Boatright v. Perkins

Boatright v. Perkins
1995 OK 34
894 P.2d 1091
66 OBJ 1328
Case Number: 80043
Decided: 04/11/1995
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

MANILLA BOATRIGHT, APPELLANT,
v.
WELDON G. PERKINS, HAROLD G. PERKINS AND WANDA BURKS, APPELLEES.

[894 P.2d 1092]
On Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division No. 4.

¶0 Plaintiff (Boatright) seeks a decreed conveyance from the defendants, her siblings, of the legal title to real property which they acquired through a probate of their mother's estate. Boatright claims that although she paid the consideration for this property's purchase and allowed legal title to be taken in her mother's name, she did not intend that the beneficial interest in the property go to its legal title holder. The District Court, Tulsa County, Donald C. Lane, Judge, sustained the defendants' motion for judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. On certiorari previously granted,

THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED, THE NISI PRIUS DECREE FOR THE DEFENDANTS REVERSED, AND THE CAUSE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS TO PROCEED IN A MANNER NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S PRONOUNCEMENT

Douglas L. Boyd, Tulsa, for appellant.

Georgina B. Landman, Tulsa, for appellees.

OPALA, Justice.

¶1 The issues presented on certiorari are: (1) Is the trial court's decision which refuses to impress a resulting trust on the defendants' title to the property in contest clearly contrary to the weight of the evidence? and (2) Does Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence recognize a rebuttable presumption of a gift when a child pays the purchase price for real property conveyed to its parent? We answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative. We conclude today that (a) Manilla Boatright [Boatright or daughter] clearly and convincingly established she paid the consideration for the purchased property in contest; (b) the legal title to this property is presumptively impressed with a resulting trust in Boatright's favor; and (c) the cause must be remanded to afford Weldon G. Perkins, Harold G. Perkins, and Wanda Burks [defendants or siblings] an opportunity to present their proof in defense against the claim.

[894 P.2d 1093]

I

THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION

¶2 In the spring of 1946 Boatright borrowed $4,000.00 from her fiancé for the down payment on a home in Tulsa.

¶3 In 1956 another home - at issue here - was purchased for $14,200.00. The property acquired earlier in 1946 was used as partial consideration. The balance of the purchase price was secured by a note signed by both Boatright and Perkins and by a mortgage given solely by Perkins. Once again legal title was taken in the mother's name. As before, Boatright's earnings were used to make all of the mortgage payments and to satisfy the ad valorem tax obligation - at the least until 1978.

¶4 In 1966 Elease Perkins borrowed from Weldon Perkins (her son) the money necessary to pay off the note and secure the release of the mortgage. These funds were repaid with monies which Boatright gave to her mother.

¶5 In 1978 Boatright filed in the Tulsa County Clerk's office an affidavit in which she claims an "interest"

¶6 Boatright, in January 1989, brought suit (a) claiming equitable title to the property as qua cestui que trust of a resulting trust and (b) seeking a decreed conveyance of the defendants' legal title acquired from the mother's probate. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the nisi prius court sustained the defendants' motion for judgment.

¶7 Boatright appealed from the nisi prius decision. Ruling there was no error in presuming a gift when a child pays the purchase price for property conveyed to a parent, the appellate court affirmed the nisi prius decree. We granted certiorari on Boatright's petition and now hold that a presumption of a gift does not arise when a child, who pays the purchase price, allows legal title to be taken in its parent's name. When legal title is conveyed to one other than the person who paid the purchase price, equity will presume that the latter (one paying the consideration) is its beneficial owner. Unless this presumption be rebutted, a resulting trust will be impressed on the property's legal title.

II

THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 A proceeding to impress a resulting trust

III

WHEN A CHILD PAYS THE PURCHASE PRICE AND A PARENT TAKES LEGAL TITLE TO A PROPERTY, NO REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF A GIFT WILL ARISE

¶9 Oklahoma's extant jurisprudence allows a rebuttable presumption of a gift where a parent pays the purchase price and legal title to property is conveyed to the child.8 This concept, which rests on the parents' legal obligation to provide for their children,9 lends no support for the reverse proposition. According to the ancient view of the chancery, though a duty to support one's child may be regarded as established, there is no corresponding obligation by a child to its parents. In short, when a child pays the consideration for the realty's purchase and legal title to the premises is taken in a parent's name, no legal presumption of a gift will arise.10

IV

WHEN LEGAL TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY IS CONVEYED TO ONE AND THE PURCHASE PRICE IS PAID BY ANOTHER, A TRUST IS PRESUMED TO RESULT IN FAVOR OF THE PERSON WHO PAYS THE CONSIDERATION

¶10 When legal title to real property is conveyed to one and another pays the consideration, the law presumes that the latter person (who paid the purchase price) intended to acquire the equitable interest in the property.

¶11 Boatright proved below that both (1) her earnings and (2) the monies she borrowed were used for payment of the property's purchase price. At all times after the property's purchase, Boatright conducted herself as though the obligation to pay the realty's purchase price was hers alone. While she accomplished payment by giving the money to her mother - who then paid the mortgage installments - rather than by direct remittance to the lender, equity looks beyond the form of transactions or the manner in which they take shape to carry out the true intentions of the parties.

V

WHEN A NISI PRIUS DECISION IN EQUITY - BY WHICH AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE THE TRIAL JUDGE SUSTAINS A DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT - IS REVERSED AS CLEARLY CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE'S WEIGHT, THE DEFENDING PARTY MUST BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT ITS CASE IN DEFENSE AGAINST THE CLAIM

¶12 The defendants moved for judgment at the conclusion of Boatright's evidence. The trial judge sustained their motion and ruled in their favor. The nisi prius decision is based upon a legal conclusion at variance with the applicable principles of equity.

VI

SUMMARY

¶13 According to Boatright's proof, she paid the consideration for both the 1946 and 1956 purchases of real property, the legal title to which was taken in her mother's name. It was not necessary for Boatright to prove more - i.e., that she intended to secure beneficial title in the purchased property. That intent is supplied by law, to whose § 137

¶14 The nisi prius decree cannot stand. The defendants were not afforded the opportunity [894 P.2d 1096] to adduce proof in defense against the claim. This cause must hence be remanded with directions to grant a new trial. On certiorari previously granted,

¶15 THE COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED, THE NISI PRIUS DECREE
FOR THE DEFENDANTS REVERSED, AND THE CAUSE REMANDED WITH
DIRECTIONS TO PROCEED IN A MANNER NOT INCONSISTENT WITH TODAY'S
PRONOUNCEMENT.

¶16 ALMA WILSON, C.J., KAUGER, V.C.J., and OPALA, SUMMERS, and WATT, JJ., concur.

¶17 SIMMS, J., concurs in result.

¶18 HODGES, LAVENDER, and HARGRAVE, JJ., dissent.

Footnotes:

1 This property was to be the home of Boatright, her minor daughter and her mother.

2 We view Boatright's use of the word "interest" [in her affidavit filed in the county clerk's office] to describe the nature of her demand as entirely compatible with her equitable claim as cestui que trust of a resulting trust.

3 A defendant's "demurrer" to the evidence is treated in equity as a motion for judgment in the movant's favor. Snow v. Winn, Okl., 607 P.2d 678, 680 (1980).

4 A resulting trust is deemed to arise when, upon the transfer of legal title to real property, an intent may be inferred from the circumstances of the conveyance that the grantor's beneficial interest was not passed with legal title. A trust would then "result" in favor of the grantor whom equity regards as cestui que trust (beneficial owner). Courts v. Aldridge, 190 Okl. 29, 120 P.2d 362, 364 (1941).

5 Cacy v. Cacy, Okl., 619 P.2d 200, 202 (1980); Staton v. Moody, 208 Okl. 372, 256 P.2d 409, 450 (1953); Childers v. Breese, 202 Okl. 377, 213 P.2d 565, 568 (1950); Aldridge, supra note 4, 120 P.2d at 365; Exchange Trust Co. v. Godfrey, 128 Okl. 108, 261 P. 197, 202 (1927); Indian Trust & Land Co. v. Owen, 63 Okl. 127, 162 P. 818, 822 (1917).

6 Aldridge, supra note 4, 120 P.2d at 365; Childers v. Breese, 202 Okl. 377, 213 P.2d 565, 568 (1950); Adams v. Adams, 208 Okla. 378, 256 P.2d 458, 462 (1953).

7 Willis v. Nowata Land and Cattle Co., Okl., 789 P.2d 1282, 1286-87 (1990).

8 Godfrey, supra note 5. 261 P. at 201; King v. Courtney, 190 Okl. 256, 122 P.2d 1014, 1015 (1942); Hankins v. Hankins, 195 Okl. 160, 155 P.2d 720, 722 (1945).

9 See Godfrey, supra note 5, 261 P. at 202.

10 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 442 comment a (1959), which states in pertinent part:

"It the law's presumption of a gift to the grantee] does not apply where the payor and transferee respectively are . . . child and parent."

11 The terms of 60 O.S. 1991 § 137 are:

"When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration therefore is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made."

12 The chancery doctrine of resulting trust is codified in 60 O.S. 1991 § 137 . See supra note 11 for the pertinent terms of 60 O.S. 1991 § 137 . Oklahoma City v. Vahlberg, 197 Okl. 613, 173 P.2d 736, 740 (1946). For a discussion of the chancery trust concepts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 440 which states in pertinent part:

"Where a transfer of property is made to one person and the purchase price is paid by another, a resulting trust arises in favor of the person by whom the purchase price is paid. . . ."

13 Wadsworth v. Courtney, Okl., 393 P.2d 530, 533 (1964); Nicklas v. Crowell, 205 Okl. 432, 238 P.2d 347, 350 (1951); Lawrence v. Lawrence, 195 Okl. 610, 159 P.2d 1018, 1020 (1945).

14 The trust must arise, if at all, at the time the purchase of the real property is made. Adams, supra note 6, 256 P.2d at 461.

15 Childers, supra note 5, 213 P.2d at 567; Exchange Bank of Perry v. Nichols, 196 Okl. 283, 164 P.2d 867, 872-73 (1946); Indian Trust, supra note 5, 162 P. at 822.

16 For a discussion of the obligation borne by the party who seeks to overcome the presumption of resulting trust, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 441.

17 Exchange Bank, supra note 15, 164 P.2d at 874.

18 When a child pays the purchase price for real property and the realty is taken in the name of a parent, there is no presumption of a gift. See section III above.

19 Leck v. Leck, Okl., 800 P.2d 249, 250 (1990); Snow, supra note 3 at 681 n. 4.

20 Malnar v. Whitfield, Okl., 708 P.2d 1093, 1095 (1985).

21 For the text of § 137, see supra note 11.

22 See explanatory text in part III of the opinion.