Pennsylvania v. Batts (majority)
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In 2006, fourteen year old Appellant Qu'eed Batts walked up the front porch steps of a house, shot Clarence Edwards in the head, and shot Corey Hilario in the back as he attempted to flee. Mr. Edwards died on the way to the hospital while Mr. Hilario sustained serious bodily injury but eventually recovered. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the appropriate remedy for the constitutional violation that occurred when a mandatory life-without-parole sentence was imposed following appellant's first-degree murder conviction. The Superior Court considered the impact of "Miller v. Alabama" (132 S.Ct. 548 (2011)) for determination of age-appropriate sentencing, but the Supreme Court agreed with the Commonwealth's argument that the impact of "Miller" was "minimal" and that the unconstitutional portion of the sentencing scheme was the statute governing parole eligibility which did not distinguish juvenile offenders when stating that parole may not be granted to those serving a life sentence. Because this portion of the statute was severable, the Commonwealth argued that the remaining statutory sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code still required that the court impose a sentence of life imprisonment for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder. "We find the Commonwealth's construction of the applicable statutes to be the best supported. Appellant's argument that the entire statutory sentencing scheme for first-degree murder has been rendered unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders is not buttressed by either the language of the relevant statutory provisions or the holding in Miller."
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[J-91-2012]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, MCCAFFERY, ORIE MELVIN, JJ.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
Appellee
v.
QU'EED BATTS,
Appellant
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No. 79 MAP 2009
Appeal from the Order of the Superior
Court at No. 766 EDA 2008 dated
04/07/2009 affirming the judgment of
sentence of Northampton County Court
of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at
No. 1215-2006 dated 10/22/2007
ARGUED: September 12, 2012
OPINION
MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR
DECIDED: March 26, 2013
This case concerns the appropriate remedy, on direct appeal, for the
constitutional violation occurring when a mandatory life-without-parole sentence has
been imposed on a defendant convicted of first-degree murder, who was under the age
of eighteen at the time of his offense.
On February 7, 2006, Appellant, then fourteen years old, walked up the front
porch steps of a house, shot Clarence Edwards in the head, and shot Corey Hilario in
the back as the man attempted to flee. Mr. Edwards died on the way to the hospital
while Mr. Hilario sustained serious bodily injury but eventually recovered. Following an
investigation, police took Appellant into custody and conducted a videotaped interview.
Appellant informed the detectives that he had recently been inducted into a gang, and,
on the night of the shooting, had been in a car with several other members of the gang,
including a senior member named Vernon Bradley. According to Appellant, when the
car was outside of the victims’ residence, Bradley had given him a gun and a mask and
told him to “put some work in,” which Appellant interpreted as an order to shoot the two
men on the porch. Appellant admitted that he had shot Mr. Edwards and Mr. Hilario, but
stated that he only did so because he believed that he would be killed if he did not
follow Bradley’s order. Appellant also told the detectives that Bradley had promoted him
to a higher ranking within the gang after the murder. The police then charged Appellant
with, inter alia, first-degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault.
Although Appellant was a juvenile, the nature of the charges automatically placed the
matter within the jurisdiction of the criminal court. See 42 Pa.C.S. §6302 (excluding
murder from the definition of a “delinquent act”).
Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion requesting that his case be transferred to
juvenile court pursuant to Section 6322 of the Juvenile Act, which requires a juvenile
seeking transfer to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that “the transfer will
serve the public interest.” 42 Pa.C.S. §6322(a). The trial judge conducted a hearing in
order to consider the statutory factors applicable to the transfer decision, including: the
nature and circumstances of the offense; the impact of the offense on the victims and
the community; the degree of culpability exhibited by the juvenile and any potential
threat to public safety posed by the juvenile; the juvenile’s amenability to rehabilitation
and the time frame necessary for such; and individual characteristics of the juvenile,
such as his age, maturity, mental capacity, prior delinquent history, and degree of
criminal sophistication. See 42 Pa.C.S. §6355(a)(4)(iii). Based on testimony presented
by both Appellant and the Commonwealth, including experts in forensic psychology, the
trial judge determined that transfer to the juvenile system was not appropriate. The
[J-91-2012] - 2
judge first emphasized the “horrendous” nature of the crime and the “severe threat to
the public” demonstrated by Appellant’s “total lack of respect for human life.”
Commonwealth v. Batts, No. 1215-2006, slip op. at 5 (C.P. Northampton Feb. 21,
2007). In addition, the trial judge credited the testimony of the Commonwealth’s experts
that Appellant’s “rehabilitation, if it ever occurs, will occur only after years of treatment
and a willingness on the part of [Appellant] to seek treatment and rehabilitation,
something that their clinical evaluations indicate [Appellant] is not ready to accept.” Id.
at 6. The judge also found that Appellant was “streetwise,” with “a well-developed
criminal mentality and the degree of maturity necessary to commit audacious criminal
acts.” Id.
Accordingly, the matter proceeded to trial, where the Commonwealth presented,
inter alia, the testimony of Mr. Hilario, several officers and detectives, and the woman
who had been driving the car in which Appellant, Bradley, and other gang members had
been riding on the night of the murder. In defense, Appellant testified, consistent with
his statement to the police, admitting that he had shot the victims, see N.T. July 30,
2007, at 68, 137-38, on the instruction of Bradley, see id. at 65-66, because his life
would have been in danger if he did not follow Bradley’s order, see id. at 56, 67. In
addition, both the Commonwealth and Appellant presented testimony from expert
forensic psychologists who opined as to the psychological factors that may have played
a role in Appellant’s conduct.
Ultimately, despite his defense of duress, the jury
convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, attempted murder, and aggravated assault.
At sentencing, the court imposed the mandatory term of life imprisonment for firstdegree murder, see 18 Pa.C.S. §1102(a)(1) (superseded, relative to juvenile offenders,
by 18 Pa.C.S. §1102.1), which rendered Appellant ineligible for parole, see 61 Pa.C.S.
[J-91-2012] - 3
§6137(a)(1), as well as six to twenty years for attempted homicide, to be served
concurrently.1
After the trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motions, he appealed to the
Superior Court.
Appellant argued, inter alia, that the imposition of a mandatory
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional in
light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct.
1183 (2005), which held that subjecting juveniles under the age of eighteen to the death
penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
See id. at 578, 125 S.Ct. at 1200.
The Superior Court upheld the sentence of life without parole, distinguishing
Roper because that case discussed only the death penalty, which the court emphasized
was categorically different than a sentence of imprisonment. See Commonwealth v.
Batts, 974 A.2d 1175 (table), No. 766 EDA 2008, slip op. at 12 (quoting Commonwealth
v. Wilson, 911 A.2d 942, 946 (Pa. Super. 2006), for the proposition that: “[T]he Roper
decision bars only the imposition of the death penalty in cases involving juvenile
offenders. The ruling does not affect the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole, the sentence imposed in the present case.”).
Further, the court
explained that prior caselaw had determined that imposing the statutorily-required lifewithout-parole sentence on juvenile offenders -- even those who were fourteen years
old at the time of the crime -- did not violate the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 13
(citing Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, 492 Pa. 17, 33, 422 A.2d 116, 123-24 (1980)
(plurality), superseded by statute on other grounds, 42 Pa.C.S. §6322; Commonwealth
v. Carter, 855 A.2d 885, 892 (Pa. Super. 2004)). Addressing Appellant’s as-applied
1
Appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault merged with the attempted murder
conviction for purposes of sentencing.
[J-91-2012] - 4
Eighth Amendment challenge, the court concluded that the sentence was not grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the offense, given that “Appellant was convicted as the
principal actor of a brutal, senseless and premeditated murder.” Id. at 14. The Superior
Court also rejected Appellant’s contention that due process required the trial court to
first consider mitigating circumstances before imposing a life sentence on a juvenile,
noting that caselaw requiring the consideration of mitigating circumstances was limited
to the context of the death penalty, see id. at 15-16 (citing Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S.
66, 76, 107 S.Ct. 2716, 2722-23 (1987)), and that adults may be sentenced to a
mandatory term of life-without-parole without consideration of mitigating evidence, see
id. at 16 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2702 (1991)).
This Court granted allowance of appeal, limited to the questions of whether
Roper rendered imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole on a juvenile unconstitutional and whether Appellant’s Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights were violated by the mandatory nature of his sentence.
See
Commonwealth v. Batts, 603 Pa. 65, 981 A.2d 1283 (2009) (per curiam). We further
reserved consideration pending disposition of Graham v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct.
2157 (2009), and Sullivan v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 129 S.Ct. 2157 (2009).
After the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida, __ U.S. __, __, 130 S.Ct.
2011, 2033 (2010), 2 which held that imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole on juvenile non-homicide offenders violated the Eighth
Amendment, the parties filed substantive briefs addressing the federal constitutional
issues.
In addition, for the first time, Appellant also included a separate argument
concerning the constitutionality of his sentence under Article 1, Section 13 of the
2
The writ of certiorari in Sullivan was dismissed as improvidently granted. See Sullivan
v. Florida, __ U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) (per curiam).
[J-91-2012] - 5
Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits “cruel punishments.” Pa. Const. art. I, §13.
Following oral arguments, this Court again reserved consideration, this time pending
disposition of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, which were to be argued in
tandem. See Miller v. Alabama, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 548 (2011) (per curiam); Jackson
v. Hobbs, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 548 (2011) (per curiam). The United States Supreme
Court issued a deeply divided decision in those cases in June 2012. See Miller v.
Alabama, __ U.S. __, __, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012).
Like Appellant, Miller and Jackson were each subject to a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The underlying homicide, in each
case, was committed when the defendant was fourteen years old, though the
circumstances of each crime substantially differed. In the course of concluding that
such sentences violate the Eighth Amendment, the five-Justice majority related that
Graham and Roper “establish that children are constitutionally different from adults for
purposes of sentencing,” given that children lack maturity and have “an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility,” can be more susceptible to “negative influences and outside
pressures,” and have “less fixed” character traits. Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2464. The
“foundational principle” of Graham and Roper, the majority continued, was that
“imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as
though they were not children.” Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2466. The majority analogized
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders to the death penalty,
finding that, just as individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances -particularly youth -- was constitutionally required before the imposition of a capital
sentence, such concerns must also be taken into account when imposing the harshest
sentence possible for a juvenile. See id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2467-68. Specifically, the
majority explained that the mandatory nature of the life-without-parole sentences at
[J-91-2012] - 6
issue precluded the sentencing court from considering important factors, such as
chronological age, level of maturity, family and home environment, the circumstances of
the offense, the extent of the juvenile’s participation in the unlawful conduct, the impact
of familial and peer pressures, the juvenile’s ability to negotiate with police or
prosecutors, and the possibility of rehabilitation.
See id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2468.
Absent the ability to reflect on these concerns, the majority reasoned, the imposition of
a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile “poses too
great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
However, the Supreme Court did not entirely foreclose the imposition of a lifewithout-parole sentence on a juvenile offender; rather, the majority stated that the
occasion for such a punishment would be “uncommon,” and, in any event, must first
“take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. In this
regard, the majority distinguished its prior ruling in Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 996, 111 S.Ct.
at 2702, noting that Harmelin “had nothing to do with children and did not purport to
apply its holding to the sentencing of juvenile offenders.” Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct.
at 2470. Indeed, the majority indicated, “if (as Harmelin recognized) death is different,
children are different too.” Id. at __,132 S.Ct. at 2470. The Court also determined that
proceedings which allow for the potential transfer of the case from adult to juvenile court
(or from juvenile to adult court), even those that provide for individualized consideration,
“cannot substitute for discretion at post-trial sentencing in adult court -- and so cannot
satisfy the Eighth Amendment.”
Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2475.
Observing that the
information available at the time of such transfer proceedings will often be limited, the
majority reasoned that “transfer decisions often present a choice between extremes:
light punishment as a child or standard sentencing as an adult (here, life without
[J-91-2012] - 7
parole),” which significantly differs from “discretionary sentencing in adult court” that
allows for intermediate options, namely, “a lifetime prison term with the possibility of
parole or a lengthy term of years.”
Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2474-75 (emphasis in
original). Thus, the majority explained that its decision “mandates only that a sentence
follow a certain process -- considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics
-- before imposing a particular penalty.” Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2471.3
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Sotomayor, filed a joining concurrence, opining
that “[t]he only juveniles who may constitutionally be sentenced to life without parole are
those convicted of homicide offenses who kill or intend to kill,” differentiating such
offenders from those who were convicted of murder as a result of participation in a
felony. Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at
__, 130 S.Ct. at 2027).
This distinction, Justice Breyer reasoned, stems from the
“fallacious” application of the theory of transferred intent -- which is based on “the idea
that one engaged in a dangerous felony should understand the risk that the victim of the
felony could be killed, even by a confederate” -- to a juvenile who did not kill or intend to
kill, notwithstanding the fact that “the ability to consider the full consequences of a
course of action and to adjust one's conduct accordingly is precisely what we know
juveniles lack capacity to do effectively.” Id.
Four Justices dissented in three separate opinions. Chief Justice Roberts, joined
by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, first noted that “the direction of society’s
evolution” had moved away from implementing a rehabilitative approach in favor of
reducing recidivism, which “led many legislatures to reduce or eliminate the possibility of
3
In this regard, the Court reserved consideration of the defendants’ argument that the
Eighth Amendment requires a categorical bar against imposition of a sentence of life
without the possibility of parole for juveniles aged fourteen and younger. See Miller, __
U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
[J-91-2012] - 8
parole, imposing longer sentences in order to punish criminals and prevent them from
committing more crimes.”
Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2478 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). Notwithstanding this progression, Chief Justice Roberts opined, the
majority’s rationale -- “that because juveniles are different from adults, they must be
sentenced differently” -- will ultimately lead to not only a bar on life-without-parole
sentences for juveniles, but also to “never permitting juvenile offenders to be tried as
adults.” Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2482. The Chief Justice reasoned that this is especially
true in light of the majority’s “announce[ment] that discretionary life without parole for
juveniles should be ‘uncommon’—or, to use a common synonym, ‘unusual.’” Id. at __,
132 S.Ct. at 2481. However, Chief Justice Roberts explained, mandatory life-withoutparole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide are not “unusual,” id. at __, 132
S.Ct. at 2477, and, despite the lower number of jurisdictions permitting life-withoutparole sentences for juveniles as compared to the punishment addressed in Graham,
the number of actual life-without-parole sentences imposed on juveniles “is over 5,000
times higher than the corresponding number in Graham,” id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2479.
The Chief Justice also faulted the majority for its reliance on Graham and Roper, as
Graham expressly stated that murder should not be compared to the nonhomicide
crimes at issue in that case, and “Roper reasoned that the death penalty was not
needed to deter juvenile murderers in part because ‘life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole’ was available.” Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2481 (citations omitted).
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented based on his disagreement
with the rationales of Roper and Graham, and, like Chief Justice Roberts, found those
cases inapplicable in the present context. See id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2485 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). Additionally, Justice Thomas reasoned that the majority’s requirement of
an individualized sentencing procedure prior to the imposition of a life-without-parole
[J-91-2012] - 9
sentence was at odds with Harmelin’s conclusion that such a procedure does not apply
outside of capital cases due to “the qualitative difference between death and all other
penalties.” Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2485 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995, 111 S.Ct. at
2702).
Finally, Justice Alito, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a dissenting opinion, noting
that the majority decision demonstrated that the Court’s “Eighth Amendment cases are
no longer tied to any objective indicia of society's standards,” and disregarded the
legislative “position that the risk that these offenders will kill again outweighs any
countervailing consideration, including reduced culpability due to immaturity or the
possibility of rehabilitation.” Id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2490 (Alito, J., dissenting).
In light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Miller, we directed the parties to submit
supplemental briefing and conducted oral argument on two additional issues:
1) What is, as a general matter, the appropriate remedy on
direct appeal in Pennsylvania for a defendant who was
sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole for a murder committed when the
defendant was under the age of eighteen?
2) To what relief, if any, is appellant entitled from the
mandatory term of life imprisonment without parole for the
murder he committed when he was fourteen years old?
See Commonwealth v. Batts, No. 79 MAP 2009, July 9, 2012 Order (per curiam).
As a final contextual matter, on October 25, 2012, the Governor signed into law a
new sentencing scheme for persons under the age of eighteen convicted of murder.
See Act of Oct. 25, 2012, P.L. __, No. 204; see also Commonwealth v. Lofton, __ A.3d
__, __, 2012 WL 6062578, at *6 (Pa. Super. Dec. 7, 2012). This legislation reflects the
General Assembly’s effort to address Miller.
[J-91-2012] - 10
Under the new statute, a person under fifteen years of age at the time of the
offense may receive “a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of
imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 25 years to life.” 18 Pa.C.S.
§1102.1(a)(2). A person at least fifteen but under eighteen years of age may receive “a
term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of
which shall be at least 35 years to life.” 18 Pa.C.S. §1102.1(a)(1). In determining
whether a life-without-parole sentence should be imposed pursuant to this statute, the
court must take into account various individualized factors, including: the nature and
circumstances of the offense; the defendant’s age, mental capacity, maturity, culpability,
and degree of criminal sophistication; and the success or failure of any prior
rehabilitative attempts. See 18 Pa.C.S. §1102.1(d). The statute also leaves room for
the court to consider any other factors that it deems relevant to its assessment. See 18
Pa.C.S. §1102.1(d)(7)(vii).
The new sentencing statute, by its terms, applies only to minors convicted of
murder on and after the date Miller was issued (June 25, 2012). See Act of Oct. 25,
2012, P.L. __, No. 204 §2; 18 Pa.C.S. §1102.1(a). Accordingly, it does not apply to
Appellant, and it does not moot the present controversy.
The questions raised in this appeal are matters of law; our standard of review is
de novo; and our scope of review is plenary. See Commonwealth v. Davidson, 595 Pa.
1, 11, 938 A.2d 198, 203 (2007).
I.
As reflected above, given the developing jurisprudence, our focus in this appeal
has shifted from broadly questioning the constitutionality of a life-without-parole
sentence imposed on a juvenile offender to a narrow issue concerning the appropriate
remedy for the Eighth Amendment violation that, under Miller, occurred when Appellant
[J-91-2012] - 11
was mandatorily sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole upon
his conviction for first-degree murder.
Further, despite the broad framing of the
questions at hand, Appellant has confined his arguments to the context of first-degree
murder; hence, the issues identified by Justice Breyer in his Miller concurrence, see
Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing additional
constitutional concerns connected with the imposition of life-without-parole sentences
on juveniles convicted of murder as a result of participation in a felony who have neither
killed nor intended to kill), are not implicated in the present matter.
Substantively, Appellant asserts that the statutory scheme providing for a
mandatory sentence of life-without-parole upon conviction of first-degree murder is
unconstitutional in its entirety in light of Miller. Hence, Appellant contends that this
Court should look to other statutes existing at the time that the offense was committed
in order to determine the appropriate sentence that may be imposed consistent with the
Eighth Amendment. See Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 7-8 (citing Miller, __ U.S.
at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2464).
This existing constitutional sentence, Appellant argues,
should be based on the most severe lesser included offense, namely, third-degree
murder, with a maximum term of forty years’ imprisonment. See id. at 8 (citing 18
Pa.C.S. §1102(d)). Devising any other sentence would, in Appellant’s view, be most
appropriately left to the Legislature.
See id. at 8-9 (citing Spectrum Arena L.P. v.
Commonwealth, 603 Pa. 180, 197-98, 983 A.2d 641, 651 (2009) (“It is not within this
Court's power to alter this scheme and the impact of any inconsistency is more properly
addressed directly to the legislature.”) (citations omitted)). Appellant contends that this
approach is particularly apt in the present matter, as it recognizes that “juveniles are
categorically less culpable than adults,” id. at 10 (citing Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct.
at 2464), and ameliorates the concern that juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment will
[J-91-2012] - 12
necessarily serve a longer term than adults receiving the same sentence, see id. at 11
(citing Graham, __ U.S. at __,130 S. Ct. at 2028). Moreover, Appellant maintains that
this remedy is consistent with that applied in analogous cases. See id. at 9 (citing
Commonwealth v. Story, 497 Pa. 273, 282, 440 A.2d 488, 492 (1981) (imposing a
sentence of life imprisonment when a statute mandating imposition of the death penalty
in certain circumstances was found unconstitutional)); id. at 10 (citing Rutledge v.
United States, 517 U.S. 292, 306, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 1250 (1996), for the proposition that
“where a greater offense must be reversed, the courts may enter judgment on the lesser
included offense”).
A remedy that would permit a court to impose a sentence of life imprisonment
with the possibility of parole, Appellant continues, would still violate the Eighth
Amendment under Miller, as the mandatory nature of such a sentence (absent further
revision to the statutory scheme) fails to take into account the age-related factors set
forth by the Supreme Court. See Supplemental Reply Brief for Appellant at 4 n.3 (citing
Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2467). Accordingly, Appellant argues that he is
entitled to a remand for an individualized sentencing hearing in which the judge should
consider the factors delineated in Miller prior to imposing an appropriate sentence
pursuant to the statutory penalty for third-degree murder. See Supplemental Brief for
Appellant at 12 (citing Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2468).
Characterizing the impact of Miller on the current sentencing scheme as
“minimal,” the Commonwealth responds that the unconstitutional portion of the
sentencing scheme is the statute governing parole eligibility, which does not distinguish
juvenile offenders when stating that parole may not be granted to those serving a life
sentence.
See Supplemental Brief for Commonwealth at 7 (citing 61 Pa.C.S.
§6137(a)(1) (excluding inmates serving terms of life imprisonment from those who may
[J-91-2012] - 13
be released on parole)).
Because this portion of the statute is severable, the
Commonwealth continues, the “remaining unaltered statutory sentencing provisions,”
including Section 1102(a) of the Criminal Code, still require that the court impose a
sentence of life imprisonment for a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder.
See
Supplemental Brief for Commonwealth at 8 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. §1102(a) (superseded, in
relevant part)). In the Commonwealth’s view, however, the judge now has discretion,
based on the age-related considerations set forth in Miller, to impose the sentence
either without parole or with the possibility of parole after a specified term of years. See
id.
The Commonwealth observes that the United States Supreme Court expressly
limited its holding in this regard:
Our decision does not categorically bar a penalty for a class
of offenders or type of crime -- as, for example, we did in
Roper or Graham.
Instead, it mandates only that a
sentencer follow a certain process -- considering an
offender's youth and attendant characteristics -- before
imposing a particular penalty.
Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. The Commonwealth also notes that, in other
cases, the Superior Court has remanded for resentencing in light of Miller for the trial
court to consider the relevant factors and determine whether a sentence of “life
imprisonment with, or without, the possibility of parole” should be imposed.
Supplemental Brief for Commonwealth at 10 (citing Commonwealth v. Knox, 50 A.3d
732, 745 (Pa. Super. 2012)). Thus, the Commonwealth reasons that the appropriate
remedy for Appellant’s unconstitutionally mandatory life-without-parole sentence is for
this Court to remand for a new sentencing hearing at which the trial court may consider
the factors detailed in Miller and impose a life sentence, either with or without parole.
See id. at 10-11.
[J-91-2012] - 14
The Commonwealth’s amicus, the Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association,
adds that Appellant’s argument is, in essence, an attempt to “negate[ ] his first degree
murder conviction” in order to obtain the lesser sentence for third-degree murder.
Supplemental Amicus Brief at 11. In this regard, amicus argues that the capital cases
relied upon by Appellant are inapposite, as they involved death sentences that “could no
longer be imposed because no applicable sentencing statute existed.” Id. at 11-12
(citing Story, 497 Pa. at 282, 440 A.2d at 492). By contrast, amicus continues, Miller did
not invalidate the entire sentencing scheme and does not prevent Appellant from
receiving a life-without-parole sentence after the trial court considers the age-related
factors set forth by the Supreme Court. See id. at 12 (citing Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132
S.Ct. at 2471). Similarly, amicus distinguishes Rutledge because that case involved
convictions for two offenses that were based on the same activity, which necessitated
vacating one conviction and sentence. Id. at 12 n.7 (citing Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 307,
116 S.Ct. at 1250-51). Moreover, amicus asserts that “[n]othing in that case, or any
other case, suggests that a sentence of life without parole, originally imposed in a
constitutionally unsound manner, cannot be reimposed in a constitutionally sound one.”
Id. at 12.
We find the Commonwealth’s construction of the applicable statutes to be the
best supported. Appellant’s argument that the entire statutory sentencing scheme for
first-degree murder has been rendered unconstitutional as applied to juvenile offenders
is not buttressed by either the language of the relevant statutory provisions or the
holding in Miller. Section 1102, which mandates the imposition of a life sentence upon
conviction for first-degree murder, see 18 Pa.C.S. §1102(a), does not itself contradict
Miller; it is only when that mandate becomes a sentence of life-without-parole as applied
to a juvenile offender -- which occurs as a result of the interaction between Section
[J-91-2012] - 15
1102, the Parole Code, see 61 Pa.C.S. §6137(a)(1), and the Juvenile Act, see 42
Pa.C.S. §6302 -- that Miller’s proscription squarely is triggered. See Miller, __ U.S. at
__, 132 S.Ct. at 2469. Miller neither barred imposition of a life-without-parole sentence
on a juvenile categorically nor indicated that a life sentence with the possibility of parole
could never be mandatorily imposed on a juvenile. See id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2469.
Rather, Miller requires only that there be judicial consideration of the appropriate agerelated factors set forth in that decision prior to the imposition of a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile. See id. at __, 132 S.Ct. at
2467-68.
We recognize, as a policy matter, that Miller’s rationale – emphasizing
characteristics attending youth -- militates in favor of individualized sentencing for those
under the age of eighteen both in terms of minimum and maximum sentences. In terms
of the actual constitutional command, however, Miller’s binding holding is specifically
couched more narrowly. See id. at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2469 (“We . . . hold that the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility
of parole for juvenile offenders.”) (emphasis added).
The High Court thus left
unanswered the question of whether a life sentence with the possibility of parole offends
the evolving standards it is discerning.
Significantly, in the arena of evolving federal constitutional standards, we have
expressed a reluctance to “go further than what is affirmatively commanded by the High
Court” without “a common law history or a policy directive from our Legislature.”
Commonwealth v. Sanchez, __ Pa. __, __, 36 A.3d 24, 66 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, __
U.S. __, 133 S.Ct. 122 (2012). Moreover, barring application of the entire statutory
scheme as applied to juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, based solely on the
policy discussion in Miller (short of its affirmative holding), would contradict the “strong
[J-91-2012] - 16
presumption that legislative enactments do not violate the constitution.” Commonwealth
v. Chase, 599 Pa. 80, 89, 960 A.2d 108, 112 (2008); see also 1 Pa.C.S. §1922(3)
(presumption that the General Assembly does not intend to violate the federal or state
constitutions when it enacts legislation).
In addition, Appellant’s argument that he should be sentenced as if he had been
convicted of the lesser offense of third-degree murder finds little support in the
authorities upon which he relies, as such caselaw is simply inapplicable to the present
circumstances. In Story, for example, this Court imposed a life sentence because the
effectuation of a death sentence would violate the defendant’s equal protection and due
process rights. See Story, 497 Pa. at 281, 440 A.2d at 492 (“Because appellant was
tried, convicted, and sentenced to death under an unconstitutional statute, he must be
treated the same as all those persons whose death penalties have been set aside.”).
Notably, the life sentence imposed in Story, like the death penalty that was vacated,
was a legislatively sanctioned punishment for first-degree murder and not a lesser
offense. See id. at 277, 440 A.2d at 490. Rutledge is similarly distinguishable, as that
case involved the vacation of one conviction and sentence where the defendant had
been convicted of two separate crimes, one of which was determined to be a lesserincluded offense. See Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 307, 116 S.Ct. at 1250. Here, by contrast,
Appellant’s conviction for first-degree murder has not been vacated; rather, we are
tasked with determining an appropriate scheme for resentencing for that offense,
consistent with Miller.
Regarding the appropriate age-related factors, as the Commonwealth and its
amicus observe, the Superior Court has considered the impact of Miller and vacated
and remanded for resentencing, instructing the trial court that:
[A]t a minimum it should consider a juvenile's age at the time
of the offense, his diminished culpability and capacity for
[J-91-2012] - 17
change, the circumstances of the crime, the extent of his
participation in the crime, his family, home and neighborhood
environment, his emotional maturity and development, the
extent that familial and/or peer pressure may have affected
him, his past exposure to violence, his drug and alcohol
history, his ability to deal with the police, his capacity to
assist his attorney, his mental health history, and his
potential for rehabilitation.
Knox, 50 A.3d at 745 (citing Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2455). We agree with the
Commonwealth that the imposition of a minimum sentence taking such factors into
account is the most appropriate remedy for the federal constitutional violation that
occurred when a life-without-parole sentence was mandatorily applied to Appellant.
We recognize the difference in treatment accorded to those subject to non-final
judgments of sentence for murder as of Miller’s issuance and those convicted on or
after the date of the High Court’s decision. As to the former, it is our determination here
that they are subject to a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment as
required by Section 1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the
common pleas court upon resentencing. Defendants in the latter category are subject
to high mandatory minimum sentences and the possibility of life without parole, upon
evaluation by the sentencing court of criteria along the lines of those identified in Miller.
See 18 Pa.C.S. §1102.1. Nevertheless, in the absence of a claim that such difference
violates constitutional norms, we have interpreted the statutory provisions applicable to
Appellant (and all others similarly situated) in accord with the dictates of the Eighth
Amendment as set forth in Miller, as well as the Pennsylvania Legislature’s intent as
reflected in the relevant statutory provisions.
[J-91-2012] - 18
II.
Given the breadth of the issues for which review was initially granted, we will also
address Appellant’s corollary argument that a categorical ban on the imposition of lifewithout-parole sentences on juvenile offenders is required by Article I, Section 13 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, which prohibits “cruel punishments.” See Pa. Const. art. I,
§13 (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
punishments inflicted.”). In this regard, Appellant has not presented a fully developed
analysis in accord with Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 390, 586 A.2d 887,
895 (1991) (setting forth the appropriate method for determining whether a provision of
the Pennsylvania Constitution provides broader protections than its federal counterpart),
but, rather, refers to an amici brief in which the Edmunds factors are discussed.4
In Edmunds, this Court has indicated that, in considering whether the
Pennsylvania Constitution should be interpreted more expansively than the United
States Constitution, the Court may consider: the text of the Constitution; the provision’s
history including relevant decisional law; related case law from other states; and policy
considerations unique to Pennsylvania. Id. 5
4
These amici include the Juvenile Law Center, the Defender Association of
Philadelphia, and law professors Sara Jacobson, Michelle Leighton, Brian J. Foley, and
Constance De La Vega.
5
We recognize that this Court has previously held Article I, Section 13 to be
coextensive with the Eighth Amendment in several contexts. See Commonwealth v.
Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16, 73-74, 454 A.2d 937, 967 (1982), abrogated on other grounds
by Commonwealth v. Freeman, 573 Pa. 532, 827 A.2d 385 (2003) (death penalty);
Commonwealth v. 5444 Spruce St., 574 Pa. 423, 427-28, 832 A.2d 396, 399 (2003)
(excessive fines); Jackson v. Hendrick, 509 Pa. 456, 465 n.10, 503 A.2d 400, 404 n.10
(1986) (prison conditions). However, none of those cases involved juvenile offenders,
who the Supreme Court has indicated are to be treated differently with respect to
criminal punishment. See, e.g., Miller, __ U.S. at __, 132 S.Ct. at 2470.
[J-91-2012] - 19
In terms of the relevant text, Appellant and his amici emphasize that the
language of Article I, Section 13 (prohibiting “cruel punishment”) differs from that of the
Eighth Amendment (prohibiting “cruel and unusual punishment”) and compare this
distinction to the Michigan Constitution, which prohibits “cruel or unusual punishment,”
Mich. Const. art. I, §16, and has been interpreted by that state’s courts as providing
broader protection than the Eighth Amendment, see People v. Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 31
n.11, 485 N.W.2d 866, 872 n.11 (1992) (“The set of punishments which are either ‘cruel’
or ‘unusual’ would seem necessarily broader than the set of punishments which are
both ‘cruel’ and ‘unusual.’”) (emphasis in original).
As to history and policy considerations, Appellant and his amici also aver that
Pennsylvania has “a longstanding historical commitment to providing special protections
for minors against the full weight of criminal punishment,” Supplemental Brief for
Appellant at 6, and that the purposes of the Juvenile Act “demonstrate[ ] a commitment
towards fairness and consideration to the most youthful offenders,” Brief for Appellant at
28 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. §6301(b)). Similarly, Appellant observes that the Supreme Court
has recognized that “juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults who commit
similar offenses.” See Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 10 (citing Miller, __ U.S. at
__, 132 S.Ct. at 2464). This diminished level of culpability, Appellant continues, is “well
established in academic literature,” which has confirmed that youth affects competence
and impulse control, as well as the ability to logically reason and appreciate
consequences. See id. at 10-11 n.12 (citations omitted). Appellant also points out that
he was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole due to a
convergence of statutory provisions rather than a definitive statement from the
Legislature indicating its intent to subject all juveniles convicted of first-degree murder to
[J-91-2012] - 20
mandatory life sentences.
See id. at 4 (citing 18 Pa.C.S. §1102(a)(1); 42 Pa.C.S.
§6302; 61 Pa.C.S. §6137(a)(1)).
We find the textual analysis provided by Appellant and his amici to carry little
force. The purport of the argument is that this Court should expand upon the United
States Supreme Court’s proportionality approach, not that it should derive new
theoretical distinctions based on differences between the conceptions of “cruel” and
“unusual.” Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 88, 100 n.32, 78 S. Ct. 590, 598 n.32 (1958)
(plurality) (suggesting that most of the judicial decisions have treated “cruel and
unusual” as, essentially, an amalgam).
In terms of the history, Appellant is correct that there is an abiding concern, in
Pennsylvania, that juvenile offenders be treated commensurate with their stage of
emotional and intellectual development and personal characteristics. As a matter of
legislative judgment, this is reflected in the salient transfer provisions of the Juvenile
Act, which, historically, has been considered to be the most appropriate manner in
which to make individualized determinations concerning age-related characteristics and
situational factors in connection with a particular offender’s suitability for treatment
within the juvenile system. See 42 Pa.C.S. §6322(a). While the United States Supreme
Court has determined that such provisions are insufficient to mitigate an Eighth
Amendment deficiency in the sentencing of underage offenders to mandatory life
without parole, nothing in the arguments presented suggests that Pennsylvania’s history
favors a broader proportionality rule than what is required by the United States Supreme
Court.
We view Appellant’s policy arguments in essentially the same light.
These
emphasize the trend of the United States Supreme Court towards viewing juveniles as a
category as less culpable than adults, and, while we recognize this progression,
[J-91-2012] - 21
Appellant does not acknowledge that there has been no concomitant movement in this
Court or in the Pennsylvania Legislature away from considering murder to be a
particularly heinous offense, even when committed by a juvenile.
See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Cotto, 562 Pa. 32, 44, 753 A.2d 217, 224 (2000) (noting that “murder
has always been excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts”); Commonwealth
v. Williams, 514 Pa. 62, 72, 522 A.2d 1058, 1063 (1987), superseded by statute on
other grounds, 42 Pa.C.S. §6322 (“Murder is a heinous and serious crime, and the
legislature’s assumption that one who commits murder is in need of adult discipline and
restraint is a reasonable one.”).
For these reasons, the arguments presented do not persuade us that the
Pennsylvania Constitution requires a broader approach to proportionality vis-à-vis
juveniles than is reflected in prevailing United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.6
Accordingly, the decision of the Superior Court is vacated, and the matter is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Madame Justice Orie Melvin did not participate in the consideration or decision of
this case.
Mr. Chief Justice Castille, Mr. Justice Eakin, Mr. Justice Baer, Madame Justice
Todd and Mr. Justice McCaffery join the opinion.
Mr. Justice Baer files a concurring opinion.
6
Certainly, “[d]etermining the appropriate sentence for a teenager convicted of murder
presents grave and challenging questions of morality and social policy.” Miller, ___ U.S.
at ___, 132 S.Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito, JJ.). Our role in establishing the direction of social policy is a limited one,
however. See, e.g., Naylor v. Twp. of Hellam, 565 Pa. 397, 408, 773 A.2d 770, 777
(2001) (recognizing the General Assembly’s superior ability to examine social policy
issues and to establish appropriate substantive legal standards).
[J-91-2012] - 22
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