WORLEY v. FRENCH

WORLEY v. FRENCH
1938 OK 581
85 P.2d 296
184 Okla. 116
Case Number: 28517
Decided: 11/15/1938
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

WORLEY, Mayor, et al.
v.
FRENCH

Syllabus

¶0 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Powers Limited to Those Expressly Granted or Impliedly Granted or Those Indispensable.
The powers which a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise are limited to those powers which are by the act under which they are created and by the charter of the municipal corporation (1) expressly granted; (2) those impliedly granted and necessarily fairly incident to the power expressly granted; or (3) those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, not simply convenient, but indispensable.
2. CARRIERS--Power of City to Fix Taxicab Rates.
Power on the part of an incorporated city or town to fix rates to be charged by the operators of taxicabs within the corporate limits of said city or town can only be derived by express grant or by necessary implication from powers expressly granted.
3. SAME--Statutes Held not to Empower Cities to Fix Taxicab Rates.
By the provisions of sections 6434, 6435, and 6436, O. S. 1931, 47 Okla. St. Ann. secs. 221-223, any person, firm, or corporation is granted specific statutory authority and right to use the city streets of any city within this state for the purpose of the operation of automobiles or auto-busses for the carrying of passengers within said cities, subject to the power of the cities to impose certain regulations for the public welfare therein specifically delegated to said cities; but by said sections the cities are not delegated authority to fix rates for the operation of such automobiles for hire.
4. STATUTES--Particular Terms not Amplified by General Words Following.
General words do not explain or amplify particular terms preceding them, but are themselves restricted and explained by the particular terms.

Appeal from District Court, Grady County; Will Linn, Judge.

Action by Ray French against John Worley, Mayor of the City of Chickasha, et al., to enjoin enforcement of city ordinance. Injunction granted, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Melton, McElroy & Vaughn, for plaintiffs in error.
Hatcher & Bond and Gerald Spencer, for defendant in error.

GIBSON, J.

¶1 This appeal is from a decree of the district court of Grady county entered October 26, 1937, permanently enjoining the enforcement of section 7 of an ordinance adopted on August 12, 1937, by the city of Chickasha, the terms of which section fix a minimum taxicab fare to be charged within the limits of that city.

¶2 The parties are herein referred to as they appeared below.

¶3 The ordinance provided for the licensing, inspection, and other regulation of the operations of taxicabs within that city. 'Section 7 thereof provided as follows:

"Section 7. Rates.--All persons, firms or corporations, owning, operating or controlling any taxicab within the limits of the city of Chickasha. shall charge a minimum fare of 10c per person."

¶4 Ray Thomas owned and operated a taxicab service in that city and filed his suit against the city of Chickasha, its mayor and chief of police, as defendants, seeking injunctive relief against the enforcement of said ordinance.

¶5 Upon hearing had, the district court found the provisions of said ordinance other than said section 7 valid, legal, and enforceable; and specifically found, and so decreed, section 7 invalid and unenforceable, and enjoined enforcement of said .section. To this action the defendants excepted and appealed to this court.

¶6 Defendants present their appeal upon the single proposition that under the legislative authority the city of Chickasha had express and implied powers and authority to fix minimum rates to be charged by taxicabs operating within the corporate limits of said city as provided by section 7 of said ordinance. The validity of said section 7 only is here at issue.

¶7 The city of Chickasha is a city of first class operating under general statutory provisions.

¶8 Defendants urge that power and authority is vested in said city for the enactment and enforcement of said section 7 under the provisions of section 6349, O. S. 1931 (11 Okla. St. Ann. see. 568), and section 6380, O. S. 1931 (11 Okla. St. Ann. see. 642), being the provisions relating to the general powers of municipalities effective since. the advent of statehood.

¶9 Defendants would give to those later en-, acted and specific legislative provisions respecting the operation of automobiles for hire, being sections 6434, 6435, and 6436,

¶10 O. S. 1931 (47 Okla. St. Ann. sees. 221-223), a more limited scope than the terms thereof provide.

¶11 Were we to assume, without deciding that the general power sections relied upon by defendants included, as defendants urge, the power to fix taxicab rates, the later enactments expressly legislating on the regulation of automobiles for hire, and which Sections (6434) authorize regulations by a city which "may include any other requirement reasonable in its nature," these later specific enactments will prevail over the former statute as to the subject matters embraced within the later enacted statutes.

"The Legislature is presumed to have had former statutes before it, to have been acquainted with their judicial construction, and to have passed new statutes on the same subject with reference thereto. * * * If it can be gathered from a subsequent statute in pari materia what meaning the Legislature attached to the words of a former statute, they will amount to a legislative declaration of its meaning, and will govern the construction of the first statute." 25 R. C. L. pp. 1063, 1064; 59 C. J. 1056, 1057.

¶12 These later sections (6434, 6435, 6436) were, construed by this court, with especial reference to the matter of fixing taxicab rates, in the case of Y & Y Cab Service v. Oklahoma City (1933) 167 Okla. 134, 28 P.2d 551, and the conclusions reached in that ease are determinative of the issue here.

¶13 Affirmed.