ANDY MARTIN MULLINS, III, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

AFFIRMED and Opinion filed October 5, 1989
 
 
S
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
............................
No. 05-88-00934-CR
............................
ANDY MARTIN MULLINS, III, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
 
.................................................................
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 1
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F87-89637-LH
.................................................................
O P I N I O N
Before Justices Howell, Rowe and Kinkeade
Opinion By Justice Kinkeade
        Andy Martin Mullins, III, charged by indictment with the offense of unlawful possession of methamphetamines appeals the trial court's overruling of his motion to suppress evidence. Mullins pleaded nolo contendere to the charge, the trial court found him guilty, placed him on probation for three years, assessed a $500.00 fine, and deferred adjudication of his guilt. Because Mullins has no right of appeal from an order deferring adjudication of guilt and failed to move for final adjudication of guilt within thirty days, we dismiss for want of jurisdiction.
 
FACTS
        Police Officers Neimen and Lee stopped Mullins in the parking lot of a topless bar after they viewed him shoving something in his pocket and walking toward the rear door of the bar. Pursuant to a pat down search by Officer Lee, methamphetamines were found in Mullins pocket.
RIGHT TO APPEAL
 
        Mullins addressed his right to appeal from a deferred adjudication for the first time at oral argument. Mullins cites as his sole authority for his right to appeal a deferred adjudication order the last sentence in Hernandez v. State, 705 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), which states:
            In the context of a deferred adjudication proceeding, since some alleged errors are appealable while others are not, that omission alone dooms our granting relief.
Mullins interpreted this sentence to mean that, depending on the alleged error, a deferred adjudication order is appealable.
        Mullins reliance on Hernandez is misplaced. There, the accused was appealing an order to set aside his deferred adjudication following a probation violation. The court's final statement refers to the raising of alleged errors in appeals taken after adjudication of guilt, judgment and sentencing following determination by a trial court to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. Id. at 702. Further, the court in Hernandez, affirming an earlier decision, held that an accused has no right of appeal from an order deferring adjudication of guilt. Id.; McDougal v. State, 610 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). Here, Mullins is attempting to raise a point of error on an appeal from an order deferring adjudication.
        The primary goal of deferred adjudication is to divert the accused from the mainstream of the criminal justice system. The trial court's role is to enter into a clearly understood pact with the accused that will induce and persuade him to follow the diversionary path. Meanwhile, the criminal action is placed temporarily on hold; a judgment is not entered and a sentence is not imposed. The accused is permitted an opportunity to demonstrate his capacity for prescribed good behavior during a specific time. The accused's success results in dismissal and his failure results in the criminal action continuing forward with the normal incidents of trial. Hernandez, 705 S.W.2d at 702.
        If a defendant is dissatisfied with the decision to defer adjudication or with the terms and conditions of the order, his proper remedy is to move for final adjudication within thirty days as provided in Article 42.12 § 3d(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. McDougal v. State, 610 S.W.2d at 509; Helmle v. State, 746 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th District] 1988, pet. ref'd). After adjudication of guilt, a defendant's normal appellate remedies are available to him. Id. A failure to file a motion to adjudicate within the thirty day period, however, results in a waiver of that right, and thereby waives defendant's right to appeal from original plea proceedings. Helmle v. State, 746 S.W.2d at 303. We do not address whether Mullin's motion to suppress may be appealed if he obtains a final adjudication. We hold that Mullins has neither sought nor received a final adjudication of guilt; consequently, we dismiss.
 
                                                                                                                                            E ED KINKEADE
                                                                  JUSTICE
 
 
DO NOT PUBLISH
TEX. R. APP. P. 90.
 
880934OP.UPF
 
 
File Date[10-05-89]
File Name[880934OP]