B.L. v. PASSAIC COUNTY BOARD OF SOCIAL SERVICES

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

B.L.,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

PASSAIC COUNTY BOARD OF

SOCIAL SERVICES and NEW JERSEY,

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,

DIVISION OF FAMILY DEVELOPMENT.

Respondents-Respondents.

______________________________

October 22, 2014

Before Judges Simonelli and Guadagno.

On appeal from the Department of Human Services, Division of Family Development, Agency No. HPW 13756-12.

B.L., appellant pro se.

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Department of Human Services (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Erick James Lucadamo, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Respondent Passaic County Board of Social Services has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Petitioner B.L. appeals from the February 13, 2013 final agency decision of respondent New Jersey Department of Human Services (DHS), Division of Family Development (DFD), which affirmed the decision of respondent Passaic County Board of Social Services (Board) to terminate B.L.'s emergency assistance (EA) benefits in the form of temporary rental assistance (TRA). We affirm.

In December 2010, B.L. began receiving general assistance (GA) benefits through Work First New Jersey (WFNJ). N.J.S.A. 44:10-34 to -78. In addition to cash assistance, in October 2011, B.L. began receiving EA in the form of TRA. In September 2012, B.L. began attending college and requested an extension of EA. On September 7, 2012, the Board notified B.L. that it had denied an extension and terminated his EA because he had received that assistance for fourteen months, which was beyond the twelve-month lifetime limit, and he failed to establish a hardship for an extension.

B.L. appealed, and the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law for a hearing as a contested case. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that B.L. established a hardship for an extension because he was attending college to become a certified drug and alcohol abuse counselor, and it would be a hardship for him to lose his apartment while pursuing his studies.

The DFD Director reversed the ALJ's decision. The Director found the regulations did not permit an extension to allow a WFNJ/GA recipient to complete his college education, and the 2013 Appropriations Act (Act), L. 2012, c. 18, prohibited college students from receiving WFNJ/GA and EA benefits as of July 1, 2012. Thus, B.L. was no longer eligible for GA and was ineligible for an EA hardship extension. This appeal followed.

Our role in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency is limited. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). We will reverse an agency's decision if we find it is "'arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, or . . . not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" Ibid. (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)).

In determining whether agency action is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, we must examine

(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have been made on a showing of the relevant factors.

[Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194 (quoting In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 482-83 (2007)).]

We "'may not substitute [our] own judgment for the agency's, even though [we] might have reached a different result.'" Ibid. (quoting Carter, supra, 191 N.J. at 483). "This is particularly true when the issue under review is directed to the agency's special 'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Id. at 195 (quoting In re Hermann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007)). Furthermore, "[i]t is settled that '[a]n administrative agency's interpretation of statutes and regulations within its implementing and enforcing responsibility is ordinarily entitled to our deference.'" E.S v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 412 N.J. Super. 340, 355 (App. Div. 2010) (second alteration in original) (quoting Wnuck v. N.J. Div. of Motor Vehicles, 337 N.J. Super. 52, 56 (App. Div. 2001)). "Nevertheless, 'we are not bound by the agency's legal opinions.'" A.B. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 407 N.J. Super. 330, 340 (App. Div.) (quoting Levine v. State Dep't of Transp., 338 N.J. Super. 28, 32 (App. Div. 2001)), certif. denied, 200 N.J. 210 (2009). "Statutory and regulatory construction is a purely legal issue subject to de novo review. Ibid. (citation omitted). Applying these standards, we discern no reason to disturb the Director's decision.

Receipt of EA is limited to a maximum of twelve lifetime months. N.J.S.A. 44:10-51(a); N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4(a). A six-month extension may be granted in cases of extreme hardship where the recipient has taken "all reasonable steps to resolve the emergent situation but the emergency nonetheless continues or a new emergency occurs, which causes extreme hardship to the family." N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4(b); see also N.J.S.A. 44:10-51(a)(2). Examples of extreme hardship are: (1) the danger of a loss of employment or a bona fide offer of employment by a recipient adult; (2) the recipient adult is in imminent physical danger; (3) there is danger of serious harm to persons who are clinically/medically diagnosed as mentally and/or physically incapable of caring for themselves, thereby possibly leading to inpatient hospital care or institutionalization; or (4) the request for additional EA arises directly out of a substantial loss of shelter, food, clothing, household furnishings and/or essential utilities incurred as a result of a natural disaster. N.J.A.C. 10:90-6.4(b)(1)(i)-(v). Enrollment in college is not an extreme hardship. Accordingly, B.L. was not entitled to an extreme hardship extension of EA.

More importantly, the Act provides as follows

Notwithstanding the provisions of any law or regulation to the contrary, the amounts hereinabove appropriated for payments for Cost of General Assistance and General Assistance Emergency Assistance Program are subject to the following condition: no funds shall be expended to provide benefits to recipients enrolled in college. For purposes of this provision, "college," is defined as that term is defined in N.J.A.C. 9A:1-1.2.

[L. 2012, c. 18.]

Because B.L. was enrolled in college, he was no longer entitled to receive GA, and thus, cannot receive EA or an EA extension. We are satisfied that the Director's decision was supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and it is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.

Affirmed.