STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JAMES R. DENELSBECK

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMES R. DENELSBECK,

Defendant-Appellant.

October 2, 2014

Argued September 24, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Alvarez and Carroll.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Municipal Appeal No. 0053-12.

John Menzel argued the cause for appellant.

Deborah A. Hay, Deputy Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (James P. McClain, Atlantic County Prosecutor, attorney; Ms. Hay, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

On October 5, 2011, defendant James R. Denelsbeck was charged in the Ventnor Municipal Court with driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; and failure to observe a signal, N.J.S.A. 39:4-81. On January 26, 2012, defense counsel entered his appearance with the court and requested a jury trial. In response, the municipal prosecutor advised that the State would not be seeking more than 180 days incarceration were defendant to be convicted of all charges. Following argument on January 30, 2012, the municipal judge denied the motion.

After defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the results of an Alcotest breath examination, a bench trial ensued. On October 25, 2012, defendant was found guilty of DWI and failure to observe a traffic signal, and acquitted of careless driving. Since defendant had three prior DWI convictions, the municipal court sentenced him to a term of 180 days in the Atlantic County Jail, a ten-year driver's license suspension, twelve hours in the intoxicated driver resource program, a $1006 fine, and applicable fees and costs. A $56 fine and $33 court costs were imposed for the red light violation.

Defendant appealed his conviction to the Law Division, where he again sought to exclude the breath test results and renewed his argument that he was entitled to a jury trial. On June 14, 2013, the court rejected defendant's challenge to the admissibility of the Alcotest results and request for a jury trial, and found him guilty. The court imposed the same sentence as the municipal court.

Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that he was entitled to a jury trial. Defendant bases his argument on the assertion that the aggregate penalties he faced exceeded 180 days of incarceration. Relying on well-settled authority to the contrary, we reject defendant's argument as without merit.

In Blanton v. N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 539-40, 109 S. Ct. 1289, 1291-92, 103 L. Ed. 2d 550, 554-55 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that DWI offenders facing a prison term of six months or less are not guaranteed a jury trial. The court noted, however, that one may be required "in the rare situation where a legislature packs an offense it deems serious with onerous penalties that nonetheless do not puncture the [six]-month incarceration line." Id. at 543, 109 S. Ct. at 1293, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 556-57 (internal quotations omitted).

New Jersey does not recognize a right to a trial by jury for DWI, which under state law is considered a motor-vehicle offense rather than a criminal offense. State v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109, 116 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S. Ct. 1413, 113 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1991). "Despite the fact that the Legislature regards DWI as a profound social problem, it has yet to impose the full force of law on that offense that would denote a social evaluation that DWI is a 'crime' or an offense that equates with the need of trial by jury." Ibid. However, in situations where a DWI defendant is also charged with "'factually related petty offenses . . . whose maximum sentences [when combined with the DWI sentence] total more than six months, and the defendant is not offered a jury trial, the sentences may not total more than six months.'" State v. Federico, 414 N.J. Super. 321, 330 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting State v. Linnehan, 197 N.J. Super. 41, 43 (App. Div. 1984), certif. denied, 99 N.J. 236 (1985)).

Here, defendant's DWI charge carried a potential prison sentence of 180 days, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(3), and his careless driving and failure to observe signal charges each carried a potential prison sentence of up to fifteen days, N.J.S.A. 39:4-104. However, we see nothing in the record to suggest that defendant faced any real risk of receiving a prison term greater than 180 days. Rather, the State made it clear from the outset that it would not seek a custodial sentence exceeding that length. If a sentence greater than 180 days had been imposed, our holding in Federico would have limited defendant's sentence to 180 days. Moreover, the additional fines, penalties, and surcharges defendant faced were not "onerous" penalties triggering a right to a jury trial. See Blanton, supra, 489 U.S. at 543, 109 S. Ct. at 1293, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 556-57. Thus, federal and state precedent support the denial of defendant's request for a jury trial.

Affirmed.