RAYMOND GILLIAM v. CITY OF ELIZABETH

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

RAYMOND GILLIAM,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF ELIZABETH,

Defendant-Respondent.

_________________________________

May 23, 2014

Argued May 13, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Reisner and Carroll.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket No. L-0116-11.

Stuart K. Santiago argued the cause for appellant.

Christopher J. Kinsella argued the cause for respondent (LaCorte, Bundy, Varady & Kinsella, attorneys; Mr. Kinsella, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Raymond Gilliam appeals from a July 12, 2013 Law Division order dismissing his slip-and-fall complaint against defendant City of Elizabeth. We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Regina Caulfield in her oral opinion of the same date.

Because the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint on summary judgment, we review the record de novo, using the same standard employed by the trial court. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Boylan, 307 N.J. Super.162, 167 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J.608 (1998); Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J.520, 540 (1995). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, this is what happened. On the evening of January 6, 2009, plaintiff was attending a meeting at a recreational center owned by the City. The custodian responsible for the premises put salt on the sidewalks and walkways outside the center at about 3:30 p.m. that day, but did not apply salt later in the day. While the meeting was going on, it started snowing and ice formed on the sidewalks. When leaving the community center at around 9:30 p.m., plaintiff fell on a patch of ice on the front walkway and was injured.

The City moved for summary judgment, invoking the common law doctrine of snow removal immunity accorded to public entities. Citing a long line of cases, beginning with Miehl v. Darpino, 53 N.J.49 (1968); Rochinsky v. State, 110 N.J.399 (1988); Lathers v. Township of West Windsor, 308 N.J. Super.301 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 154 N.J.609 (1998); and Luchejko v. City of Hoboken, 414 N.J Super.302 (App. Div. 2010), aff'd207 N.J.191 (2011), Judge Caulfield found that the City was immune from suit for alleged negligent failure to remove snow from the sidewalks outside its facility. Judge Caulfield rejected plaintiff's reliance on Bligen v. Jersey City Housing Authority, 131 N.J.124 (1993), because that case involved a public housing project, and the Court held that, with respect to common law weather immunity, a public housing authority was subject to the case law applicable to commercial landlords.

On this appeal, plaintiff primarily argues that we should adopt Judge Dreier's concurring opinion in Lathers, supra, 308 N.J. Super.at 306-08. In his concurrence, Judge Dreier commented that it might be appropriate to modify the doctrine of snow removal immunity. However, he also aptly observed that the Appellate Division has no authority to modify Supreme Court precedent. Id.at 308. That observation is as true today as it was when he wrote it. Moreover, we agree with Judge Caulfield that Bligendoes not support plaintiff's claim, because it is limited to situations involving public housing complexes, i.e., where the public entity is acting as a landlord. Bligen, supra, 131 N.J.at 136; Lathers, supra, 308 N.J. Super.at 305-06. That is not the case here.

The recreation center where plaintiff fell was one of many recreation centers and other public buildings in Elizabeth. The City cannot be held liable for failing to remove the snow and ice from all of its many walkways, sidewalks, and streets during inclement weather; that is the essence of snow removal immunity. Lathers, supra, 308 N.J. Super.at 304-05.

Affirmed.