TAXICAB DRIVERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 889 v. COOK

TAXICAB DRIVERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 889 v. COOK
1958 OK 116
327 P.2d 660
Case Number: 37009
Decided: 05/06/1958
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

TAXICAB DRIVERS' LOCAL UNION NO. 889, GLOYD DAVIDSON, AND JOSEPH MAROOF,
PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR,
v.
J.H. COOK, DEFENDANT IN ERROR.

Syllabus by the Court.

¶0 1. An order overruling a motion to quash and objection to the jurisdiction cannot be reviewed on appeal unless the same is properly presented to the trial court in a motion for a new trial.
2. The suability of a voluntary unincorporated association by its common name must be seasonably presented to the trial court and a proper record of its ruling preserved to present the issue to this court.
3. The officers of an association who, while enforcing a provision of the association's contract with a member's employer, tortiously interfere with a member's right to dispose of his labor, are not the member's agent for that purpose.
4. All persons have the right to dispose of their labor in their chosen vocation without unlawful interference from others; and the gravamen of a cause of action for damages resulting from a suspension from employment at the request of a third person is an unlawful, tortious, interference by such third person with the plaintiff's right to dispose of his labor.
5. A member's refusal to comply with the void judgment of an association's tribunal does not place the member in bad standing with such association so as to justify the association in causing the member's suspension from work under the terms of its contract with the member's employer.
6. Punitive action taken against a member of a voluntary association, as authorized by the reasonable rules of such organization, must be observed by the member only where the procedure adopted to impose the punishment conforms to the basic notions of justice which all recognize as essential to a fair trial, and where the decision of the organization tribunal is supported by some evidence.
7. The decision of a voluntary association tribunal is void where the member is not given a trial conforming to the rules of such organization and the basic notions of justice which all recognize as inherent in a fair trial.
8. It is the duty of this court, in reviewing instructions for the purpose of determining whether or not substantial error has been committed, to consider such instructions as a whole, and, if they are found to have fairly submitted the issues to the jury, the cause should not be reversed merely because individual instructions, standing alone, may be subject to criticism.
9. Where the plaintiff, damaged by the wrongful act of the defendant, uses reasonable care and attempts to reduce the loss for which defendant is liable, he can recover from the wrongdoer in full for all damages even though his efforts to reduce the loss may have resulted in an increase of the total damage.

Appeal from District Court of Oklahoma County; Wm. L. Fogg, Judge.

Action for damages resulting from the alleged wrongful termination of plaintiff's employment at defendants' request. Judgment for plaintiff and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

C.W. Schwoerke, Oklahoma City, for plaintiffs in error.

Everett E. Cotter, Johnson, Gordon & Cotter, Oklahoma City, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM.

¶1 This action was initiated by defendant in error, plaintiff below, to recover damages for the alleged wrongful actions of the various defendants below in instituting and conducting disciplinary action against him within the defendant labor union and thereafter causing the loss of his job. The initial petition joined several individuals, the plaintiff's employer, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and the plaintiffs in error as defendants; but all save the present plaintiffs in error and the International Union were omitted from the third amended petition upon which the action was tried. At the conclusion of the trial and after verdict for plaintiff, the trial court sustained a motion for new trial by the International Union but overruled the motion of plaintiffs in error and entered judgment against them conforming to the verdict of the jury. They have appealed.

¶2 The facts out of which this action arose are, in all material respects, substantially the same as those stated in Taxicab Drivers' Local Union No. 889 v. Pittman, Okl., 322 P.2d 159. We shall not restate them here. This action was not consolidated for trial with the Pittman case, as were other actions also arising out of the same facts, but the issues presented in this case concerning these defendants are substantially the same as those presented in that case concerning the same defendants. Our conclusion here is largely controlled by our conclusion in that action.

¶3 After service of process the defendant Local Union appeared specially and questioned the service of process on it as an entity under the provisions of Section

¶4 As in the other actions, the Local Union asserts in this action that no cause of action was stated or proved against it because the individuals whose acts caused the plaintiff to lose his job were as much his agents as the agents of the other union members. The fallacy of this argument was discussed in our opinion in the Pittman case. We see no necessity to elaborate further. The obstacles to the satisfaction of a judgment from any assets other than those of the Local Union do not preclude a determination of its liability as a factual entity.

¶5 We noted in our other opinion, above cited, that the gravamen of all these actions for damages was the wrongful interference with the plaintiff's employment. With this in mind, the argument alleging a failure of the evidence to disclose that the Union's action proximately caused plaintiff's damages is without merit. There was ample evidence in this case to disclose that the Local's Business Agent, Davidson, and the Local's President, Maroof, who were charged with responsibility in these matters by the Union Constitution and By-Laws, caused the plaintiff to be suspended from work for his failure to pay a fine which was wrongfully imposed by the Union tribunal and void. These officers were acting on behalf of the Local Union and within the authority specifically granted them by the Local Union. Their actions caused the damage.

¶6 Defendants also complain of certain instructions given by the court. Instruction No. 13 contained language which is contrary to the Union Constitution provision concerning a waiver of a fine pending appeal to the International Union. In this regard the instruction was not correct, but we fail to see how it was prejudicial. We held in the Pittman case that the fine was absolutely void for failure of the Union to grant plaintiff a trial. He was not, therefore, obligated to pay the void penalty, and the Union or these individual defendants cannot justify their interference with his employment upon the basis of his refusal to pay. The jury was properly instructed that a wrongful refusal to accept plaintiff's dues, which he had tendered, would constitute no defense. That part of the instruction concerning a reasonable time for granting a waiver of the fine was simply immaterial. Instruction No. 11 concerning the duty and liability of the Local and International Unions contained no prejudicial error for the same reasons. If the instruction was objectionable as applied to the International Union, that can offer no comfort to these defendants concerning whom adequate instructions were given as related to the facts on which their liability rested. Finally, Instruction No. 10 concerning agency also lacks prejudice inasmuch as the undisputed evidence disclosed the agency of the individuals in the performance of their duties as officers of the Local Union when they caused plaintiff to be suspended. Neither do we find reversible error in the admission of evidence of a conversation with one of these officers. Briefly, we note that the petition in error and the assignments of error by these defendants concerning all these instructions and the evidence are joint, not several, and for this reason too no reversible error is presented. Bilby v. Gibson, supra; Rein v. Patton, 208 Okl. 442, 257 P.2d 280.

¶7 Defendants also contend that the amount of damage awarded is not sustained by the undisputed evidence. The jury verdict was for the exact amount claimed by the petition which included the plaintiff's weekly earnings for each week prior to trial since his discharge. The defendants' contention arises because after several months of unsuccessful effort to find other work, plaintiff had to have a hernia operation in order to correct the disability which prevented him from securing work other than as a cab driver. Naturally he was disabled for a period as a consequence of the operation. We are not persuaded that this period should not have been allowed in computing damages. Plaintiff was not able to secure another job as a cab driver because of the Local Union's adjudication and its closed-shop contract with the other cab companies in this area. His operation helped to enable him to qualify for other employment after having been refused work by reason of the hernia. This was an effort to mitigate the damages for which defendants are responsible. They cannot complain.

¶8 What we have heretofore said in this opinion and in our opinion in the Pittman case, supra, disposes of the defendants' contentions concerning the submission to the jury of the issue of a fair union trial of plaintiff as well as the sufficiency of the evidence as against the defendants, Maroof and Davidson.

¶9 Judgment affirmed.

¶10 The Court acknowledges the aid of the Supreme Court Commission in the preparation of this opinion. After a tentative opinion was written by the Commission, the cause was assigned to a Justice of this Court, and thereafter, upon report and consideration in Conference, the foregoing opinion was adopted by the Court.

¶11 WELCH, C.J., CORN, V.C.J., and HALLEY, JOHNSON, WILLIAMS and JACKSON, JJ., concur.