PROTEST OF STANOLIND PIPE LINE CO. v. STANOLIND PIPE LINE CO.

PROTEST OF STANOLIND PIPE LINE CO. v. STANOLIND PIPE LINE CO.
1934 OK 254
32 P.2d 869
168 Okla. 281
Case Number: 23743
Decided: 04/24/1934
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

PROTEST OF STANOLIND PIPE LINE CO. et al. SEMINOLE COUNTY et al.
v.
STANOLIND PIPE LINE CO. et al.

Syllabus

¶0 1. Judgment--Presumptions in Favor of Validity of Judgment of Courts of Competent Jurisdiction.
When a court of competent jurisdiction has rendered a judgment in relation to any subject within its jurisdiction, the presumption arises that it had before it sufficient evidence to authorize it to award such judgment; and where facts are required to be proved to confer jurisdiction, the presumption is that such facts were duly proved although the record was silent upon the matter.
2. Same--Collateral Attack on Judgment of District Court--Judgment not Rendered Void by Defective Pleading.
The district courts of this state are courts of general jurisdiction, and their judgments cannot be collaterally attacked unless the record affirmatively shows want of jurisdiction, and every fact not negatived by the record is presumed in support of the judgment, and where the court is one having power to grant the relief sought, and having the parties before it, the fact that the petition defectively states a cause of action or fails to state it, does not make the judgment void on collateral attack; there being no connection between jurisdiction and sufficient allegations.
3. Same--Finding of Jurisdictional Facts Conclusive in Collateral Attack.
A finding of the jurisdictional facts in a domestic judgment is conclusive in a collateral attack upon such judgment where an attempt was made to again put such facts in issue.
4. Same--Party Making Collateral Attack Required to Allege and Prove Invalidity of Judgment Appears on Face of Judgment Roll.
Where the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is attacked in a collateral proceeding, the party attacking must allege and prove that the judgment roll shows upon the face thereof that the judgment is void.
5. Taxation--Inherent Power of Court of Tax Review to Vacate Its Own Judgments.
The Court of Tax Review has inherent power to vacate its own judgments at any time within ten days after the same are filed with the State Auditor.

Appeal from Court of Tax Review; Porter Newman, Asa E. Walden, and O. C. Wybrant, Judges.

Protest of the Stanolind Pipe Line Company et al. against certain tax levies made by the Excise Board of Seminole County. Judgment for protestants, and Seminole County and another appeal. Reversed, with directions.

Orr & Woodford and Otis H. Presson, for plaintiffs in error.
Hunt & Eagleton, for defendants in error.

BUSBY, J.

¶1 On June 13, 1929, a judgment was rendered in the district court of Seminole county in an action therein pending in which S. D. Patterson was plaintiff and Carr school district No. 25, Seminole county, was defendant. The judgment was in favor of the plaintiff. No appeal was taken and the judgment became final. It was assigned to Hugh Green.

¶2 The validity of the judgment was collaterally attacked in the Court of Tax Review in a protest filed by the defendant in error. We have examined the judgment roll in connection with the questioned judgment and find it valid. The reasons for so holding are fully set forth in cause No. 23631. Seminole County, Okla., and Hugh Green, Plaintiff in Error, v. Gulf Pipe Line Company of Oklahoma, a Corporation, Defendant in Error, this day decided, 168 Okla. 136, 32 P.2d 42, which involved the same character of attack upon the same judgment. The views expressed in the opinion in that case are controlling in the case at bar.

¶3 An additional contention is made in the brief in this case, namely, that the appeal to this court was not perfected in the lime required by law and should be dismissed. It appears that on January 25, 1932, the Court of Tax Review sustained the protest involved. The decision was not filed with the State Auditor until February 18, 1932. Less than 10 days thereafter, and on February 24, 1932, the decision was set aside, the cause retried, and the protest was again sustained. The appeal was taken within the time required by law from the latter order and judgment.

¶4 Protestant's counsel contend that the Court of Tax Review had no power to set is former order aside, and that its act in doing so was void. They assert that the time for perfecting appeal is determined by reference to the first judgment. Section 12310, O. S. 1931, provides for appeals from the Court of Tax Review. It reads:

"Either the protestant or the county may appeal from the final decision of the court to the Supreme Court of the state, and it shall be sufficient to perfect such appeal if the appellant shall, within ten days after the filing of such decision of the court with the State Auditor, cause to be filed with the State Auditor a statement in writing that appellant does appeal. If no appeal be taken, the decision of the court shall be final."

¶5 Under the above section a judgment of the Court of Tax Review does not become final until 10 days after it is filed with the State Auditor. Without considering the power that may be exercised over a judgment after the expiration of that time, it was certainly within the power of the lower tribunal to vacate its own judgment within the ten days before it became final. The, contention of protestant is without merit. The decision of the Court of Tax Review is reversed, with directions to render judgment denying the protest.