appellee seeks an award
of costs and attorney fees incurred in defending this appeal. Not only
was appellee awarded attorney fees in the original decree of divorce, but
she has since been awarded fees eight additional times in subsequent proceedings.
Because appellee was awarded fees below and has prevailed on appeal, we
award appellee her costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal.
See, e.g., Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah Ct. App.
1990) ("Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below to the party
who then prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that party on
appeal."). Accordingly, we remand to the trial court for the limited purpose
of determining the amount of costs and attorney fees reasonably incurred
by appellee in defending this appeal.
CONCLUSION
¶17.
Although this appeal could
appropriately be dismissed by reason of appellant's contempt, we have elected--in
the interest of finality--to dispose of it on the merits. Appellant has
not challenged the trial court's determinations on the two narrow issues
we remanded, which are the only issues properly appealable in this second
appeal. Additionally, the distribution of the estate is almost exactly
50/50. Hence, we affirm the decision of the trial court. Appellee is entitled
to her costs and fees reasonably incurred on appeal. We remand the case
to the trial court for the purpose of determining the amount of such costs
and fees.
______________________________
Russell W. Bench, Judge
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¶18.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Michael J. Wilkins,
Presiding Judge
______________________________
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Ultimately, the D'Aston appellant gave notice of her compliance, and the appeal was heard on its merits. See D'Aston v. D'Aston, 808 P.2d 111, 112 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
2. The Utah Supreme Court granted certiorari in Von Hake I, see Von Hake v. Thomas, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993), and then remanded to this court by minute entry order, No. 930457 (Utah Dec. 1, 1993), instructing us to allow the parties to brief the issue of why the appeal should not be dismissed. The supreme court affirmed our decision in Von Hake I in all other respects. See id.
3. We granted appellant "ninety days following his actual release from federal prison to file a motion to reinstate his appeal, such motion to be accompanied by proof that as of that time he has served the outstanding contempt sentence." Von Hake II, 881 P.2d at 898.
4. The trial court's Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Upon Remand contains a detailed breakdown of the valuation of the divided estate. The amounts in this valuation, when totaled, give $785,520 to appellee, and $778,962 to appellant. This division equates to 50.2% for appellee and 49.8% for appellant.
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