NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY v. D.H.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD

PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

D.H.,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

V.S.,

Defendant.

___________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP

OF S.H.,

A Minor.

_______________________________________________________

May 19, 2014

Submitted May 13, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Fisher, Koblitz and O'Connor.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, Docket No. FG-01-61-12.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Markis M. Abraham, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent(Lewis A.Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Ashley L. Davidow, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor (Karen A. Lodeserto, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant D.H. (Daniel) appeals a judgment terminating his parental rights to one child, S.H., who was born on September 22, 2009. The child's mother, V.S. (Valerie), whose parental rights were terminated during the same proceeding, has not appealed.1 We find no merit in Daniel's appeal and affirm.

In his appeal, Daniel argues the evidence was insufficient to support the judge's conclusions and the judgment that his parental rights be terminated. We reject those arguments and affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Michael J. Blee in his comprehensive and well-reasoned fifty-four-page written opinion. We add only the following brief comments.

Parents have a constitutionally protected right to the care, custody and control of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982); In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 346 (1999). "The rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential,' 'basic civil rights . . .,' and 'rights far more precious . . . than property rights.'" Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, 558 (1972) (internal citations omitted). "[T]he preservation and strengthening of family life is a matter of public concern as being in the interests of the general welfare." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1(a); see also K.H.O., supra, 161 N.J. at 347.

The constitutional right to the parental relationship, however, is not absolute. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 599 (1986). At times, a parent's interest must yield to the State's obligation to protect children from harm. In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992). To effectuate these concerns, the Legislature created a test for determining whether a parent's rights must be terminated in the child's best interests. N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) requires that the Division prove by clear and convincing evidence the following four prongs:

(1) The child's safety, health or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship;

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm . . .;

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good.

See also A.W., supra, 103 N.J. at 604-11.

The record adduced during a five-day trial reveals the extensive substance abuse and mental health issues exhibited by Valerie and her inability or unwillingness to adequately address those problems. As noted, Valerie has not appealed so we turn our attention to Daniel, who argues that Valerie's behavior cannot be used to terminate his parental rights. To be sure, "one parent cannot be held responsible for the shortcomings of another." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. R.L., 388 N.J. Super. 81, 102 (App. Div. 2006), certif. denied, 190 N.J. 257 (2007). The judge, however, made numerous findings regarding Daniel's own lengthy past mental health history and of critical importance Daniel's minimization of his own and Valerie's past and present mental health and substance abuse history and his tendency "to blame everyone else for removal of his son and [Valerie's] condition [while] fail[ing] to take any responsibility for his own actions." Based on these circumstances, explained in greater detail in the judge's comprehensive opinion, the judge concluded that Daniel "lacks insight and does not appreciate the extraordinary task of raising his now toddler son, who has special needs of his own, in the same home with a mother [] who does not want this child and continues to struggle with mental health and substance abuse issues." These and the many other findings made by the trial judge in his lengthy opinion supported his conclusion that the Division met its burden of proving that prong one of the statutory test supports the termination of Daniel's parental rights.

Those same findings overlap and inform whether the second prong has been met. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 280 (2007). As the judge explained, Daniel's unwillingness to separate from Valerie in order to attempt to regain custody of his son may demonstrate that he loves his family, but it also demonstrates, as the judge held, that Daniel is unwilling to take the difficult steps necessary to eliminate the circumstances that warranted the child's removal. The judge's findings more than adequately support his conclusion that the Division met its burden of proving that prong two of the statutory test supports the termination of parental rights.

The judge also made thorough and adequate findings regarding the third and fourth prongs and his conclusion that these prongs also require termination. All the judge's findings are supported by credible evidence and, therefore, are entitled to our deference. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998).

Affirmed.

1All names used are fictitious.