Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Young, B. (concurring/dissenting)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
[J-52A&B-2021][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : : Appellant : : : v. : : : : BRENDAN PATRICK YOUNG, : : Appellee : No. 19 MAP 2021 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : : Appellant : : : v. : : : : DANIEL CASEY, : : Appellee : No. 20 MAP 2021 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 2088 MDA 2018 dated 11/2/20 quashing the order of the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division at Nos. CP14-CR-0001389-2017, CP-14-CR0000784-2018 & CP-14-CR-00015402018 dated 11/21/18 ARGUED: September 21, 2021 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 2089 MDA 2018 dated 10/28/20 quashing the order of the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division at Nos. CP14-CR-0001377-2017, CP-14-CR0000781-2018 & CP-14-CR-00015362018 dated 11/21/18 ARGUED: September 21, 2021 CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: December 22, 2021 I support the majority’s holding that the exception embodied in Always Busy Consulting, LLC v. Bradford & Co., ___ Pa. ___, 247 A.3d 1033 (2021), to the policy of dismissal announced in Commonwealth v. Walker, 646 Pa. 456, 185 A.3d 969 (2018), is inapplicable, as well as the associated reasoning. I respectfully dissent, however, with respect to the determination that Rule of Appellate Procedure 902 applies to effectively eviscerate Walker. The majority cites Commonwealth v. Williams, 630 Pa. 169, 106 A.3d 583 (2014), as evidencing this Court’s previous reliance on Rule of Appellate Procedure 902 to alleviate the harsh effect of a quashal where a litigant has failed to file separate notices of appeal. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 23. Walker, however post-dated Williams. Thus, the Walker Court was well aware that there was a long line of prior decisions, such as Williams, favoring remedial measures over quashal. See Walker, 646 Pa. at 468-69, 185 A.3d at 976-77. This is why, when the Walker Court departed from those cases by mandating quashal, it provided for only prospective enforcement of the rule. See id. at 469, 185 A.3d at 977. Indeed, were Walker’s quashal requirement to be subordinated to the discretionary, safe-harbor approach of Rule 902, the decision’s vestige would remain only in cases in which a litigant neglected to reference Rule 902. This, however, is contrary to Walker’s unqualified pronouncement that the failure to file separate notices of appeal, when a single order resolves issues arising on more than one lower court docket, “will result in quashal of the appeal.” Id. at 470, 185 A.3d at 977. Along these lines, it is difficult to conceive why the Court would have pronounced a bright-line rule in the first instance if it were to be subject to an exception stripping it of the prescribed effect. I personally see little difference between the discretionary latitude that was available under the common law -- which was explicitly rejected in Walker -- and that which is available under Rule 902. For this reason and otherwise, it seems to me to be incongruous to differentiate Rule 902 from the common-law approach for the purpose of obviating Walker but nevertheless to accept the Commonwealth’s generic (i.e., non-rule- [J-52A&B-2021][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] - 2 based) overture to the Superior Court seeking latitude to amend as sufficient to implicate Rule 902 as such. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 22 n.18. Justice Donohue joins this concurring and dissenting opinion. [J-52A&B-2021][M.O. – Dougherty, J.] - 3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
