RALPH A. NUZZO V. SEMINARA

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

RALPH A. NUZZO, GARY J. SEMINARA,

THOMAS V. SEMINARA, Individually

and in the Right of LACKAWANNA

ASSOCIATES, a New Jersey Partnership,

PARISH ASSOCIATES, a New Jersey

Partnership, and RARITAN ASSOCIATES,

a New Jersey Partnership,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

GABRIEL M. JULIANO,

Defendant-Respondent,

and

ROBERT E. MONTEYNE, TRI-CORE, INC.,

A Delaware Corporation, and BRIG

ASSOCIATES, INC., A New Jersey

Corporation,

Defendants.

____________________________________

Before Judges Fuentes, Simonelli and Fasciale.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Passaic County, Docket No. C-4313-89.

Peter R. Bray argued the cause for appellants (Bray & Bray, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Bray, on the briefs).

Scott E. Reiser argued the cause for respondent (Lum, Drasco & Positan, LLC, attorneys; Mr. Reiser, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs appeal from an April 22, 2013 order denying their motion to revive a December 15, 1992 judgment that they obtained against defendant Gabriel M. Juliano, and from a June 17, 2013 order denying reconsideration. We affirm.

On December 15, 1992, plaintiffs obtained the judgment against defendant. On March 13, 1995, defendant filed a bankruptcy petition attempting to discharge the judgment. On January 25, 1999, the bankruptcy judge concluded that defendant's debt to plaintiffs was non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C.A. 523(a). On March 7, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion in the Chancery Division to revive the judgment. Defendant objected to the motion, contending that plaintiffs failed to comply with the twenty-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:145. As a result, defendant cross-moved to discharge the judgment. The motion judge conducted oral argument, and on April 22, 2013 entered an order concluding that plaintiffs' motion to revive was indeed time-barred. She stated in part:

[Plaintiff1] has not waited six months, a year, or five years to recognize that attention needed to be paid to the judgment, but has in fact filed a motion close on the heels of the expiration of the Statute of Limitations date established by the law. However, in law unlike horseshoes, "close" does not control.

While Equity seems to beg this Court to extend the time, the plaintiff has not provided this Court with any specific reasons or extraordinary circumstances that kept him from seeking revival of the judgment prior to December 15, 2012. This Court, despite its own research and the additional research provided by both counsel, cannot find a single case upon which to base an exercise of discretion that would allow it to execute an order to revive this judgment in light of expiration of the judgment in December, 2012.

Therefore, this Court will deny the plaintiff's motion to revive the final judgment and grant the defendant's cross motion to discharge the judgment.

Plaintiffs moved for reconsideration arguing that the statute of limitations period did not begin to run until January 10, 1994, when plaintiffs docketed the judgment. On June 17, 2013, the judge denied reconsideration, re-emphasizing that the limitations period ran from the December 15, 1992 judgment.

On appeal, plaintiffs raise the following points:

POINT I

THE TIME PERIOD UNDER N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5 DOES NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL THE JUDGMENT IS DOCKETED.

POINT II

RECONSIDERATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.

POINT III

THE TIME TO REVIVE THE JUDGMENT WAS TOLLED.

"A trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). After a thorough review of the record and consideration of the controlling legal principles, we conclude that defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We affirm substantially for the reasons stated by the judge in her comprehensive and well-reasoned opinions. We add the following brief comments.

Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:14-5, "[a] judgment in any court of record in this state may be revived by proper proceedings or an action at law may be commenced thereon within [twenty] years next after the date thereof, but not thereafter." It is well-established that the "running of the period of limitations commence[s] with the entry of the judgment . . . not with its recording." Giordano v. Wolcott, 46 N.J. Super. 278, 282 (App. Div. 1957), certif. denied, 27 N.J. 399 (1958). To revive a judgment, a party need prove only that "(1) the judgment is valid and subsisting; (2) it remains unpaid in full, or, if in part, the unpaid balance; and (3) there is no outstanding impediment to its judicial enforcement, e.g., a stay, a pending bankruptcy proceeding, an outstanding injunctive order, or the like." Kronstadt v. Kronstadt, 238 N.J. Super. 614, 618 (App. Div. 1990) (emphasis added).

Here, plaintiffs received the judgment in their favor on December 15, 1992. The time period in which to revive that judgment thus expired on December 15, 2012. Although there was no legal impediment to filing a motion to revive before that date, plaintiffs did not file their motion to revive until March 7, 2013. Applying the plain language of the statute, plaintiffs were out of time. Plaintiffs provide no authority for their position that the statute of limitations was tolled for the period between defendant's 1995 bankruptcy petition and the Bankruptcy Court's 1999 denial of discharge.

1 Although the judge referred to "plaintiff" Nuzzo, we infer that the opinion applies to all of the plaintiffs.