Rodgers v. Rosen

Rodgers v. Rosen
1987 OK 37
737 P.2d 562
58 OBJ 1342
Case Number: 59541
Decided: 05/12/1987
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

TERESA RODGERS, APPELLEE,
v.
HARVEY ROSEN, AN INDIVIDUAL, DAVID ROSEN, AN INDIVIDUAL, LAWRENCE KATES, AN INDIVIDUAL, AND ARTHUR BURDORF, AN INDIVIDUAL, D/B/A, LYREWOOD ASSOCIATES, A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, STANDARD INVESTMENTS OF LOS ANGELES, A GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, AND J. ERNEST TALLEY, AN INDIVIDUAL, D/B/A TALLEY INVESTMENTS OF WICHITA, KANSAS, APPELLANTS.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division III; Appeal from District Court of Oklahoma County; Homer Smith, Trial Judge.

¶0 Appellee was assaulted in her apartment by an unknown intruder. Appellee initiated this action against owners of her apartment complex alleging that owners' negligence had allowed the intruder access to her apartment. Trial court granted summary judgment for owners but reversed itself on motion for new trial. Owners appealed the grant of motion for new trial. Court of Appeals affirmed trial court on ground that duty of landlords was statutorily imposed. Owners petitioned this Court for certiorari.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; ORDER OF TRIAL COURT REVERSED.

James W. Bill Berry & Associates by James W. Berry, Oklahoma City, for appellee.

Huckaby, Fleming, Frailey & Chaffin by Micheal L. Darrah, Oklahoma City, for appellants.

LAVENDER, Justice:

¶1 Teresa Rogers, appellee in this case, was assaulted in her apartment by an unknown [737 P.2d 563] assailant. In the process of escaping from this assailant appellee leaped out of the window of her second story apartment and received injuries to her back. Appellee brought this action against the owners of the apartment complex in which her apartment was located, alleging that the owners, as landlords, had acted negligently in allowing the assailant to gain access to her apartment. Appellant owners brought a motion for summary judgment alleging they owed no duty to appellee and that she therefore could not maintain an action in negligence. The trial court granted appellants' motion on the ground that there was no duty of the landlord to protect a tenant from criminal acts of a third party. Appellee filed motion for new trial alleging that facts before the trial court at the time of ruling on the motion for summary judgment established that acts or omissions of appellants' agents were directly responsible for the entry of the assailant to appellee's apartment. The trial court granted the motion for new trial and appellants brought the present appeal.

¶2 The Court of Appeals, Division III, to which this case was originally assigned, affirmed the trial court's order granting the new trial. In doing so, the Court of Appeals found that the Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,

I.

¶3 The pertinent provisions of section 118 of the Oklahoma Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, provide:

"A. A landlord shall at all times during the tenancy:

1. Except in the case of a single-family residence, keep all common areas of his building, grounds, facilities and appurtenances in a clean, safe and sanitary condition;

2. Make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the tenant's dwelling unit and premises in a fit and habitable condition; . . . ." (Emphasis added)

¶4 We are constrained to hold contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion, and accordingly vacate the opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division III, rendered in this case. Such words as "safe," "fit" and "habitable," as used within the context of such statutes, imposing a minimum duty of maintenance of the premises on the landlord, refer exclusively to the physical condition of the premises, and have no relation to a duty to provide protection to the tenant against criminal activities of third parties.

II.

¶5 This Court, in Lay v. Dworman,

¶6 On appeal appellee argues that the trial court properly granted the motion for new trial because the evidence before it on motion for summary judgment raised a question of appellants' liability for her injuries under one or both of two theories; negligence and implied warranty.

¶7 In conjunction with the motion for summary judgment the following facts were acknowledged to be uncontroverted: 1) that a ladder was used to gain access to appellee's apartment; 2) that the assailant broke a window to gain access to appellee's apartment; and 3) that the ladder used had possibly belonged to an independent contractor who had done work on the complex prior to the incident. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to appellee it is apparent that, although the ladder was used to gain access to the window, the window itself was secure against intrusion absent the application of the force to break it.

¶8 The evidence before the trial court on appellants' motion for summary judgment was uncontroverted by competent evidence as to the mode of entry into appellee's apartment. The entry by force through the otherwise secure window provided the proximate cause of appellee's injuries. As the proximate cause of her injuries had no relation to any breach of duty by appellants, appellants were entitled to judgment on appellee's negligence theory as a matter of law.

¶9 Similarly, the materials before the trial court failed to establish any factual basis to support appellee's alleged implied warranty theory. The materials present nothing more than a mere allegation that appellee's injuries were a result of appellants' failure to provide adequate security. There is a total failure to establish the existence of a causation link between appellants' acts or omissions and appellee's injuries. As such the materials failed to establish a basis for recovery under implied warranty theory as the existence of proximate cause is a necessary prerequisite to maintaining a cause of action under that theory.

III.

¶10 The trial court's grant of summary judgment to appellants was proper as a matter of law. Its subsequent grant of appellee's motion for new trial was the result of an erroneous reassessment of the facts upon which the judgment had been entered. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division III is VACATED. The order of the trial court granting appellee's motion for new trial is REVERSED.

¶11 HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and HODGES, SIMMS, OPALA and SUMMERS, JJ., concur.

¶12 DOOLIN, C.J., and ALMA WILSON and KAUGER, JJ., dissent.

Footnotes:

1 41 O.S. 1981 §§ 101 through 135.

2 Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231 (D.C.App. 1971); Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority, 78 Ill. 2d 204, 35 Ill.Dec. 530, 399 N.E.2d 596 (1979); DeKoven v. 780 West End Realty Co., 48 Misc.2d 951, 266 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965); New York City Housing Authority v. Medlin, 57 Misc.2d 145, 291 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1968).

3 732 P.2d 455 (Okla. 1987).

4 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 448 (1965).

5 Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 517 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1973); Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943 (Okla. 1973).

6 Lindsay v. Sikes, 483 P.2d 1141 (Okla. 1971).

7 See Sneed v. Beaverson, 395 P.2d 414 (Okla. 1964).

8 Supra, note 3.