THOMAS BROWN v. BOARD OF REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

 

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0




THOMAS BROWN,


Appellant,


v.


BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR and NORTH BERGEN

HEALTH CARE MINNESOTA

c/o TALX UC EXPRESS,


Respondents.

_____________________________

May 28, 2014

Argued March 4, 2014 Decided

 

Before Judges Hayden and Rothstadt.

 

On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 358,464.

 

Ronald Kurzeja argued the cause for appellant (Thomas Brown, on the pro se brief).


Robert M. Strang, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent Board of Review (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Mr. Strang, on the brief).

 

Respondent North Bergen Health Care has not filed a brief.

 

PER CURIAM


Thomas Brown appeals from a final decision by the New Jersey Department of Labor ("Department"), Board of Review ("Board"), disqualifying him from receiving unemployment benefits, in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), because he left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to work. Brown argues that he should not be disqualified from receiving benefits because his employer harassed him, verbally abused him, and increased his workload which caused him to suffer physical problems involving his back. We affirm.

Brown testified to the facts relating to his employment and his claim at a hearing held by an appeals examiner. According to Brown, North Bergen Health Care, L.L.C. employed him for thirty years when on January 11, 2011, he left his position "voluntarily" because he "was concerned about [his] health." Brown described the workload as being "too much" for him, and his employer would not give him any extra help. Brown stated that the increased workload began two years earlier in 2009, and that for those two years, he was able to perform his function despite the extra workload.

As a result of the extra workload, Brown claimed that he suffered from back problems for which he received medical treatment. He did not, however, produce any medical evidence that his back issues were caused by his employment or that any doctor advised him to leave his job. He also never requested a leave of absence.

Brown also believed that he was forced to leave work because of his employer's harassing him after he complained about the workplace being too cold. According to Brown, he put up with his supervisor's conduct "for years." However, it was his back problems which ultimately caused him to leave his employment.

After he left his employment, Brown filed for unemployment benefits. On August 19, 2011, the Department notified Brown that it deemed him disqualified from receiving benefits because he left work for personal reasons. Brown filed an appeal of that determination to the Department's Appeal Tribunal. As noted, an appeals examiner conducted a (telephonic) hearing on February 2, 2012 and subsequently issued an opinion, denying Brown's appeal based on his failing to provide medical evidence that his back problems were caused by his employment as required by Wojcik v. Board of Review, 58 N.J. 341, 344 (1971). Brown then sought a review of the Appeal Tribunal's decision by the Board. The Board issued its opinion on July 6, 2012, affirming the Appeal Tribunal's determination.

Our review of administrative agency decisions is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997) (citing Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 101 N.J. 95, 103 (1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). We will not disturb the Board's action unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." Ibid.

As noted in its decision, the Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's reliance upon N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), which disqualifies a person for benefits

[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment . . . and has earned in employment at least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate[.]

A claimant seeking unemployment compensation benefits has the burden of establishing that he or she left work for good cause attributable to such work and not voluntarily. N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c). An employee has left work "voluntarily" within the meaning of the statute "only if 'the decision whether to go or to stay lay at the time with the worker alone.'" Lord v. Bd. of Review, 425 N.J. Super. 187, 191 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. Bd. of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 435 (1953)). "'[G]ood cause attributable to such work' means a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). Causes personal to a claimant that are not shown to be attributable to the work itself do not satisfy the statutory requirement. White v. Bd. of Review, 146 N.J. Super. 268, 270 (App. Div. 1977); Stauhs v. Bd. of Review, 93 N.J. Super. 451, 457-58 (App. Div. 1967). It is the claimant's obligation to establish through competent medical evidence that a health issue attributable to work forced him to leave his employment. Wojcik, supra, 58 N.J. at 344.

The Board's decision was legally correct, supported by undisputed facts and, therefore, not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Brown voluntarily left his employment with North Bergen Health Care, L.L.C. for personal reasons, perhaps related to his back and for no other reason, but he offered no proof that his back problems were attributable to his employment.

Affirmed.

 

 

 
 

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