STATE ex rel. DEVONIAN OIL CO. v. SMITH

STATE ex rel. DEVONIAN OIL CO. v. SMITH
1929 OK 315
280 P. 433
138 Okla. 89
Case Number: 19395
Decided: 09/10/1929
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

STATE ex rel. DEVONIAN OIL CO.
v.
SMITH, Judge.

Syllabus

¶0 1. Appeal and Error--Disposition of Cause--Judgment Upon Reversal.
Under section 801, C. O. S. 1921, and Rule 7 of the Supreme Court, when a judgment or final order shall be reversed on appeal, the appellate court shall render judgment or remand the cause to the lower court for rendition of such judgment as should have been rendered.
2. Same--Construction of Mandate--Mandamus to Correct Mistake by Trial Court.
It is the province of this court to construe its own mandate in connection with its opinion, and, if it finds that the trial court has misconstrued the same, the mistake may be corrected by writ of mandamus from this court.

Original action for writ of mandamus by the State on the relation of the Devonian Oil Company against Charles C. Smith, Judge of the District Court of Logan County. Writ granted.

Randolph, Hayer, Shirk & Bridges, for petitioner.

RILEY, J.

¶1 Herein is sought a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent, district judge of Logan county, to enter judgment for the Devonian Oil Company and against A. L. Brown pursuant to an opinion and mandate of this court.

¶2 An alternative writ was granted June 25, 1928. Brown, in the year 1926, sued the Devonian Oil Company in the district court of Logan county, seeking to cancel an oil and gas lease and damages. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Brown, canceling the lease. An appeal was lodged in the Supreme Court, and on October 4, of plaintiff in error, the Devonian Oil Company. The mandate of this court issued January 25, 1928, and on March 5, 1928, same was spread of record. On April 28, 1928, the plaintiff in error therein, the Devonian Oil Company, presented to the respondent judge of the district court, a motion to enter judgment in its favor pursuant to said mandate, but the respondent denied the motion under the theory, as disclosed in his response, that this court's judgment was ambiguous, in this, to wit: It was not clear to him whether judgment should be entered in accord with prayer of the petition in error or the prayer of answer and cross-petition of defendant below, and as a result of which he awaited directions by writ of mandamus. Another contention advanced in the brief on behalf of respondent is that Rule 7 of this court does not give authority to reverse the judgment of the trial court, direct it to vacate its former judgment and enter judgment in favor of plaintiff in error, as was done in this case. In other words, it is asserted that the Supreme Court can go no further in its judgment than the rules expressly authorize, and that there is no authority to do more than enter judgment reversing the case. With that contention we cannot agree. That point has been repeatedly decided to the contrary. City Nat. Bk. v. Coatney, 122 Okla. 233, 253 P. 481; Lawton Nat. Bk. v. Ulrich, 81 Okla. 159, 197 P. 167; C. R., I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Weaver, 67 Okla. 293, 171 P. 34.

¶3 Section 801, C. O. S. 1921, provides:

"When a judgment or final order shall be reversed on appeal, either in whole or in part, the court reversing the same shall proceed to render such judgment as the court below should have rendered, or remand the cause to the court below for such judgment." Beams v. Young, 92 Okla. 294, 222 P. 952.