FRANCES J. HOFFMAN v. BRUCE W. HOFFMAN

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

FRANCES J. HOFFMAN,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

BRUCE W. HOFFMAN,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

June 26, 2014

Argued: June 17, 2014 Decided:

Before Judges Ashrafi and Haas.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-908-98.

Bruce W. Hoffman, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Frances J. Hoffman, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Bruce W. Hoffman appeals from the June 7, 2013 order of the Family Part denying his motion to recuse the trial judge and denying his request to require plaintiff Frances J. Hoffman to provide him with her case information statement (CIS). We affirm.

The parties were married on October 17, 1981, and divorced on January 19, 2000. The Final Judgment of Divorce (FJOD) incorporated the terms of the parties' property settlement agreement (PSA). "Repetitive litigation ensued in the aftermath of the divorce, initiated largely by defendant." Hoffman v. Hoffman, A-4309-10 (App. Div. December 2, 2011) (slip op. at 2), certif. denied, 210 N.J. 27 (2012). "In a previous opinion, we affirmed the Family Part's September 5, 2003 order denying defendant's motion to terminate alimony and child support and re-determine equitable distribution following a plenary hearing." Ibid. (citing Hoffman v. Hoffman, A-0986-03 (App. Div. May 27, 2004)). More recently, we affirmed the Family Part's June 16, 2011 order denying defendant's motion for a stay of wage garnishment. Id. at 2-3.

In this matter, defendant filed a motion on March 25, 2013 seeking to recuse the trial judge and to require plaintiff "to provide [him] with her completed CIS with attachments within [three] days." On June 7, 2013, the judge denied the motion. In a written statement of reasons, the judge stated that defendant was seeking her recusal because she had previously "denied hearing his request for [reimbursement of] $1,363,800.45." Finding that "[t]his denial is not a basis for a recusal[,]" the judge concluded that her prior involvement in the case did not prevent her "from producing a fair and unbiased hearing or judgment, nor [does it] prove [an] appearance of bias on her part."

With regard to defendant's motion to obtain plaintiff's CIS, the judge stated that "[p]laintiff submitted her financial documentation to the Court and requested that it remain confidential." Nevertheless, the judge recognized that "without access to such reliable indicia of the supporting spouse's financial ability, [defendant] may be unable to prove that modification is warranted." In balancing the parties' competing concerns, the judge explained she "wanted to review the financial information submitted so that [she] could excise irrelevant matters before demanding the parties to exchange information. The reason for this action is that [d]efendant has harassed [p]laintiff with an overload of over fifty . . . filings and appeals since January 13, 2001." Therefore, the judge denied defendant's motion "at this time" to permit her to review the materials and consider redacting any confidential information. This appeal followed.

On appeal, defendant argues that the judge erred in denying his recusal motion and his request for an immediate turnover of plaintiff's CIS. We disagree.

The disposition of a recusal motion is "entrusted to the 'sound discretion' of the trial judge whose recusal is sought." Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 66 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Magill v. Casel, 238 N.J. Super. 57, 63 (App. Div. 1990)). Recusal is appropriate "when there is any . . . reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead . . . the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g). However, a judge need not "withdraw from a case upon a mere suggestion that he [or she] is disqualified 'unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him [or her] to exist or is shown to be true in fact.'" Panitch, supra, 339 N.J. Super. at 66-67 (quoting Hundred E. Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 60 (1986)). "Bias cannot be inferred from adverse rulings against a party." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008) (citing Matthews v. Deane, 196 N.J. Super. 441, 444-47 (Ch. Div. 1984)). The denial of a motion seeking recusal is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Panitch, supra, 339 N.J. Super. at 71.

After applying these principles to the present case, we discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's denial of defendant's recusal motion. The mere fact that the judge previously made an adverse ruling against defendant was not a sufficient reason for recusal and nothing in the record suggests that the judge was biased toward either of the parties.

We dismiss defendant's appeal from the portion of the June 7, 2013 order that denied his motion to require plaintiff to produce her CIS. It is "well settled that a judgment, in order to be eligible for appeal as a final judgment, must be final as to all parties and all issues." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 2:2-3 (2014); See Smith v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 421 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 96 (2011) (holding that in order for a "judgment to be final and therefore appealable as of right, it must dispose of all claims against all parties") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Here, the judge's decision on the CIS production issue was clearly interlocutory. The judge merely ruled that she needed to review the financial information plaintiff provided, and possibly redact any confidential material, before ordering that the CIS be turned over to defendant. Thus, the judge denied defendant's motion "at this time" to enable her to complete her review. Because the order was not "final" within the intendment of Rule 2:2-3(a)(1), we dismiss this aspect of defendant's appeal.

Finally, defendant attempts to challenge other prior court rulings in his brief. However, defendant's notice of appeal states he is only appealing from the June 7, 2013 order. "[I]t is only the judgments or orders or parts thereof designated in the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal process and review." Pressler and Verniero, supra, comment 6 on R. 2:5-1(f)(1); see also 1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 459 (App. Div. 2004). Thus, defendant's arguments seeking relief from the support obligations imposed by the FJOD and previous Family Part orders are not properly before us.

Affirmed.