SUMMERHILL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION v. PATRICIA VENNER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

SUMMERHILL COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATION,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

PATRICIA VENNER,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________

Argued May 19, 2014 Decided June 27, 2014

Before Judges Harris and Kennedy.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Docket No. DC-1678-13.

Patricia Venner, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Gary J. Zangerle argued the cause for respondent.

PER CURIAM

Defendant, a resident condominium owner in the Summerhill Community real estate development, appeals from a final judgment in the Special Civil Part, following a bench trial, in favor of plaintiff, Summerhill Community Association, for unpaid fees, assessments and counsel fees. Defendant argues that the fees and assessments were not owed to plaintiff, and that even if she owed money to plaintiff, plaintiff collected the money in an earlier lawsuit.

We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable law, and we affirm essentially for the reasons expressed in an opinion from the bench issued by Judge Susan L. Claypoole, following trial. We add only the following.

Judge Claypoole found the testimony offered at trial by plaintiff's manager to be credible, and that the documentary evidence he presented showing defendant's arrearages to be reliable, as well. The judge further found that defendant's claim that she had already paid whatever she had owed to plaintiff in an earlier lawsuit, concerned prior arrearages and did not offset the current arrearages that were the subject of plaintiff's complaint.

Our "review of the [trial] judge's findings of fact based on the testimony presented during [a] plenary hearing[] is limited." Mountain Hill L.L.C. v. Twp. Comm. of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 146, 192 (App. Div. 2008), certif. denied, 199 N.J. 129 (2009). "'The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)); see also In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 116-17 (1997). We "should not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Seidman, supra, 205 N.J. at 169 (internal quotation omitted).

Moreover, "'[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference[,]'" and are subject to de novo review. Mountain Hill L.L.C., supra, 403 N.J. Super. at 193 (first alteration in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Construction of a contract is for the court, Driscoll Constr. Co. v. State of N.J., Dep't of Transp., 371 N.J. Super. 304, 313 (App. Div. 2004), while whether conduct constitutes a breach of the contract is a question for the factfinder. Magnet Res., Inc. v. Summit MRI, Inc., 318 N.J. Super. 275, 286 (App. Div. 1998).

Guided by these principles, we perceive no error in Judge Claypoole's findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Affirmed.