Ex. Parte Halley

Ex. Parte Halley
1890 OK 2
25 P. 514
1 Okla. 12
Case Number: ___
Decided: 06/24/1890
Supreme Court of Oklahoma

Ex Parte HALLEY

Habeas corpus

¶0 JURSIDICTION OF UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS -- Territories -- Criminal Law.
Section 10 of the organic act of Oklahoma provides that persons charged with any crime in the Territory may be arrested by the United States marshal, or any of his deputies, but in all cases the accused shall be taken for preliminary examination before a United States commissioner, or a justice of the peace for the county. Held, that a United States commissioner had authority to commit petitioner upon a charge of assault to the custody of a United States marshal, notwithstanding section 11 of the organic act puts in force in Oklahoma the Nebraska laws providing for the arrest and commitment of persons charged with crimes and offenses.

C. B. Freeman and C. W. Kerns, for petitioner.

Horace Speed, for the Territory.

SEAY, J.

¶1 This is a case in which the petitioner, A. H. Halley, presented a petition to the Honorable E. B. GREEN, as judge of the first judicial district of the territory of Oklahoma, in which he alleges that he is unlawfully held and restrained of his liberty, at the city of Guthrie, in said territory of Oklahoma, by W. S. Lurty, the United States marshal of said territory, by virtue and authority of a commitment issued by W. M. Allison, a United States commissioner, in and for the first judicial district of said territory; that said petitioner was apprehended on a warrant issued on a complaint made before said commissioner by one E. M. Bamford, charging the petitioner with having unlawfully and feloniously assaulted him (said Bamford) with the intent to inflict upon him great bodily injury, contrary to the statute, and against the peace and dignity of the United States; that the petitioner was, on the 13th day of June, 1890, examined before said commissioner and held to answer said charge of assault with intent to do great bodily injury before the district court, at Guthrie, on the first Monday in September, 1890. Petitioner then alleges the illegality of his imprisonment to consist in this, to-wit: That the crime charged is an offense against the laws of Nebraska extended over this territory by the act of congress giving it a territorial government, and is not an offense known to or against the laws of the United States; that said W. M. Allison, commissioner, as aforesaid, had no "power or authority or jurisdiction" over said offense, and that said Lurty, United States marshal, had no authority, under said warrant, to restrain said petitioner of his liberty. Whereupon said judge caused a writ to be issued to said Lurty, United States marshal, commanding him to bring the body of said petitioner before said judge at Guthrie, on the 17th day of June, together with the cause of his detention and restraint. In obedience to said writ, said marshal brought said prisoner before said judge, making return that he held said petitioner in default of bail by virtue and authority of a commitment from United States Commissioner Allison as heretofore stated. The supreme court, of which said judge is chief justice, then being in session, the case was by him adjourned into the supreme court for hearing. See section 368, c. 34, p. 1068, Comp. St. Neb. There is no question of fact, nor plea of not guilty, nor excuse, nor extenuation set up in the petition for the crime charged. It is contended for the petitioner that the United States commissioner had no authority to hear or commit, and the United States marshal had no authority to hold or restrain the petitioner for a crime committed under the laws of Nebraska, which were put in force here by the organic act of the territory, but that the authority is conferred exclusively on what counsel calls the "local territorial courts and officers."

¶2 The question presented is one of power of jurisdiction, and is the only question to be decided in this case. It involves the legal relations of territories to the parent government. A territory is merely an inchoatestate. It people are not sovereign. Its organic act takes the place of a constitution. "The government of the territories belongs primarily to congress," and "during the term of their pupilage as territories they are mere dependencies of the United States. *** All political power exercised therein is derived from the general government." Territories are spoken of by Judge BRADLEY as "dependencies," and "the extent of their power depends upon the organic act in each case." Snow v. U. S., 18 Wall. 317. This was a case in which the legislature of Utah, under authority of the territorial organic act, had created the office of attorney general for Utah territory, and a question arose between that officer and the United States attorney for said territory as to who should appear and prosecute crimes committed against the territorial laws. Judge BRADLEY, who delivered the opinion, said this was an anomalous case; that, "strictly speaking, there is no sovereignty in a territory of the United States except the United States itself. Crimes committed therein are committed against the government and dignity of the United States. It would seem that indictments and writs should regularly be in the name of the United States, and that the attorney of the United States was the proper officer to prosecute all offenses." But after stating that the practice had been different, and that "there is no necessary conflict between the organic act and the territorial laws of Utah, he concludes that as the practice has been supported by long usage, and as the entire matter is subject to the control and regulation of congress," it is his duty, under the circumstances, to declare the territorial act valid. This had the effect to oust the United States attorney general from prosecuting crimes committed under territorial laws. In Hussey v. Smith, 99 U.S. 20, the court held that while the marshal, created by the territorial laws, had the right to serve process, and make sales of land, under judgments of the court, held under the territorial laws, yet, when such process was served and sales made by the United States marshal, his acts were upheld on the ground that he was a de facto officer, and his acts, as such, were as valid and binding as if he had been an officer de jure. The court says: "An officer de facto is not a mere usurper, nor yet within the sanction of the law, but one who, colore officio, claims and assumes to exercise official authority; is reputed to have it, and the community acquiesces accordingly." So under the authority here quoted even if the acts of the marshal and commissioner complained of were only acts of officers de facto, the promotion of good government, in the punishment of crime, would induce us to sustain those acts. But we hold that they acted as de jure officers.

¶3 It seems from the scope of the argument in this case that some fear is entertained that the court may drift too far towards centralization, and claim more power for federal officers and United States courts than is consistent with the full recognition of the rights of the people to control their own local affairs, in their own way. On this point, it is enough to say that we give hearty assent to the doctrine laid down by Chief Justice CHASE, in Clinton v. Englebrecht, 13 Wall. 434, in which he uses the following comprehensive language: "The theory upon which the various governments for portions of the territories of the United States have been organized has ever been that of leaving to the inhabitants all the powers of self-government, consistent with the supremacy and supervision of the national authority, and with certain fundamental principles established by congress." If, after what has been said, any one should doubt the authority of the commissioner to examine and bind the prisoner, or the marshal to imprison and restrain him of his liberty, let him examine section 10 of the organic act, --the constitution of the territory. That section provides that "persons charged with any offense or crime in the territory of Oklahoma, *** may be arrested by the United States marshal, or any of his deputies, wherever found in said territory; but in all cases the accused shall be taken for preliminary examination before a United States commissioner, or a justice of the peace of the county." Observe the language: "Any offense or crime in the territory of Oklahoma." We cannot conceive how the jurisdiction of the commissioner or marshal can be longer questioned.

¶4 But it is said that section 11 of the organic act puts the chapter of the Nebraska statutes concerning crimes in force here. So it does, "so far as they are locally applicable, and not in conflict with the laws of the United States and this act." While it may be conceded that under the Nebraska statute the petitioner might have been arrested by a sheriff, and taken before a justice of the peace for preliminary examination, and if held to answer an indictment might, in default of bail, have been remanded to the custody of the sheriff, to be by him safely kept, till the grand jury examined and disposed of the case, this would in no wise affect the power exercised by the commissioner and marshal in this case, under the authority conferred on them by the tenth section of the organic act. For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner is remanded to the custody of Warren S. Lurty, United States marshal for the territory of Oklahoma, to be by him dealt with according to law.

¶5 The other justices concur.