NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. S.D.E.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

S.D.E.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF I.D.J.E., a minor.

__________________________________

May 19, 2014

Before Judges Sapp-Peterson, Lihotz and Maven.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket No. FG-07-66-13.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Durrell Wachtler Ciccia, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Andrea M. Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Merav Lichtenstein, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor, I.D.J.E. (Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant S.D.E. appeals from a June 17, 2013 judgment, entered following a two-day trial, which terminated her parental rights and awarded guardianship of her six-year-old child I.D.J.E. to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division). Defendant argues the Division failed to present clear and convincing evidence, satisfying each of the four prongs of the statutory test, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), proving guardianship was in the best interest of the child.1 Following our review, we reject defendant's arguments as unfounded and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the comprehensive fifty-two page written opinion rendered by Judge Ronald D. Wigler. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(A).

We need not recite the extensive trial evidence detailed in the court's opinion. We provide only these brief comments.

The Division initially removed I.D.J.E. from defendant's care on March 10, 2009. Defendant's older child had also been removed from her care and the Division was granted guardianship. Defendant suffers from depression and bi-polar disorder. Despite repeated efforts to assist in managing her mental illness, she has habitually failed to comply with her medication regime or attend recommended therapy. The child was returned to defendant's care and the Division continued to provide assistance. The Division received and investigated several referrals alleging concern for the child's care, which it found to be unsubstantiated. The Division continued to provide services to defendant and the child. Over the ensuing years, the Division's efforts to enable defendant to independently care for I.D.J.E. were unsuccessful.

Defendant's behavior became erratic and unstable. She was transient after being evicted; she engaged in criminal conduct and was arrested; at times she would cease contact with her welfare caseworker or the Division; she was volatile, combative and violent; and generally did not comply with necessary welfare requirements. I.D.J.E. suffered behavioral difficulties. He was oppositional, aggressive and physically harmed himself by banging his head against the wall, as well as scratching and punching himself. In October 2011, I.D.J.E. was again removed from defendant's care. Ultimately the child was placed in a therapeutic home, where he remained at the time of trial.

Defendant was evaluated by the Division's psychiatric experts, who confirmed her mental illness and anger management disorders, along with a general denial that she needed assistance and refusal to take prescribed medication. Throughout the proceeding she remained homeless, refused to engage services for anger management, counseling, outpatient mental health, vocational training, and budgeting training. When defendant enrolled in a program, she was typically discharged for disruptive, abusive behavior and noncompliance with the rules of conduct. Five days before trial, defendant satisfactorily completed parenting skills training. However, defendant never stabilized her mental health or secured housing. Defendant's visitation with I.D.J.E. was terminated in November 2012, because of her violent outbursts, verbal abuse, and threats toward the child.

The Division provided fact and expert testimony, which Judge Wigler credited. The Division established defendant had harmed the child due to her unabated mental illness, inability to control her emotions and anger, and a personality disorder, which precluded her acknowledgment of a need for treatment. These conditions were not resolved despite years of extended services. Further, the Division established I.D.J.E. would suffer significant harm if the bond with his foster mother, who had expressed a desire to adopt him, were severed.

Defendant testified on her own behalf, insisting she was working towards becoming a better parent. She explained she completed parenting skills training, was concluding anger management, was taking Seroquel for "probably a few weeks," and was searching for subsidized housing and employment. Defendant believed her difficulties in parenting I.D.J.E. resulted from stress, saying she had been evicted and "locked up," and lacked a good support system. Although defendant admitted she was "a little depressed," she denied there was anything wrong with her.

In his thorough analysis of the evidence, Judge Wigler set forth his factual findings, supporting the termination of defendant's parental rights and awarding the Division guardianship. We defer to these findings after determining they are "supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence" in the record. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). See also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 375 N.J. Super. 235, 259 (App. Div. 2005) ("When the credibility of witnesses is an important factor, the trial court's conclusions must be given great weight and must be accepted by the appellate court unless clearly lacking in reasonable support.") (citation omitted).

Further, we reject defendant's claims of error. On appeal, defendant fails to acknowledge the effects of her untreated mental health issues. She suggests I.D.J.E. was removed from her care because she was homeless and in need of funds. The facts, however, prove otherwise. Further, we note the child was not removed because defendant suffers from mental health issues. See N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 450-51 (2012) (stating mental illness does not per se disqualify a parent from raising a child, absent a threat to the child's health, safety and well-being). Rather, the child was removed and reunification failed because defendant continually and consistently refused to engage and maintain necessary mental health medication and treatment. The Division clearly demonstrated absent treatment, defendant became volatile, erratic, and violent, posing significant harm to the child's safety and welfare.

Our de novo review supports Judge Wigler's evaluation of the underlying facts and the legal conclusions drawn therefrom. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007). The conclusion that the Division specifically established the discrete, yet overlapping, prongs set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a), by clear and convincing evidence, is solidly grounded on the applicable law. Id. at 280. Accordingly, we sustain the judgment terminating defendant's parental rights and awarding the Division guardianship of I.D.J.E.

Affirmed.

1 I.D.J.E.'s biological father was also a defendant in the guardianship action. He has not appealed from that judgment.