ASTON SAPPE v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-05921-12T2

ASTON SAPPE,

Appellant,

v.

NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

_________________________________

May 30, 2014

Submitted May 5, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Parrillo and Sumners.

On appeal from the New Jersey Department of Corrections.

Aston Sappe, appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General,

attorney for respondent (Lisa A. Puglisi, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Megan E. Shafranski, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

This is a prison disciplinary appeal. Appellant Aston Sappe, an inmate currently confined at the Southern State Correctional Facility, appeals a Department of Corrections (DOC) determination, after administrative proceedings, finding that he committed prohibited act .402, being in an unauthorized area, in violation of N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a). We affirm.

On Wednesday, May 22, 2013, at around 8:20 a.m., Sergeant M. Pierce observed appellant loitering and speaking with other inmates in Main Compound A. Prison rules permit inmates in main compounds only if they are either assigned to outside work details or if they have scheduled appointments. Appellant does not work on Wednesdays and did not have a scheduled appointment at that time.

Consequently, the charge of prohibited act .402 was served on appellant at 9:35 a.m. the next day, May 23, 2013, and the investigation was conducted that same day. It was determined that the charge had merit and thus was referred to an impartial disciplinary hearing officer for further action.

At the hearing, appellant was provided the assistance of counsel substitute, the opportunity to confront Sergeant Pierce, the officer who initially reported the disciplinary violation, and the opportunity to review the adjudication report and all evidence considered by the hearing officer. Appellant pled not guilty. Although he did not dispute his presence in Main Compound A, he explained that he was proceeding to his job detail to have his detail officer sign his job change papers. When he could not locate the officer, with whom he did not have a scheduled appointment, appellant walked back through Main Compound A and in the process stopped and spoke to other inmates. At the close of evidence, the hearing officer found appellant guilty of prohibited act .402 and sanctioned him to ten days' detention (suspended for sixty days) and fourteen hours' extra duty.

On administrative appeal, the assistant superintendent affirmed the hearing officer's findings and related sanctions.

On appeal, appellant argues that "the finding of guilt was not supported by substantial evidence" and "the disciplinary report was not properly investigated." We disagree.

Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656 (1999); Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We will not upset the determination of an administrative agency absent a showing that it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; that it lacked fair support in the evidence; or that it violated legislative policies. See In re Musick, 143 N.J. 206, 216 (1996); Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980); Campbell v. Dep't of Civil Serv., 39 N.J. 556, 562 (1963). Further, decisions of administrative agencies carry with them a strong presumption of reasonableness. City of Newark v. Natural Res. Council, 82 N.J. 530, 539, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983, 101 S. Ct. 400, 66 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1980). We may not vacate an agency's determination because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result. See generally De Vitis v. N.J. Racing Comm'n, 202 N.J. Super. 484, 489-90 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 337 (1985). Further,

it is not our function to substitute our independent judgment for that of an administrative body, . . . where there may exist a mere difference of opinion concerning the evidential persuasiveness of the relevant proofs. As a reviewing court, we will not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, draw inferences and conclusions from the evidence, or resolve conflicts therein.

[Ibid. (citations omitted).]

Here, there is substantial credible evidence of appellant's guilt. Even by his own account, appellant was present in Main Compound A, which was an unauthorized area for him since he was not assigned to an outside work detail and does not claim to have had a scheduled appointment with his detail officer. Moreover, appellant admitted that on his return he stopped to speak with several other inmates, a clear violation of prohibited act .402.

We are also satisfied that the administrative adjudication comported with procedural due process. See Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 521-22 (1975); McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 194-95 (1995). Appellant timely received notice of the charge and contrary to his allegation, a DOC officer thoroughly investigated the matter that same day, May 23, 2013. Appellant was afforded counsel substitute and an impartial hearing, at which time he was granted the opportunity to confront or cross-examine Sergeant Pierce. He was permitted to make a statement and was also free to call witnesses on his behalf. In sum, appellant was afforded all the process due.

Affirmed.