PETROVICS v. BROWN

PETROVICS v. BROWN
1950 OK 205
221 P.2d 1022
Case Number: 33509
Decided: 07/18/1950
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Syllabus

¶0 In the notice of resale prescribed by statute the description of the land may be held sufficient if it is found that it is such as will enable the owner and prospective purchasers to identify and locate the land to be sold with substantial certainty and that it is not calculated to mislead.

Appeal from the District Court, Garfield County, Tom R. Blaine, Judge.

Action by J. Floyd Brown against Liebfried Petrovics and others, to recover possession of and to quiet title to realty under a resale tax deed. Judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed. Judgement affirmed.

Winfield Scott and H. R. Christopher, both of Enid, for plaintiff in error.

Elam and Crowley, of Enid, for defendant in error.

WELCH, J.

¶1 The plaintiff J. Floyd Brown, resting his claim of title upon a county treasurer's resale deed, recovered judgment quieting title to real estate. The property is described as follows:

"The North Twenty-five (25) feet of the South Fifty (50) feet of Lots One (1), Two (2), Three (3), Four (4), Five (5), and Six (6), in Block Thirty-four (34) in the original townsite of the City of Enid, Oklahoma."

¶2 The defendant, Liebfried Petrovics, the record owner of the land at the time of resale, asserts error.

¶3 It was contended before the trial court, as here, that sale of the land was invalid for the reason that notice of resale was not in compliance with the statutes in that the property was not properly described in said notice of resale and said notice was not sufficient to apprise the defendant that his property was being advertised for sale. In the property schedule set forth in the notice of resale there appears the following:

"Enid Original

"N. 25' of S. 50' of 1 to 6, 34, L. Petrovice."

¶4 In Eckels v. Krober et al., 198 Okl. 625, 181 P.2d 268, in the second paragraph of the syllabus it is said:

"In a notice of resale of land prescribed by 68 O.S. 1941 § 432b, the description of the land is sufficient if the notice as a whole will enable the owner and prospective purchasers to become informed that certain land is to be sold and enable them to identify and locate the land with substantial certainty. In determining such matters a fact question may be involved and the trial court's determination in that respect will not be disturbed by this court unless clearly against the weight of the evidence."

¶5 The explanatory matter in the notice of resale is such as to leave no doubt as to the meaning of the figures therein and that '1 to 6, 34' means lots 1 to 6 block 34. The name L. Petrovics listed thereafter as the name of the record owner is not at variance with the name Liebfried Petrovics. The caption 'Enid Original' appearing above the lots and block number, in its generally accepted meaning, locates the lots as being in the Enid Original townsite.

¶6 The notice of resale in the matter of land description appears on its face to be in substantial compliance with the statute.

¶7 It is suggested here that the tax sale notices might have been confusing and therefore insufficient under the rule of Kasner v. Stanmire, 195 Okl. 80, 155 P.2d 230, and Eckels v. Krober, supra.

¶8 In these cases we were furnished complete copies of the notices of sale which demonstrated an arrangement and some details justifying a conclusion that the notices were inexact and confusing as to the involved land. Here the excerpts from notices which are furnished us do not disclose the complete arrangement of the various tracts for sale and resale and do not demonstrate such confusion as to the involved tract. In those cases last cited the trial court found the notices in fact were insufficient and there was sufficient evidence, including complete copies of the notices, to sustain that finding. Here, in effect, the trial court found the opposite to be true. This finding was based on the evidence heard and examined, perhaps including complete copies of the notices. The record furnishes no justification for reversing that finding.

¶9 The property here involved was sold at resale in 1945 for unpaid special paving assessments for the years 1940-1944. Original sale for delinquent paving assessments was held in November, 1940, and each year thereafter to and including 1944. During these years all ad valorem taxes were paid.

¶10 The defendant asserts the deed is void because the resale of May, 1945, was held within less than two years of the November, 1944 sale for delinquent taxes, and this irrespective of original sale in 1940. It is further asserted that there is no authority for resale resting alone on original sale for delinquent paving assessments, and when there is no delinquent ad valorem tax.

¶11 These contentions of the defendant are in conflict with statutes which provide for the enforcement of delinquent paving assessments by resale in the same manner as other taxes and which provide that resale shall include all delinquent taxes against the property to be sold. These provisions of statute are clear in their terms as reflected in numerous decisions of this court, and we deem specific citation here unnecessary.

¶12 The resale deed in which the plaintiff is named grantee appears on its face to be substantially in the form as provided by statute and prima facie valid.

¶13 The judgment is affirmed.

¶14 ARNOLD, V. C. J., and CORN, GIBSON, LUTTRELL, JOHNSON and O'NEAL, JJ., concur.