QUIGLEY v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

QUIGLEY v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
1956 OK 168
298 P.2d 415
Case Number: 37227
Decided: 05/22/1956
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

IN THE MATTER OF THE DEATH OF NEAL QUIGLEY, EVELYN QUIGLEY, SURVIVING WIFE, PETITIONER,
v.
THE STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA, RESPONDENT, THE ARROW DRILLING COMPANY, A CORPORATION, RESPONDENT, THE EMPLOYER'S MUTUAL LIABILITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF WISCONSIN, INSURANCE CARRIER.

Syllabus by the Court.

¶0 Because House Bill No. 734 of the Twenty-fifth Legislature, 1955 S.L. 485,

85 O.S.1955 Supp. § 4, permits an employee who is injured outside the State of Oklahoma to maintain an action for compensation in the State Industrial Commission, the persons authorized by 12 O.S.1951 § 1054, may, by virtue of Art. XXIII, § 7 Const., 12 O.S. 1951 § 1053 and the Death Benefit Act, maintain an action therein for death benefits, if the injury results in death.

Syllabus by the Court.

¶0 Because House Bill No. 734 of the Twenty-fifth Legislature, 1955 S.L. 485,

Petition for review from the State Industrial Commission.

Original proceeding to review an order of the State Industrial Commission denying, for lack of jurisdiction, an award of death benefits to Evelyn Quigley, the claimant, for death of her husband, Neal Quigley, against the respondents, Arrow Drilling Co., his employer, and its insurance carrier, Employers' Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin. Order vacated.

Donald Royse, Elk City, for petitioner.

George E. Fisher, John A. O'Toole, Oklahoma City, for respondents.

DAVISON, Justice.

¶1 This is an original proceeding in this court to review an order of the State Industrial Commission, denying an award of death benefits under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law, 85 O.S. 1951 § 1 [85-1] et seq. to the claimant, Evelyn Quigley, for the accidental death of her husband, Neal Quigley, as against his employer, Arrow Drilling Company and its insurance carrier, Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Company of Wisconsin, as respondents. The parties will be referred to as they appeared before the Commission.

¶2 The deceased was employed by the respondent as an oil well driller at a location in the Oklahoma Panhandle some twelve miles north of Perryton, Texas. He was driving an automobile, allegedly in the course of his employment on October 5, 1955, at a place in the State of Texas approximately seventeen miles south of Perryton in said State of Texas when he met his death as a result of a collision. The Commission denied an award of death benefits to his widow, the claimant, finding that it had no jurisdiction to make such an award in cases where the injury, which caused the death, occurred outside the state.

¶3 A determination of the meaning and effect on claims for death benefits, of the 1955 amendment to 85 O.S. 1951 § 4 [85-4] (House Bill # 734, S.L. 1955, page 485 disposes of all issues presented). The title of said House Bill is as follows:

"An Act amending Section Four (4), Title
Eighty-five (85), Oklahoma Statutes, 1951, relating
to Workmen's Compensation Law, fixing jurisdiction in
cases where injury occurs outside the State of
Oklahoma, when employment contract made and entered
into within the territorial limits of the State of
Oklahoma; providing for election by the injured
employee in such cases to assert claim and liability
under either the law of this State or the State where
accident and injury occurred; * *."

¶4 The Bill itself so far as here applicable reads as follows:

"Section 1. Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Law
Applicable When Contract of Employment Entered Into
Within State - Jurisdiction of Actions for Injuries -
Compensation Paid Before Commencement of Action -
Territorial Jurisdiction - Lands and Property of
United States. That Section Four (4), Title
Eighty-five (85), Oklahoma Statutes, 1951, be and the
same is hereby amended as follows:
"Section 4. From and after the passage and
effective date of this Act, all the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of this State (Title 85
O.S. 1951) and all amendments thereof or thereto
shall apply to employers and to employees,
irrespective of where accident resulting in injury
may occur, whether within or without the territorial
limits of the State of Oklahoma, when the contract of
employment was entered into within the State of
Oklahoma, and the said employee was acting in the
course of such employment and performing work outside
the territorial limits of this State under direction
of such employer. In such cases the injured employee
may elect to commence and maintain his action for
benefits and compensation before the State Industrial
Commission of the State of Oklahoma, and the said
Commission is hereby vested with jurisdiction thereof
as fully as if such injury or accident had occurred
within this State. * * *"

¶5 The finding of the Commission, in its order herein, was that,

"The extra-territorial jurisdiction Act, laws 1955,
page 486 Section 2, has no application to claims for
injuries resulting in death arising outside the State
of Oklahoma and the State Industrial Commission has
no jurisdiction of this claim."

¶6 The argument of the parties, in their briefs, seems to be pitched upon the same foundation as the above quoted finding, namely, that claims for death benefits are within the purview of the said legislative act if, and only if, the wording of the title and body thereof are sufficiently comprehensive to include them. That assumption, however, is incorrect. The 1950 amendment to Art. XXIII, § 7 of Oklahoma Constitution authorizing it and the 1951 death benefit statutes, House Bill No. 312 of the 23rd Legislature S.L. 1951, pp. 267 to 270 inc., provide for amount of compensation, which is exclusive, payable in cases where death results from injuries suffered in employment covered by the Workmen's Compensation Law. The first discussion and interpretation of said Death Benefit Act was in the opinion of this court in the case of Capitol Steel & Iron Co. v. Fuller, 206 Okla. 638, 245 P.2d 1134, 1139. Therein, it was pointed out that,

"The effect of the amendment or added proviso of
Article XXIII, sec. 7 of the Constitution was to
place a death action upon the same footing as a
personal injury action when each arose by reason of
accidental injury in the course of employment covered
by the Workmen's Compensation Act." And,
"* * * any provision in said act which modifies the
provisions of sections 1053 [12-1053]and 1054
[12-1054] of Title 12 O.S. 1941, except to
`provide an amount of compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Law for death resulting from injuries
suffered in employment covered by such law,' is
also void. * * *
"It must be always borne in mind that the injured
employee's cause of action for damages for personal
injuries was and is one at common law, now abrogated
by the Workmen's Compensation Law, but that the right
of others to recover for his death is purely
statutory and exists in this jurisdiction solely by
virtue of 12 O.S. 1941, sec. 1053 [12-1053]. St.
Louis & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Goode, 42 Okla. 784, 142 P. 1185,
L.R.A. 1915E, 1141. No cause of action for death is
created by Art. XXIII sec. 7 (originally or as
amended) or by the Workmen's Compensation Law which
now applies to and controls both causes of action.
This last mentioned law does not and cannot create
either."

¶7 Those quoted pronouncements have been followed in all subsequent cases dealing with the same subject matter. Any right of recovery for death, whether it be by an action at law for wrongful death or a claim for death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law, exists by reason of the provisions of 12 O.S. 1951 § 1053 [12-1053], as follows:

"When the death of one is caused by the wrongful
act or omission of another, the personal
representative of the former may maintain an action
therefor against the latter, or his personal
representative if he is also deceased, if the former
might have maintained an action had he lived, against
the latter or his representative for an injury for
the same act or omission."

¶8 This reasoning leads to but one conclusion * * *. In all instances where an injured person may pursue a remedy to recover for his loss, either in damages or compensation, the persons authorized by 12 O.S. 1951 § 1054 [12-1054] may, if death results from the injury, pursue a remedy to recover for their loss, either in damages or death benefit award.

¶9 Under the common law, a person wrongfully injured could maintain an action for damages in the courts of this state only when the injury was inflicted in this state. In those cases where such right of recovery has been abrogated by the Workmen's Compensation Law, the proceeding is before the Industrial Commission and prior to the 1955 amendment to 85 O.S. 1951 § 4 [85-4] was limited to injuries occurring within this state. Sheehan Pipe Line Const. Co. v. State Industrial Comm., 151 Okla. 272, 3 P.2d 199; Beck v. Davis, 175 Okla. 623, 54 P.2d 371; Battiest v. State Industrial Comm., 197 Okla. 618, 173 P.2d 922. Proceedings for recovery of death benefits were likewise restricted. However, it is uncontroverted that, by virtue of said 1955 amendment to 85 O.S. 1951 § 4 [85-4], the State Industrial Commission is authorized to make awards for injuries suffered outside this state when the requirements of said law have been met. We have, heretofore, consistently held that,

"When an injury occurs, a cause of action accrues
to the injured employee and he has a right of action
in the Industrial Commission. He `need proceed no
further than the State Industrial Commission to
recover full compensation therefor.'" Markley v.
White, 168 Okla. 244, 32 P.2d 716, 717; Landry v. Acme
Flour Mills Co., 202 Okla. 170, 211 P.2d 512, 516.

¶10 And now, since the 1950 amendment of Art. XXIII, § 7 Oklahoma Constitution and the passage of the 1951 Death Benefit Act, supra, when the injury results in death and, by virtue of the Workmen's Compensation Law, the employee "might have maintained an action (in the State Industrial Commission) had he lived, against the latter (the employer) for an injury for the same act or omission", then because of the provisions of 12 O.S. 1951 § 1053 [12-1053] as modified by the Death Benefit Act, supra, the authorized persons (under 12 O.S. 1951 § 1054 [12-1054]) "may maintain an action therefor against the latter (the employer)."

¶11 Turning back to the case now being considered, the enactment of House Bill 734, above quoted, authorized the deceased, Neal Quigley, had he lived, to maintain an action in the State Industrial Commission for the injury. Therefore, by reason of 12 O.S. 1951 § 1053 [12-1053], that situation permits the claimant, Evelyn Quigley, to maintain an action for his death as the result of such injuries. In line with this conclusion, it is immaterial to the jurisdiction of the Commission, whether the title or body of said House Bill 734 makes the act expressly applicable to claims for death benefits. The State Industrial Commission has jurisdiction to hear the matter on its merits.

¶12 The order is vacated and the Commission is directed to hear and determine the merits of the claim.

¶13 JOHNSON, C.J., WILLIAMS, V.C.J., and HALLEY, BLACKBIRD, JACKSON and HUNT, JJ., concur.