CITY OF MCKEESPORT V. WCAB (MILETTI) APPEAL OF: BEATRICE MILETTI (Majority Opinion)
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
[J-45-1999] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA WESTERN DISTRICT CITY OF MCKEESPORT, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (MILETTI), APPEAL OF: BEATRICE MILETTI : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 76 W.D. Appeal Docket 1998 Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered July 17, 1998 at No. 2081 C.D. 1997 reversing the Order of the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board at No. A96-1447 entered July 1, 1997. 715 A.2d 532 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) ARGUED: March 9, 1999 OPINION MR. JUSTICE CAPPY1 DECIDED: JANUARY 19, 2000 We granted allocatur to determine whether the Commonwealth Court erred in reversing a workers' compensation judge s decision, granting Appellant Beatrice Miletti's fatal claim petition, on the basis that Mrs. Miletti failed to satisfy the requirements of section 301(c)(2) of the Workers Compensation Act (Act). 77 P.S. 411(2). For the reasons that follow, we hold that Mrs. Miletti was entitled to fatal claim benefits; thus, we reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court. Mrs. Miletti is the widow of Cresente Miletti (Decedent). Decedent was a firefighter for Appellee City of McKeesport. Decedent had worked for the City for thirty years before retiring on August 31, 1983. On February 25, 1993, Decedent passed away. Thereafter, 1 The opinion was reassigned to this author. Mrs. Miletti filed a fatal claim petition, pursuant to the Act, on September 27, 1993. In her petition, Mrs. Miletti alleged that Decedent suffered and died from interstitial lung disease (ILD) as a result of his employment as a firefighter.2 The City of McKeesport denied the allegations and the parties proceeded to a hearing before a workers' compensation judge. At the hearing, Decedent's physician, Dr. Rahat M. Chaudhry, who is board certified in internal medicine, presented deposition testimony, credited by the workers compensation judge, that he began treating Decedent on July 24, 1986 for ILD. In Dr. Chaudhry s opinion, the ILD was caused by on-the-job inhalation of heat, soot, chemicals, and asbestos and which, in turn, caused Decedent's death. The workers' compensation judge further found that on January 13, 1993, Mrs. Miletti's counsel first notified the City of McKeesport that only as of December 7, 1992, did Dr. Chaudhry identify the cause of Decedent's chronic respiratory problems as being work-related.3 2 The workers compensation judge s Finding of Fact No. 6(a), based upon Decedent's physician's testimony, described ILD as follows: [A] progressive and terminal disorder wherein the normal lung tissues are displaced by fibrous tissue and as a consequence lose the ability to expand properly. There are many known causes of ILD, including exposure to noxious materials such as soot, asbestos, metals, chemicals, coal, pesticides, and molds, as well as a pre-existing history of systematic diseases such as lupus and arthritis. 3 Specifically, the workers' compensation judge accepted as credible the testimony of Dr. Chaudhry, that he began treating Decedent in 1986 for ILD. Dr. Chaudhry initially believed decedent's condition to be idiopathic in nature, and thus, did not discern a causal relationship between Decedent's work and his disease. However, he subsequently changed his opinion. The workers compensation judge credited Dr. Chaudhry's opinion that Decedent's lung disease and subsequent death were caused by occupational inhalation of heat, soot, chemicals and asbestos, and credited Dr. Chaudhry's testimony that he told Decedent that his disease was work-related on December 7, 1992. The judge also accepted as credible the testimony of Decedent's fellow firefighter of twenty years, Albert Cipicchio, that Decedent was exposed to burning rubber, plastic wiring and (continued ¦) [J-45-1999] - 2 The workers' compensation judge granted the fatal claim petition for death from work-related lung disease. Before the workers compensation judge, the City of McKeesport argued that Mrs. Miletti had failed to establish that Decedent's disability arose within 300 weeks of Decedent's last date of occupational exposure as required by section 301(c)(2) of the Act. 77 P.S. §411(2). However, the workers' compensation judge rejected this argument and held that Mrs. Miletti had produced unequivocal and credible medical testimony that Decedent was disabled as a result of ILD prior to July 24, 1986 (the date he first received treatment by his physician). Because this date fell within 300 weeks following Decedent's retirement in August 1983, Decedent established a compensable disability and satisfied the requirements of section 301(c)(2). The Workers Compensation Appeal Board (Board) affirmed. The Commonwealth Court, en banc, reversed the order of the Board. The court determined that Mrs. Miletti failed to meet the limitations for instituting a fatal claim petition under section 301(c)(2) because Decedent did not file a claim for benefits during his lifetime and his date of death was more than 300 weeks from his last date of employment. As noted above, we granted allocatur to address whether the Commonwealth Court erred in reversing the workers' compensation judge s decision, granting Mrs. Miletti's fatal claim petition, on the basis that Mrs. Miletti failed to satisfy the mandates of section 301(c)(2) of the Act.4 ( ¦continued) asbestos, and that the City of McKeesport provided masks which restricted breathing, and therefore, were not usable. The judge found that Decedent passed away on February 25, 1993 and concluded that his death was caused by a compensable disability. 4 Appellate review of a Commonwealth agency determination is limited. The court shall affirm the adjudication of a Commonwealth agency unless it finds that the adjudication is in violation of constitutional rights, is not in accordance with law, is violative of the practices and procedure of the Commonwealth agency, or any findings of fact made by the agency (continued ¦) [J-45-1999] - 3 The relevant section of the Act provides that: The terms "injury," "personal injury," and "injury arising in the course of his employment," as used in this act, shall include, unless the context clearly requires otherwise, occupational disease as defined in section 108 of this act: Provided, That whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease: And provided further, That if the employe's compensable disability has occurred within such period, his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall likewise be compensable. 77 P.S. §411(2)(emphasis supplied). The Commonwealth Court interpreted this provision of the Act and determined that Mrs. Miletti was not entitled to fatal claim benefits. In reaching its conclusion, the Commonwealth Court relied upon its decision in Fortely v. WCAB (J & L Steel Corporation (Buckeye)), 543 A.2d 1248 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). In Fortely, the Commonwealth Court reviewed section 301(c)(2) and found that this section barred an occupational disease death benefit claim where the decedent had not filed a disability claim during his or her lifetime, and the date of death was more than 300 weeks from the last date of employment. Thus, the Fortely court's focus in interpreting section 301(c)(2) was on whether a lifetime claim petition was filed and when death occurred. In the case sub judice, the Commonwealth Court found that Decedent did not seek benefits for his occupational disease during his lifetime. Thus, based upon Fortely, the Commonwealth Court determined that Mrs. Miletti was required to establish that ( ¦continued) and necessary to support its adjudication are not supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. §704; Wilson v. WCAB (Alcoa), 669 A.2d 338, 340 (Pa. 1996). [J-45-1999] - 4 Decedent s death occurred within 300 weeks after his last date of employment.5 As Decedent died over ten years after his retirement as a firefighter, a period in excess of 300 weeks, the Commonwealth Court concluded that Ms. Miletti was not entitled to an award of fatal claim benefits. We find that the Commonwealth Court's analysis is inconsistent with the plain language of section 301(c)(2). Based upon the explicit language of the statute, it becomes clear that the proper focal point is whether the decedent's disability occurred within three hundred weeks of exposure. The Commonwealth Court erroneously concentrated on when death occurred and whether a lifetime disability claim was filed. By doing so, the court failed to give meaning to the express words of the legislature. The rules of statutory construction require that when the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the statute is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. 1 Pa.C.S.A. §1921(b). The meaning of the words of the statute is unmistakable. Section 301(c)(2) specifically permits fatal claim benefits so long as the disability occurred within 300 weeks of exposure. Indeed, as Judge Alexander F. Barbieri (now deceased) explains in his venerable treatise on workers' compensation: if the employee's compensable disability has occurred within such period, his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall likewise be compensable. The effect of this is that, if the disability occurs within the 300 weeks' period, the employee's death thereafter, no matter how long after, even if beyond the period of 300 weeks, is compensable because the disease was compensable during the employee's lifetime. Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Disease, §7.32(2)(Bisel 1999). Contrary to the Commonwealth Court's analysis, the statute's mandate is clear: if a 5 Three hundred weeks is the equivalent of five years, nine months and one week. [J-45-1999] - 5 disability occurs within 300 weeks of exposure, an employee s subsequent death is compensable.6 See Penn Steel Foundry and Machine Co. v. WCAB (Wagner), 551 A.2d 653 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). A second rule of statutory construction leads us to the same conclusion. The rules of statutory construction require that every statute shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all of its provisions. 1 Pa. C.S.A. §1921(a). As noted above, the critical language for purposes of this appeal is that if the employee's "compensable disability had occurred within such period, his subsequent death as a result of the disease shall likewise be compensable." 77 P.S. 411(2). This statement by the General Assembly is rendered meaningless and is superfluous unless one interprets it to apply only to deaths occurring beyond the 300 week period. The situation where death occurs within the 300 week period is already addressed by the preceding sentence: whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease. 77 P.S. §411(2). As demonstrated by reading these sentences, the time of death and the filing of a lifetime claim petition are irrelevant to a determination of the timeliness of a fatal claim petition.7 Again, it is whether disability occurred within 300 weeks of exposure. 6 To the extent that the Commonwealth Court s decision in Fortely is inconsistent with our decision today, it is hereby rejected. 7 A separate question arises whether section 301(c)(2) would permit death benefits to be awarded in a situation where a claim based upon disability occurring within 300 weeks would not meet the procedural or substantive requirements of the Act as of the time the death claim is filed. In such circumstances, it is arguable that the disability is not compensable for purposes of section 301(c)(2). For example, the issue would present (continued ¦) [J-45-1999] - 6 In the case sub judice, the evidence, as found by the finder of fact, establishes that Decedent was disabled as a result of work-related interstitial fibrosis prior to July 1986. As this date falls within the 300 week period following Decedent's last date of employment, i.e., the date of his last occupational exposure, his widow, Mrs. Miletti, is entitled to benefits pursuant to 77 P.S. §411(2). Mr. Justice Nigro files a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Zappala and Madame Justice Newman join. ( ¦continued) itself in a case in which, prior to the employee s death, the three-year limitation period for the filing of a claim petition imposed by section 315 of the Act, 77 P.S. §602, expired without a lifetime claim having been filed, and where it is established that the employee was informed of the work-related nature of his disease. In the case at bar, although Decedent did not file a lifetime claim within three years after he suffered total disability, this court has held that the three-year period does not commence until such time as the employee is apprised by competent medical diagnosis that his disability is due to occupational disease. See Price v. Workmen s Compensation Appeal Bd. (Metallurgical Resources), 626 A.2d 114, 117 (1993). Here, Decedent did not receive such diagnosis until December 1992, and the fatal claim petition was filed within one year s time thereafter. Thus, section 315 is no impediment to the death claim, and the City of McKeesport has not suggested that the Act otherwise bars the underlying claim for disability. [J-45-1999] - 7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
