IN THE MATTER OF D.V.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

IN THE MATTER OF D.V.

____________________________

Submitted July 21, 2014 Decided July 30, 2014

Before Judges Harris and Fasciale.

On appeal from the Department of Human Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities.

Disability Rights New Jersey, attorneys for appellants J.V. and A.V. (Susan Saidel, Senior Staff Attorney, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey, Department of Human Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gene Rosenblum, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Appellants J.V. and A.V., the adoptive parents of D.V. a developmentally disabled child registered with the Division of Developmental Disabilities (the Division) appeal from the Division's June 20, 2012 Final Agency Decision requiring appellants to contribute to the care and maintenance of D.V. We affirm.

I.

In 2005, when D.V. was nine years old, he was declared eligible for Division services. In March 2006, the Division began funding the residential placement of D.V. at a school in Pennsylvania.

As early as August 2005, appellants were advised that their financial resources would be evaluated to determine "the required contribution towards the cost of [D.V.'s] care and maintenance." In July 2006, the Division's contractor, MAXIMUS, requested that appellants submit financial information so that MAXIMUS could "perform the financial assessment of each person's ability to pay" as a "legally responsible relative" of the person D.V. who is not able to pay the full cost of care and maintenance.

Appellants claimed that they were not aware of any potential personal obligation, even subject to an assessment of financial resources, to contribute to the care and maintenance of D.V. Instead, they argued that an August 4, 2006 letter to them from a Division caseworker promised that their "assessment for contribution to care will be made [from] a monthly [subsidized] adoption payment" they received on D.V.'s behalf from the then-named Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS).

After receiving the caseworker's letter, appellants did not provide MAXIMUS with the requested information, even though the contractor persisted, through a series of seven letters in 2006, 2007, and 2008, in reminding appellants of their obligation to contribute for D.V.'s care and maintenance and continually requesting financial information.

On October 27, 2008, appellants wrote a letter to the Division explaining their "unique situation" that "[D.V.'s] disabilities turned out to be much more severe than DYFS led [them] to believe." Appellants claimed that they were never told by the Division that they would be responsible for care and maintenance contributions, and their case manager had told them "that she had never heard of this, and no one in their office ever heard of this happening."

The Division responded to appellants' letter on February 23, 2009, stating the following:

Our statute found at N.J.S.A. 30:4-66 states that parents are financially responsible for the residential care of their children under the age of 18. [D.V.] is placed . . . at a daily cost to the [S]tate of $348. Any contribution to care that we receive is only a small fraction of the State's cost to maintain him in this placement. Therefore, we must ask that you co-operate with [MAXIMUS] in completing the contribution to care assessment from your income.

When the financial information was not forthcoming, MAXIMUS made three additional requests of appellants. Finally, on September 14, 2009, appellants supplied MAXIMUS with the data. Two days later, MAXIMUS informed appellants that their "ability to pay towards the care and maintenance in accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:4-60 and 66 and N.J.A.C. 10:46D" was $813.58 per month. One week after that, on September 21, 2009, appellants verbally notified MAXIMUS that D.V.'s mother's income had been reduced, but there were no written records to support the claim because she was self-employed.

On April 29, 2010, MAXIMUS issued another assessment of appellants' ability to pay for D.V.'s care and maintenance. This time, the monthly obligation was calculated at $689.16. Appellants requested a review of this determination, which proceeded through several stages of the Division's appeal process. Finally, on June 20, 2012, the Division determined that appellants' "responsibility as the [legally responsible relatives] is $527.57 per month." This appeal followed.

On appeal, appellants raise the following arguments for our consideration:

POINT I: THE DIVISION OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES' FINAL DECISION IS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

A. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL PREVENTS THE DIVISION OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES FROM REQUIRING CONTRIBUTION TO CARE PRIOR TO 2008.

POINT II: THE DIVISION OF DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF N.J.A.C. 10:46D-2 IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A FINANCIAL REASSESSMENT.

POINT III: THE DIVISION INCORRECTLY ASSERTS THAT IT IS ENTITLED TO RETAIN FUNDS FROM D.V.'S UNEARNED INCOME.

After our review of the record we are convinced that all of these arguments are meritless. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E). We add the following brief comments.

The scope of review of state agency determinations is well-established:

Our role in reviewing an agency's decision is limited. In re Proposed Quest Acad. Charter Sch. of Montclair Founders Grp., 216 N.J. 370, 385 (2013). We will not reverse its decision "because of doubts as to its wisdom or because the record may support more than one result." In re N.J. Pinelands Comm'n Resolution, 356 N.J. Super. 363, 372 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 176 N.J. 281 (2003). To reverse a decision, we must find: "(1) it was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; (2) it violated express or implied legislative policies; (3) it offended the State or Federal Constitution; or (4) the findings on which it was based were not supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record." Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007).

Moreover, we must extend substantial deference to an agency's interpretation and application of its own regulations, particularly on technical matters within the agency's special expertise. In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. Act Rules, 180 N.J. 478, 488-89 (2004). However, "[w]hile we must defer to the agency's expertise, we need not surrender to it." N.J. Chapter of Nat'l Ass'n of Indus. & Office Parks v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 241 N.J. Super. 145, 165 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 122 N.J. 374 (1990).

Furthermore, a court is never bound by an agency's determination of a purely legal issue. In re Stream Encroachment Permit, 402 N.J. Super. 587, 597 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). When "the issue involves the interpretation of statutes and regulations, it is a purely legal issue, which we consider de novo." Klawitter v. City of Trenton, 395 N.J. Super. 302, 318 (App. Div. 2007).

[Pinelands Pres. Alliance v. State of N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., ___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. June 3, 2014) (slip op. at 16-17).]

We discern nothing in the Division's determination that approaches, much less surmounts, the high threshold of being arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Moreover, appellants are not entitled to the benefits of the doctrine of equitable estoppel because they did not reasonably rely upon any binding pronouncement of the Division as to their supposed exemption from the provisions of N.J.S.A. 30:4-60(b) and -66. A caseworker's stray comments are an insufficient foundation upon which to build a claim for the remedy of equitable estoppel.