BROWN v. CREEK COUNTY

BROWN v. CREEK COUNTY
2007 OK 56
164 P.3d 1073
Case Number: 103658
Decided: 07/03/2007

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

JOSHUA RAY BROWN, Plaintiff,
v.
CREEK COUNTY by & through the Creek County Board of County Commissioners, MICHAEL S. WARD, M.D., and CINDY A. NEWELL, L.P.N., Defendants.

CERTIFIED QUESTION FROM A FEDERAL COURT

¶0 CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED

Richard D. Marrs and E. Diane Hinkle, Richardson Law Firm Tulsa, Oklahoma, for plaintiff.
Matthew B. Free and Angela L. Smoot, Best & Sharp, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for defendants.

OPALA, J.

¶1 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma certified the following questions under the authority of the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act,

1. "Whether the provisions of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act ('GTCA'), Okla Stat. tit. 51, § 151 et seq., specifically §§ 156 and 157 pertaining to the statute of limitations, are in conflict with Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(11)?

2. Whether the claim presentation process and limitations contemplated by Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 156 and 157 can be read in pari materia with Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(11)?

3. Whether the statute of limitations on a claim brought by a prisoner for personal injury against a political subdivision of the state, pursuant to the GTCA, is governed by the statute of limitations in the GTCA, Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 156 and 157, or by Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(11)?

4. When does a cause of action accrue if the applicable statute of limitations on a claim brought against a political subdivision of the state for injury to a prisoner is governed by Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 156 and 157?

5. If Okla. Stat. tit. 12., § 95(A)(11) is the applicable statute of limitations on a claim brought by a prisoner for personal injury against a political subdivision of the state, does the 2004 enactment, or 2005 amendment, which adds the language 'claims for injury to the rights of another,' govern the claim?"

We answer (a) that a cause of action accrues at the time a plaintiff may maintain the claim, (b) that the statutes of limitation tendered for our construction are in conflict, and (c) that the Governmental Tort Claims Act controls. By today's answers the second and fifth questions are rendered moot.

I
THE ANATOMY OF FEDERAL LITIGATION

¶2 On October 1, 2004 Joshua Brown (plaintiff) was incarcerated at the Creek County Jail. He requested prescribed medication from defendant Cindy Newell, L.P.N (defendant) and, by October 22, 2004, he had properly submitted a written request for medication. Those requests were ignored.

¶3 On November 1, 2004 plaintiff was rushed to St. John Medical Center in Tulsa, Oklahoma, where he underwent a partial colectomy. Plaintiff claims that his failure to receive the requested medication necessitated the surgical procedure and has resulted in permanent injury. On January 30, 2005 plaintiff gave notice of his claim to the government sought to be sued. The government did not respond.

¶4 On March 20, 2006 plaintiff brought this action against defendants in the District Court in Creek County, Oklahoma, alleging negligence and deprivation of constitutional rights. Defendants removed the suit in reliance on federal question jurisdiction. Unable to determine how Oklahoma law would choose between two provisions in her statutes of limitation that were asserted as applicable to the inmate's claim in his suit against a political subdivision of the government, the federal district court posed to this court the legal questions we answer today.

II
DEFINING THE POINT AT WHICH A CAUSE OF ACTION ACCRUES

¶5 Before determining whether the limitations in the Governmental Tort Claims Act and those in

¶6 Defendant argues that a plaintiff must complete all the notice requirements and file suit within one entire year because "One waits at his own risk."

¶7 Because under GTCA's § 157(A) the right to sue does not attach until the claim has been denied or is deemed denied, we hold that causes of action brought under the GTCA do not accrue until that point.

III
DETERMINING THE CONTROLLING STATUTE

¶8 The terms of § 157 of the GTCA provide that no action brought under that act may be filed more than 180 days after notice of claim to the appropriate political subdivision has been denied or is deemed denied. The terms of

¶9 The plain language of the GTCA dictates that its prescriptions must control over any others. The terms of GTCA's § 164 provide that only those other statutes that are "not inconsistent" with the GTCA "shall apply to and govern all actions brought under the provisions of this act." Section 153 defines the liability of the state as exclusively governed by the GTCA. Further, in case of a conflict between a specific and a general statute, the specific enactment will control.

¶10 CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED

¶ 11 All justices concur.

FOOTNOTES

1 The provisions of 20 O.S. 2001 § 1602 are:

"Power to Answer. The Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals may answer a question of law certified to it by a court of the United States, or by an appellate court of another state, or of a federally recognized Indian tribal government, or of Canada, a Canadian province or territory, Mexico, or a Mexican state, if the answer may be determinative of an issue in pending litigation in the certifying court and there is no controlling decision of the Supreme Court or Court of Criminal Appeals, constitutional provision, or statute of this state."

2 See, e.g., Rivas v. Parkland Manor, 2000 OK 68, ¶23, 12 P.3d 452, 458; Neer v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Com'n, 1999 OK 41, ¶19, 982 P.2d 1071, 1079; Roberts v. University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics, 2003 OK 33 ¶6, 66 P.3d 453, 455.

3 MBA Commercial Const., Inc. v. Roy J. Hannaford Co., 1991 OK 87, ¶13, 818 P.2d 469, 473.

4 Walker v. Bowman, 1910 OK 290, ¶2, 111 P. 319.

5 Wille v. Geico Cas. Co., 2000 OK 10, ¶ 8, 2 P.3d 888, 894 (Opala, J., dissenting on an unrelated point).

6 Zachary v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, 2001 OK CIV APP 120, ¶ 5, 34 P.3d 1171, 1173.