STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. SHAMAR L. MOORING

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-03674-12T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

SHAMAR L. MOORING,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________________

August 18, 2014

Submitted August 12, 2014 Decided

Before Judges Nugent and Carroll.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Middlesex County, Law Division, Indictment No. 11-12-1823.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Jacqueline Turner, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the brief).

Andrew C. Carey, Acting Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Brian D. Gillett, Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor/Special Deputy Attorney General, of counsel; Matthew P. Tallia, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

After losing his motion to suppress cocaine seized by a narcotics officer who had watched him sell some of it, defendant Shamar L. Mooring pled guilty to third-degree possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance (CDS) on or near school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7. A judge sentenced him to probation for five years, gave him credit for time served, and ordered him to pay mandatory penalties and assessments. In this appeal, defendant argues that his suppression motion was wrongfully denied. We reject that argument and affirm.

The procedural history of this case is uncomplicated. The police arrested defendant on May 28, 2010, and a Middlesex County grand jury subsequently charged him in a three-count indictment with CDS offenses. Defendant filed a suppression motion, which a judge denied following a hearing. A month after the hearing, a Middlesex County grand jury charged defendant in a superseding indictment with third-degree possession of CDS, cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count one); third-degree possession with intent to distribute a CDS, cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and -5(b)(3) (count two); third-degree possession with intent to distribute a CDS, cocaine, on or near school property, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7 (count three); third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b) (count four); and fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1) (count five).

Defendant negotiated a plea with the State, pled guilty to count three, and was sentenced according to the terms of the plea negotiation. Following his sentence, defendant appealed the denial of his suppression motion.

At the suppression hearing, only one witness testified: New Brunswick police Sergeant John Quick, who was in charge of the New Brunswick Police Department's narcotics squad. Sergeant Quick recounted the details of defendant's arrest and the seizure of a cocaine stash defendant had hidden in an alley, near a drainpipe on the side of a house. The Sergeant was working an afternoon surveillance detail, sitting in an unmarked sedan, when he saw defendant take money from another individual, walk into the alley, retrieve some small envelopes from the stash, and return to the other man, who ingested the contents of the small envelopes. Sergeant Quick seized the stash and back-up units seized defendant.

On cross-examination, defendant attacked the Sergeant's credibility by implying from photographic evidence and some inconsistencies between the Sergeant's testimony and his arrest report that the Sergeant did not see him in the alleyway and did not see him sell drugs. The motion judge found Sergeant Quick credible and denied defendant's motion.

On appeal, defendant makes one argument:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AS THE OFFICER S TESTIMONY WAS NOT CREDIBLE. U.S. Amend. IV, XIV; N.J. Const. Art. I, para 7.

Having considered defendant's argument in light of the record and controlling law, and having given the motion judge's credibility determinations the deference required under our standard of review, see State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964), we conclude that defendant's argument is without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.